Ali R. Muhammad v. Lone Star Funds

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 7, 2024*
Decided December 5, 2024
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1730
ALI R. MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LONE STAR FUNDS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-cv-05060
Mary M. Rowland,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ali Muhammad appeals the judgment dismissing his claims of federal
constitutional violations in connection with a state-court eviction proceeding. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm, though in part on a different ground.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 24-1730 Page 2
The case reflects several procedural oddities. First, Muhammad brought the case
to federal court with a Notice of Removal that attempted to remove a long-pending
state-court action against him seeking first foreclosure of the mortgage on his home and
ultimately eviction from the property. The Notice of Removal had at least two fatal
problems: (1) it was filed after the 30-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); and (2) the
state-court plaintiffs did not assert any claims arising under federal law that might have
permitted a timely removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Before the district court could remand, however, Muhammad filed what he
called an “Amended Answer and Verified Complaint.” Dkt. 6. The district court treated
that document as in effect a civil complaint in a new case in which Muhammad was the
plaintiff and was suing nearly 40 defendants—including corporations, attorneys,
state-court judges, the governor of Illinois, and other elected officials—alleging that
they deprived him of property without due process or just compensation.
The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the complaint appeared to
be attacking a state-court judgment, which is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). That doctrine prevents district courts from
exercising jurisdiction over claims by parties who claim they were injured by state-court
judgments and who ask a federal court to review and reject state-court decisions. Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The district court gave
Muhammad an opportunity to amend his complaint.
Muhammad did amend his complaint, but he essentially repeated the allegations
in the original complaint. The amended complaint alluded to his contractual dispute
with Caliber Home Loans, Inc. over the right to possess real property, the state-court
eviction proceedings, and the defendants’ alleged attempt to remove him unlawfully
from his home. Muhammad later filed an emergency motion seeking to set aside the
state-court judgment in his eviction proceeding.
The district court dismissed the amended complaint under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, entering final judgment of dismissal. The
court explained that the amended complaint contained the same flaw as the original
complaint: It sought to challenge the state-court judgment in his eviction proceeding. At
the time the district court acted, its application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was
correct under controlling circuit precedents. Under those precedents, it did not matter
that Muhammad was seeking damages for alleged violations of his federal

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 24-1730 Page 3
constitutional rights in the state-court proceedings. His federal complaint alleged that
the state-court’s orders had violated his federal rights, and his case asked the federal
court to review and reject the state court’s judgments. See, e.g., Bauer v. Koester, 951 F.3d
863, 866 (7th Cir. 2020) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claim for damages to remedy
injuries inflicted by state-court foreclosure judgment); Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
908 F.3d 1050, 1062 (7th Cir. 2018) (same).
On appeal, Muhammad argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply
because one of his claims—that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to remove him
unlawfully from his property—is independent of the state court’s judgment. But we
agree with the district court that this theory does not avoid the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Notably, Muhammad has not contended—either in the district court or on appeal—that
he experienced any injury before or separate from the state-court judgment in his
eviction proceeding. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
There is still a problem, however. Several months after the district court
dismissal here, this court issued an en banc decision overruling in part the Bauer/Moore
line of cases and holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine no longer applies to a
plaintiff’s federal claims for money damages for injuries inflicted by a state-court
judgment. Gilbank v. Wood County Dep’t of Human Services, 111 F.4th 754 (7th Cir. 2024)
(en banc) (holding on damage claims set forth in Part I of opinion by Kirsch, J., joined in
relevant part by Easterbrook, J.), petition for cert. filed, No. 24-470 (Oct. 28, 2024). In this
case, plaintiff Muhammad asks for hundreds of millions of dollars in damages for the
injuries he says were inflicted by the state court’s judgments. Amended Cplt. ¶ 25. All
of his other claims for relief seek to set aside the state court’s judgments and thus are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but under Gilbank, the damages claims are not
barred on that basis.
The Amended Complaint, however, fails to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, so it is subject to dismissal on the merits under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The Amended Complaint identifies the parties, and it demands
various forms of declaratory relief, as well as hundreds of millions of dollars in
damages. The Amended Complaint does not, however, satisfy Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) by actually identifying any wrongful conduct by the defendants, other
than with conclusory labels. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (courts
should focus on factual allegations, disregard legal conclusions, and draw on their
judicial experience and common sense); Taylor v. Salvation Army Nat’l Corp., 110 F.4th

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 24-1730 Page 4
1017, 1028 (7th Cir. 2024) (affirming dismissal for failure to state claim). The Amended
Complaint quite literally fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Finally, Muhammad also argues for the first time on appeal that Illinois’s
eviction statute, as applied to him, is unconstitutional. But he waived that argument by
not raising it in the district court. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887,
897 (7th Cir. 2023).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing this action for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction is modified to dismiss plaintiff Muhammad’s claims for
damages for failure to state a claim for relief and, as modified, is AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --