Church Mutual Insurance Company , now known as CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY , S.I. v. FRONTIER MANAGEMENT, LLC, WELLTOWER TENANT GROUP , LLC, d/b/a THE AUBERGE AT ORCHARD…

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1900
C HURCH M UTUAL I NSURANCE C OMPANY , now known as
C HURCH M UTUAL I NSURANCE C OMPANY , S.I.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
F RONTIER M ANAGEMENT, LLC, WELLTOWER TENANT GROUP ,
LLC, d/b/a THE A UBERGE AT O RCHARD PARK, and C HARLES
NEDOSS , Independent Executor of the Estate of Bertrand Ne-
doss, Deceased,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23 C 0164 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2024 — DECIDED J ANUARY 2, 2025
____________________
Before S YKES , Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and S T. EVE, Cir-
cuit Judges.
S YKES , Chief Judge. In January 2021, 87-year-old Bertrand
Nedoss wandered out of his care facility in suburban Chicago,
developed hypothermia, and died of cardiac arrest. His estate

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2 No. 24-1900
filed suit in state court raising negligence and wrongful-death
claims against Welltower Tenant Group, the facility’s owner,
and Frontier Management, LLC, its operator.
Welltower and Frontier were insured under a “claims
made” policy issued by Church Mutual Insurance Company.
As the name implies, this type of insurance covers claims
made against the insured during the policy period. The
Church Mutual policy was effective from July 1, 2020,
through July 1, 2021. The estate filed suit in October 2021,
more than three months after the policy expired. But nine
days after Bertrand’s death—within the policy period—an at-
torney for the Nedoss family sent written notice that his firm
had been retained in connection with “personal injuries and
related malpractice” at the care facility. The letter claimed an
attorney’s lien and demanded that evidence be preserved.
Coverage turned on whether the attorney’s letter qualified as
a “claim” under the policy.
Church Mutual denied coverage but provided a defense
while reserving the right to have a court determine its policy
obligations. It then filed this suit seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Welltower
and Frontier. The district court entered partial summary judg-
ment for Welltower and Frontier, ruling that the attorney’s
letter was a claim under the policy. That triggered the in-
surer’s duty to defend. The judge stayed the rest of the federal
case pending the outcome of the state lawsuit.
Church Mutual appealed the stay order and also asks us
to review and reverse the partial summary judgment. On the
eve of oral argument, however, Welltower and Frontier set-
tled with the estate and the state-court case was dismissed.

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No. 24-1900 3
That development moots this appeal. The stay order was
the only possible basis for appellate jurisdiction; the partial
summary judgment is not a final order. Though the coverage
dispute is ongoing, the dispute over the judge’s stay order
evaporated with the dismissal of the state case. We therefore
dismiss the appeal as moot.
I. Background
The Auberge at Orchard Park is an assisted-living facility
in Morton Grove, Illinois, owned by Welltower and operated
by Frontier. Bertrand Nedoss, age 87, was a resident. Early in
the morning on January 5, 2021, Nedoss wandered away from
the facility. More than two hours after he went missing, staff
found him on the garage ramp of the building next door. It
was 32 degrees outside. Nedoss was hospitalized and treated
for hypothermia, but he died of cardiac arrest that afternoon.
Welltower and Frontier were insured by Church Mutual
under primary and umbrella policies providing defense and
indemnity coverage on a claims-made basis from July 1, 2020,
to July 1, 2021. The primary policy had a $1 million limit and
covered claims “first made … during the policy period.” The
term “claim” as defined in the policy is a “suit or demand
made by or for the injured person for monetary damages.”
The umbrella policy provided $5 million of excess coverage
for claims covered by the primary policy.
On January 14, 2021—nine days after Bertrand’s death—a
lawyer for the Nedoss family sent a letter to the care facility’s
legal department giving notice of his retention for “personal
injuries and related malpractice sustained at the Auberge.”
The letter claimed an attorney’s lien under Illinois law and
instructed the Auberge to preserve evidence.

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4 No. 24-1900
Ten months later, on October 15, 2021, Charles Nedoss, the
executor of Bertrand’s estate, filed suit in Illinois state court
raising claims of negligence and wrongful death against
Welltower and Frontier arising from Bertrand’s walkaway
and death. By then the Church Mutual policy had expired.
But the January 14 letter from the Nedoss family’s lawyer was
within the policy period, so Welltower and Frontier tendered
the suit to Church Mutual. The insurer denied coverage but
agreed to provide a defense until a court could determine its
obligations under the policy.
This federal coverage suit followed. Church Mutual sued
Welltower and Frontier under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to
defend or indemnify in connection with the estate’s lawsuit.
The insurer argued that the January 14 letter from the Nedoss
family’s attorney was not a claim as defined in the policy.
Welltower and Frontier counterclaimed for declaratory judg-
ment, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
The federal coverage suit was assigned to District Judge
Harry Leinenweber. Ruling on cross-motions for summary
judgment, he concluded that the attorney’s letter qualified as
a claim under the policy. The judge accordingly entered par-
tial summary judgment for Welltower and Frontier, trigger-
ing Church Mutual’s duty to defend its insureds in the
underlying state lawsuit. What remained for decision in the
federal litigation were issues concerning the extent of the in-
surer’s indemnification obligation and its liability on the
counterclaims for breach of contract and the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. Welltower and Frontier moved to stay

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No. 24-1900 5
the rest of the federal case pending the resolution of the es-
tate’s case in state court.
Soon after the stay motion was filed, Welltower and Fron-
tier admitted liability in the state-court litigation, leaving only
damages for trial. At a hearing on the stay motion a few weeks
later, Church Mutual opposed a stay. Judge Leinenweber dis-
agreed, reasoning that it made good sense to stay the federal
case until the conclusion of the state-court trial, which would
determine whether damages exceeded the limits of the
Church Mutual policies. He stayed the case “until further or-
der” of the court.
Church Mutual appealed the stay order. And although the
partial summary judgment is a nonfinal order, Church Mu-
tual asks us to review that ruling as well.
II. Discussion
We begin with several developments that have occurred
since this appeal was filed, some of which affect jurisdiction.
After the parties filed their opening and response briefs, we
noted a potential defect in subject matter jurisdiction—
namely, the record lacks complete information about the par-
ties’ citizenship for purposes of evaluating diversity jurisdic-
tion. Specifically, Welltower and Frontier—both LLCs—had
not complied with their obligation under Circuit Rule 28 to
provide complete information about the citizenship of their
members in the jurisdictional statement in their brief. 7TH C IR .
R. 28(a), (b). We ordered them to submit an amended jurisdic-
tional statement.
They complied—but only partially. Their amended juris-
dictional statement disclosed some additional information
about the citizenship of their members. But their attorney

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6 No. 24-1900
explained that the information remained incomplete because
contractual confidentiality obligations to unit holders inhib-
ited her ability to learn and disclose their identities.
Then, two weeks before the scheduled date for oral argu-
ment, the parties notified us that Welltower and Frontier had
settled with the Nedoss estate. A few days later, the state-
court judge approved the settlement and dismissed the es-
tate’s case. The parties sent us notice of the dismissal order
just one business day before the argument date, so we pro-
ceeded with oral argument as planned.
There is one more notable development, though it has no
effect on jurisdiction. On June 11, 2024—before the parties
filed their appellate briefs—Judge Leinenweber died. The
case was reassigned to District Judge Manish Shah.
So as the case came to us and has shifted on appeal, it pre-
sents a tangle of jurisdictional issues. Church Mutual ap-
pealed the stay order, but it has also asked us to review the
partial summary judgment on the key coverage question.
Both orders are interlocutory; the case remains unfinished be-
low, which ordinarily precludes appellate jurisdiction.
Church Mutual’s argument for immediate review proceeds in
two steps: first, it argues that the stay is a form of abstention
and thus is immediately appealable as a final order under 28
U.S.C. § 1291; second, the insurer argues that the partial sum-
mary judgment is immediately reviewable because it is en-
compassed within the final stay order or because it qualifies
for review under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion.
There’s no need to decide if Church Mutual is right about
appellate jurisdiction. Nor is it necessary to wrestle with the

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No. 24-1900 7
complexities that surfaced on appeal regarding subject matter
jurisdiction. The dismissal of the underlying state-court case
moots this appeal. And “we can address jurisdictional issues
in any order we choose.” Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601
U.S. 1, 4 (2023).
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to de-
ciding live Cases or Controversies.” Ruggles v. Ruggles, 49
F.4th 1097, 1098 (7th Cir. 2022). “The mootness doctrine im-
plements Article III’s Case or Controversy requirement by
preventing federal courts from resolving questions that can-
not affect the rights of the parties before them.” Id. at 1099. An
appeal becomes moot if an intervening event precludes any
effectual relief in favor of the appellant. Finch v. Treto, 82 F.4th
572, 578 (7th Cir. 2023); see also Orion Sales, Inc. v. Emerson Ra-
dio Corp., 148 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he case itself
has not become moot, only the preliminary injunction under
appeal has … .”).
For example, an appeal of a preliminary injunction be-
comes moot when the injunction expires or the event in ques-
tion occurs. See, e.g., Finch, 82 F.4th at 578; Gjertsen v. Bd. of
Election Comm’rs of City of Chi., 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th Cir. 1984)
(dismissing as moot an appeal from a preliminary injunction
regarding an election because the election had already been
held). An appellate ruling regarding an expired preliminary
injunction is purely advisory; the same is true when the in-
junction concerned an event that has already occurred. In ei-
ther case, the appellate court cannot provide any meaningful
relief. So too for a stay whose only justification has passed.
Here the reason for the stay no longer exists, and nothing
we might say about it would benefit Church Mutual. Judge
Leinenweber stayed this case to await the determination of

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8 No. 24-1900
damages in the state-court case. The settlement accomplished
that, removing the only justification for the stay and mooting
this appeal. Cf. Lindstrom v. Graber, 203 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir.
2000) (dismissing as moot an emergency stay of extradition
because the appellant had been extradited); see also Meierhenry
Sargent LLP v. Williams, 992 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 2021) (per
curiam) (“With the conditions underlying the stay having
now passed, there is no relief for us to order, making it the
paradigm of a moot issue.” (internal quotation omitted))).
Whatever we might decide about the propriety of the stay rul-
ing is irrelevant now that the state case is over.
Church Mutual resists this conclusion, arguing that Judge
Leinenweber’s stay order did not automatically terminate
with the dismissal of the state lawsuit but rather remains in
effect “until further order.” It also observes that Judge Shah
cannot lift the stay while the appeal is pending. True, but ir-
relevant. Judge Shah can dissolve the stay once we dismiss
the appeal as moot. Church Mutual has offered no reason to
think that he would leave the stay in place. Indeed, the in-
surer’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument that there is
no conceivable basis for doing so.
Finally, Church Mutual argues that it would be more effi-
cient to proceed directly to an appellate ruling on the key cov-
erage question now rather than waiting for final judgment.
But efficiency cannot trump the requirements of Article III.
Though the coverage dispute remains live, the dismissal of
the state-court case moots this appeal.
DISMISSED

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