Eulalia Mateo -Mateo v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2694
EULALIA M ATEO -M ATEO, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
M ERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Nos. A215-878-644, A215-878-645, and A215-878-646
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2024 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 23, 2024
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ST. EVE and LEE, Circuit
Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Eulalia Mateo-Mateo and her two
minor children, all Guatemalan citizens, challenge the denial
of Mateo’s claim for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withhold-
ing of removal, and relief under the Convention Against

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2 No. 23-2694
Torture (“CAT”).1 Mateo sought relief on the basis that the
mother of her children’s father had, and would continue to,
physically and verbally abuse her.
We deny the petition for review. We find that Mateo’s
claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)—
asylum, humanitarian asylum, and withholding of removal—
fail for two independent and dispositive reasons. First, Mateo
failed to challenge the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) and the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) finding that the
Guatemalan government was not unable or unwilling to pro-
tect her. Second, the IJ’s and Board’s finding that Mateo did
not experience persecution on account of a protected ground
is supported by substantial evidence. Mateo’s final claim for
CAT relief fails on exhaustion grounds.
I. Background
A. Factual History
Mateo started dating Marco Tulio in 2014, when she was
nineteen years old. She met Marco’s mother, Lucinda Juarez,
a few months later when Lucinda stood outside of Mateo’s
home and threatened to hurt or kill her. Mateo hid inside, and
Lucinda left after about an hour.
Mateo soon learned that she was pregnant, and she and
Marco moved in with Lucinda. Lucinda’s hostility towards
Mateo escalated. Lucinda ordered Mateo to convert from Ca-
tholicism to Protestantism, which Mateo refused. She also
1 Eulalia Mateo-Mateo refers to her last name as Mateo in her brief, so
we will do the same.

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No. 23-2694 3
physically abused Mateo, hitting her almost every day.
Marco’s sister Olga also hurt Mateo by pulling her hair.
When Mateo became pregnant with their second child,
Marco left for the United States. Lucinda, meanwhile, hit
Mateo’s waist, back, and stomach repeatedly in an attempt to
cause a miscarriage.
In March 2016, Mateo moved out of Lucinda’s home and
in with Mateo’s mother. The physical abuse ended at this
time, though Lucinda still engaged in verbal abuse. In 2018,
Lucinda attempted to lure Mateo’s children away from her
and threatened Mateo. Mateo then left Guatemala for the
United States with her children.
B. Procedural History
Upon arriving in the United States, a United States Cus-
toms and Border Patrol officer apprehended Mateo and her
children, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated
removal proceedings. Mateo and her children conceded re-
movability. Mateo subsequently applied for asylum, with-
holding of removal, and relief under the CAT, naming her
children as derivative applicants on her asylum application.
An IJ held a hearing on Mateo’s application where Mateo
testified to the above facts. The IJ found Mateo credible but
denied her asylum application, explaining that Mateo did not
demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution.
The IJ provided two independent reasons Mateo did not
demonstrate past persecution. First, Mateo did not provide
evidence that Lucinda harmed her “on account of [her] mem-
bership” in any of Mateo’s five proffered social groups: 1) in-
digenous Guatemalan women; 2) unmarried indigenous

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4 No. 23-2694
woman raising children without the father; 3) young, unmar-
ried indigenous mother abandoned by her partner; 4) indige-
nous Guatemalan women subject to domestic abuse by their
partner’s family; or 5) indigenous Guatemalan woman with
no access to justice. Even assuming her proffered social
groups were cognizable, the IJ concluded that Lucinda
harmed Mateo due to “personal animosity,” not group mem-
bership.
Second, the IJ found that Mateo did not establish that the
Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect
her from Lucinda. Mateo testified that she did not report the
abuse to the police because Lucinda could pay them off and
because the police were too far away, but the IJ deemed this
reasoning too speculative and insufficient.
The IJ then explained that Mateo did not establish a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected
ground. Because Mateo did not establish past or a well-
founded fear of future persecution, the IJ denied her asylum
claim.
The IJ similarly denied Mateo’s application for withhold-
ing of removal, explaining that Mateo did not show a past or
future threat to her life or freedom on account of a protected
ground. Finally, the IJ denied Mateo relief under the CAT be-
cause Mateo did not establish that she faced a substantial risk
of torture if she returned to Guatemala.
Mateo then appealed to the Board. The Board affirmed the
IJ’s denial of asylum, explaining that it found no clear error in
the IJ’s findings on a lack of a “nexus” between persecution
and a protected ground and that Mateo failed to show the
Guatemalan government’s inability or unwillingness to

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No. 23-2694 5
protect her. The Board also explained that the lack of nexus
doomed Mateo’s claim for humanitarian asylum. It then af-
firmed the IJ’s decision that Mateo had not satisfied the higher
burden necessary for withholding of removal.
Finally, the Board deemed Mateo’s claim for CAT relief
waived because she had “not meaningfully identified error in
the Immigration Judge’s denial.” This petition for review fol-
lowed.
II. Discussion
Because the Board “adopted the view of the IJ and af-
firmed with additional analysis, we review both opinions.”
Osorio-Morales v. Garland, 72 F.4th 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2023). We
review legal determinations de novo and uphold factual find-
ings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.
Borjas Cruz v. Garland, 96 F.4th 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 2024). Un-
der the “deferential” substantial evidence standard, we re-
verse factual findings “only if the evidence compels a differ-
ent result.” Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676, 684 (7th Cir.
2021).
A. Claims Under the INA
We begin with Mateo’s challenge to the denial of her asy-
lum, humanitarian asylum, and withholding of removal
claims, finding that all three claims fail for two reasons, each
independently dispositive.
To qualify for asylum, Mateo “bears the burden of proving
that [s]he is a ‘refugee’ within the meaning of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.” Osorio-Morales, 72 F.4th at 742 (quoting
Vahora v. Holder, 707 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2013)). To do so,
Mateo must demonstrate that she is “unable or unwilling” to
return to Guatemala “because of persecution or a well-

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6 No. 23-2694
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). One of those protected
grounds must be a “central reason” for her persecution.
Zhakypbaev v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2018). Addi-
tionally, “to receive protection under the [INA], the persecu-
tion must be inflicted by the government, or by private actors
whom the government is unable or unwilling to control.”
Osorio-Morales, 72 F.4th at 742 (quoting Vahora, 707 F.3d at
908).
Setting aside differences between Mateo’s claims under
the INA, humanitarian asylum and withholding of removal
likewise require that an applicant’s persecution be on account
of a protected ground and by the government or private ac-
tors whom the government is unable or unwilling to control.
See id.; Georgieva v. Holder, 751 F.3d 514, 523 (7th Cir. 2014)
(humanitarian asylum); Almutairi v. Holder, 722 F.3d 996, 998
(7th Cir. 2013) (withholding of removal).
In her petition for review, Mateo argues only that the IJ
and Board erred by finding that she did not experience harm
on account of a protected ground. She does not address their
independent and dispositive determination that she failed to
establish the Guatemalan government’s inability or unwill-
ingness to protect her. Without a challenge to this dispositive
finding, we must deny the petition for review of her asylum,
humanitarian asylum, and withholding of removal claims. See
Diaz Mejia v. Garland, 74 F.4th 896, 898–99 (7th Cir. 2023) (ex-
plaining that a petitioner’s failure to develop an argument be-
fore us results in waiver).
Even if Mateo had made arguments regarding the Guate-
malan government’s protection, we must deny her petition

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No. 23-2694 7
for the additional reason that she has not established that she
experienced harm on account of a protected ground. The
Board affirmed the IJ’s finding that “personal animosity” mo-
tivated Lucinda, not Mateo’s group membership. Mateo chal-
lenges this finding by asserting that Lucinda assaulted her for
“being [an] unmarried mother of two minor children” and
“due to being a young mother of two children,” but she pro-
vides no evidence in the record to support these assertions.
Even if these proffered social groups are cognizable, her con-
clusory statements about Lucinda’s motive fall far short of
demonstrating that the “evidence compels a different result.”2
See Meraz-Saucedo, 986 F.3d at 684.
We do not intend to diminish the harm Mateo experi-
enced. But because Mateo has waived one dispositive issue
and substantial evidence supports the IJ and Board’s finding
on another, her claims under the INA must fail.
B. CAT
Finally, we turn to Mateo’s claim that she is eligible for re-
lief under the CAT. The Board deemed Mateo’s CAT claim
waived because she failed to “meaningfully identif[y] error in
the Immigration Judge’s denial.” In her petition for review,
Mateo does not challenge the Board’s finding of waiver, and
instead jumps right to asserting that she is eligible for CAT
relief. But without challenging the Board’s decision on
waiver, and without having presented her CAT arguments
2 Mateo also attempts to revive her argument that Lucinda harmed
her on account of her religion, but Mateo has waived this argument by not
raising it before the Board. See Diaz Mejia, 74 F.4th at 899 (foreclosing ar-
gument on an issue the applicant did not meaningfully present to the
Board).

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8 No. 23-2694
before the Board, we must conclude that Mateo failed to ex-
haust administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1);
Munoz-Rivera v. Garland, 81 F.4th 681, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2023)
(explaining that the exhaustion requirement includes present-
ing arguments to the Board that it has power to address); see
also Tjong v. Holder, 498 F. App’x 603, 606 (7th Cir. 2012). We
therefore need not reach the merits of Mateo’s CAT claim.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.

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