Dale A. Staggers v. Public Defender of Indiana

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit*
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 27, 2025
Decided January 27, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1499
DALE A. STAGGERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PUBLIC DEFENDER OF INDIANA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-02132-TWP-MKK
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Dale Staggers, an Indiana prisoner, sued the Public Defender of Indiana for
improperly responding to a data breach that allegedly exposed his personal
information. The district court concluded that he failed to state a claim under federal
* The defendant was not served with process in the district court but was notified
of this appeal and opted to appear and file a brief. We have agreed to decide the case
without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and
legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP .
P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1499 Page 2
law and dismissed any pendent state-law claims without prejudice. Staggers challenges
the latter decision, but dismissal of the state-law claims was appropriate, so we affirm.
In February 2022, the Public Defender of Indiana informed Staggers by letter that
his personal information—which he provided when the Public Defender represented
him decades ago—may have been compromised after a data breach. Staggers filed this
lawsuit, alleging that the Public Defender failed to timely notify him of the breach so
that he could take protective measures. The district court screened his complaint,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and ordered Staggers to show cause why his complaint should
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Staggers then asserted that the defendant’s
misfeasance infringed his constitutional right to privacy, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violated
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g), and amounted to a breach
of fiduciary duty under Indiana tort law.
Upon consideration of Staggers’s response, the district court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim under federal law. It explained that Staggers’s
§ 1983 claim failed because he expressly alleged “negligence,” which does not implicate
the Constitution. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986). Staggers also did not
state a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act because he admitted that a
hacker, not the Public Defender, illegally accessed the computer system. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(g). Last, the court summarily dismissed any state-law claims, citing a lack of
jurisdiction, without considering their merits.
On appeal, Staggers disputes only the district court’s refusal to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. True, the district court did not
explain why it relinquished supplemental jurisdiction, a discretionary decision that we
review deferentially. RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir.
2012). But we can easily infer that it deferred to the presumption of relinquishment
upon dismissal of all claims over which it had federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); RWJ Mgmt. Co., 672 F.3d at 479–80. There are limited
circumstances in which the presumption does not hold. Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v.
Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 906–07 (7th Cir. 2007). But Staggers establishes none of them. He is
not prevented from refiling his case in state court by the statute of limitations, because it
is tolled while the case is pending in federal court (i.e., until our mandate issues).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); see also Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2018).
Second, the case was dismissed at screening, so going to state court would not cause a
“substantial duplication of effort.” RWJ Mgmt. Co., 672 F.3d at 480. And third, we
cannot say on this limited record that the resolution of any claim is clear. See id.

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No. 24-1499 Page 3
Finally, Staggers is mistaken in asserting that the district court should have
“remanded” his state claims to state court instead of dismissing them. A district court
has authority to remand a case only if it was removed to federal court after first being
filed in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447. Dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate
disposition of claims when a district court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(d) (twice referring to proceedings following “dismissal” of pendent
claims); Rivera v. Allstate Ins. Co., 913 F.3d 603, 618 (7th Cir. 2018).
AFFIRMED

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