Shedrick Bowes-Northern v. City of Chicago

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 18, 2024*
Decided December 18, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1112
SHEDRICK BOWES-NORTHERN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-03351
Virginia M. Kendall,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Shedrick Bowes-Northern appeals the stay of his suit alleging that persons
connected to his arrest and state-court prosecution violated his constitutional rights.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1112 Page 2
Because Bowes-Northern waited until his reply brief to argue that the stay was
improper, he has waived those arguments, and we affirm.
We recount the facts as Bowes-Northern alleges them. Chicago police officers
arrested Bowes-Northern in 2020, without probable cause, for aggravated and unlawful
use of a weapon. The handcuffs cut off his circulation, exacerbating diabetes-related
issues. Bowes-Northern reported this to the officers and urged them to loosen the cuffs,
but they did not. After his arrest, Bowes-Northern was charged with the weapons
offense and detained at Cook County Jail. While there, jail officers denied his requests
for diabetic shoes and treatment for foot pain. They also put him in a cell with an
offender who the officers knew would (and did) expose himself to Bowes-Northern.
While his state charges were pending, Bowes-Northern sued in federal court,
raising several claims. First, he contends that defendants associated with the City of
Chicago lacked probable cause to arrest and charge him. Second, he contends that they
used excessive force and provided inadequate care. Third, he argues that defendants
associated with Cook County failed to provide medical attention and housed him in
unconstitutional conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also invoked state-law claims.
The district court stayed the case upon the defendants’ motion. Agreeing with
the defendants that litigating the federal claims would interfere with the state’s criminal
prosecution, the court stayed the case under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
pending resolution of the criminal charges. It ended the stay after Bowes-Northern
pleaded guilty in state court. But when he later retracted that plea, the defendants
moved to reinstate the stay, and the district court did so. It did not specify the basis for
the stay, but we presume that it invoked Younger again because the state prosecution
had resumed. Bowes-Northern timely appealed the second stay order.
We begin our analysis with the issue of appellate jurisdiction, which we have an
independent obligation to assess. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94
(1998). We may review stay orders that require “an essential part of the federal suit to
be litigated in a state forum.” Loughran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2 F.4th 640, 646
(7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
10 n.11 (1983)). The parties do not dispute that an essential part of this suit is
Bowes-Northern’s claim that the defendants lacked a basis to arrest him and charge him
with unlawful use of a weapon. Nor do they dispute that the state prosecution is
expected to consider that issue. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review the stay order.

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No. 24-1112 Page 3
With our jurisdiction secure, we conclude that we must affirm. The defendants
argue that Bowes-Northern waived his opposition to the stay, correctly pointing out
that his opening brief focuses only on the merits of his claims instead of arguing that a
stay was improper. But a stay order is collateral to the merits; thus we cannot address
the merits now. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106–07 (2009). Further,
arguments that an appellant waits until a reply brief to raise are waived. E.g., Appvion,
Inc. Ret. Sav. & Emp. Stock Ownership Plan ex rel. Lyon v. Buth, 99 F.4th 928, 954–55
(7th Cir. 2024). The rationale for this rule is important: Belated attempts to raise issues
in a reply brief “violate the need of the judicial system for order and efficiency” and
“seek to expand the issues on appeal without effective notice to the opposing party and
come at a time when the opposing party has no opportunity to make a written
response.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 830 F.2d 610, 621 n.7
(7th Cir. 1987). The defendants ask us to enforce that rule and affirm on the basis that
Bowes-Northern has waived any argument that the stay is improper. In his reply brief,
he gives us no reason to create and to apply an exception to this waiver rule. We
therefore enforce it. Appvion, Inc. ex rel. Lyon, 99 F.4th at 954–55.
We thus AFFIRM the district court’s decision to stay this litigation pending the
resolution of the state criminal charges. Bowes-Northern’s four currently pending
motions, all of which assume incorrectly that we reach the merits of this case or raise
issues outside the scope of his notice of appeal, are also DENIED. We reiterate that the
district court has not resolved the merits of Bowes-Northern’s claim, and when it does,
any adversely affected party will have an opportunity to timely appeal the merits.

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