Tyrae Irvin v. Exeter Finance LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 27, 2025*
Decided January 29, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2393
TYRAE IRVIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EXETER FINANCE LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23 CV 13873
Manish S. Shah,
Judge.
O R D E R
Tyrae Irvin sued Exeter Finance for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (the “Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, after Exeter telephoned him repeatedly about
the debt he owed on his car loan and informed the credit reporting agencies that he was
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2393 Page 2
delinquent. The district court dismissed his amended complaint for failure to state a
claim, and because Exeter is not a debt collector under the Act, we affirm the judgment.
We accept the facts alleged in the amended complaint as true, drawing
reasonable inferences in Irvin’s favor. See Esco v. City of Chi., 107 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir.
2024). In late June 2023, Irvin started receiving letters and calls from Exeter about the
loan he had taken out from a dealership to finance the purchase of a car earlier that
month. Exeter called him four or five times per day over a span of four months. In
August, without validating any amount owed beforehand, Exeter sent Irvin letters
stating that it was attempting to collect a debt. After six months of not receiving
payments, Exeter reported to the credit bureaus that Irvin owed nearly $32,000 on his
car, which caused his credit score to drop and prevented him from obtaining credit.
Irvin sued Exeter under the Act for harassment and unfair practices. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692d(5), 1692f(7), (8). Exeter moved to dismiss Irvin’s amended complaint for failure
to state a claim. Specifically, Exeter argued that Irvin’s complaint did not support a
reasonable inference that Exeter was a “debt collector” subject to liability under the Act,
which does not apply to “any person attempting to collect any debt … which was
originated by such person” or “concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it
was obtained.” Id. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii), (iii). In support of this argument, Exeter attached to
its motion two exhibits: (1) the retail installment contract with the dealership for Irvin’s
purchase on June 6, 2023, which listed July 21, 2023, as the first payment date; and
(2) the contract assigning Irvin’s loan from the dealership to Exeter on June 6, 2023.
The district court agreed with Exeter. It took notice of the contracts and
determined that the debt originated on the day of the purchase and therefore was not in
default when it was assigned to Exeter the same day. Accordingly, the court concluded,
the company was not a debt collector under the Act. Irvin appeals the dismissal of the
amended complaint, a ruling that we review de novo. See Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co.,
937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019).
Irvin first challenges the district court’s consideration of the contracts attached to
Exeter’s motion to dismiss, asserting that Exeter improperly presented them even after
he responded that they were hearsay. Although a motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleading, a defendant
permissibly relies on external documents “if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s
complaint and are central to his claim.” Mueller v. Apple Leisure Corp., 880 F.3d 890, 895
(7th Cir. 2018). This rule is liberal, especially when “the plaintiff does not contest the
validity or authenticity of the extraneous materials.” Id. Here, the contracts detailing the

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No. 24-2393 Page 3
terms of the purchase and the servicer of the car loan were central to Irvin’s claims that
Exeter was using unlawful debt-collection practices. And though Irvin believed the
contracts to be inadmissible, he did not call into question their substance or their
authenticity. Accordingly, the district court permissibly considered the contracts.
Next, Irvin argues that the district court erred when it concluded that, as a matter
of law, Exeter was not a debt collector. But Irvin’s interpretation of the statute is
mistaken. To state a valid harassment or abuse claim under the Act, Irvin needed to
allege facts plausibly suggesting that Exeter was a “debt collector” who engaged in
prohibited conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. The statute expressly excludes from the
definition of “debt collector” an entity attempting to collect a debt if its efforts concern a
debt “which was originated by” that entity or “which was not in default at the time it
was obtained by” that entity. Id. § 1692a(6)(F). Here, the contracts showed that Exeter
began servicing the debt on June 6, the date Irvin’s car loan originated and, further, that
the debt was not in default that day because payment was not due until July 21, six
weeks after the assignment of the loan to Exeter. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Ameritech Corp.,
129 F.3d 952, 958–59 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, Exeter did not contact Irvin as a “debt
collector.”
AFFIRMED

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