United States of America v. Christopher Easterling

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1143
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
C HRISTOPHER EASTERLING,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:20-cr-30032 — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 13, 2024 — DECIDED F EBRUARY 3, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, J ACKSON -A KIWUMI , and K OLAR , Cir-
cuit Judges.
JACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit Judge. Christopher Easterling
appeals his sentence for attempted robbery and possessing a
firearm after sustaining a felony conviction. The United States
Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of his sentencing
assigned him two criminal history points for committing the
offenses while on parole. But a retroactive amendment to the
Guidelines no longer includes those so-called status points

-- 1 of 7 --

2 No. 23-1143
and, without them, Easterling would have a lower recom-
mended sentencing range. We therefore remand for resen-
tencing.
I
On September 15, 2019, Easterling attempted to rob a
Walgreens store. He walked up to the counter, pulled out a
firearm, and told the cashier, “[L]et’s get this going, babe.”
The cashier fled and Easterling walked behind the counter to
the cash register but did not take anything. He was appre-
hended and charged with three offenses: (1) interference with
commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs
Act robbery); (2) carrying and using a firearm during a crime
of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and (3)
possessing a firearm after having been previously convicted
of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Easterling pleaded guilty to all three counts. The Sentenc-
ing Guidelines at the time assigned him a total offense level
of 21 and a criminal history category of IV, which yielded an
advisory range of 57 to 71 months in prison for Counts 1 and
3. For Count 2, the district court was statutorily required to
impose a sentence of at least 84 months’ imprisonment, to run
consecutively to the sentence for Counts 1 and 3. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(4), (c)(1)(ii). Added together, Easterling’s advisory
guidelines range totaled 141 to 155 months in prison.
At the sentencing hearing on June 8, 2021, the district court
imposed a sentence above the guidelines range. The court
sentenced Easterling to 239 months in prison, composed of
155 months for Count 1, 120 months for Count 3 to run con-
currently with the sentence for Count 1, and the consecutive
84 months for Count 2. That amounted to a sentence 54%

-- 2 of 7 --

No. 23-1143 3
higher than the high end of the range recommended by the
Guidelines and just one month shy of the 240-month statutory
maximum sentence for Hobbs Act robbery. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a). The court stated that Easterling’s conduct called for
a “significant sentence,” as did his “persistent and repeated
history of violence” and the need to protect the public.
Easterling appealed the sentence. Before we could decide
his appeal, the Supreme Court held that an attempted Hobbs
Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924.
United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 860 (2022). The ruling in-
validated Easterling’s conviction for possessing a firearm
during the attempted robbery, which was Count 2 of the in-
dictment. Consequently, we vacated the judgment and re-
manded his case to the district court for resentencing. See
United States v. Easterling, No. 21-2097, 2022 WL 2688265, at *1
(7th Cir. July 8, 2022).
At the resentencing hearing on January 17, 2023, the dis-
trict court calculated a new advisory guidelines range of 84 to
105 months, down from 141 to 155 months at his original sen-
tencing. Despite the reduction in the guidelines range, the
court once again sentenced Easterling to 239 months in
prison: this time, 239 months on Count 1 and 120 months on
Count 3, to be served concurrently. The court reasoned that
“nothing had changed” in terms of Easterling’s history or the
nature and characteristics of the offense. The need to protect
the public was “still great,” the court remarked, and the rob-
bery had “caused extreme harm to th[e] victim.” The resulting
sentence was 137% higher than the high end of the range rec-
ommended by the Guidelines.
Easterling appealed again. And, once again, the law
changed before we could issue a ruling. This time the United

-- 3 of 7 --

4 No. 23-1143
States Sentencing Commission proposed Amendment 821 to
the Sentencing Guidelines, which removed the imposition of
two criminal history points for an offense committed while
under a criminal justice sentence. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines
Manual Amend. 821 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023). The Com-
mission also proposed Amendment 825, which made Amend-
ment 821 retroactive. See id. at Amend. 825. Congress allowed
both amendments to take effect on November 1, 2023.
The parties agree that, if the district court finds the amend-
ments apply to Easterling, his guidelines range would be sig-
nificantly lower. Previously, Easterling received two criminal
history points for committing the offense while on parole for
a prior conviction, which pushed him into a criminal history
category of IV. Without those two points, he has a criminal
history category of III and a new advisory guidelines range of
70 to 87 months. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt.
A. This means Easterling’s current 239-month sentence is
175% higher than the high end of the range now recom-
mended by the Guidelines.
Given the November 2023 amendments, Easterling filed
with the district court a motion for sentence reduction pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(2). The statute allows district courts
to reduce a defendant’s prison sentence if the Sentencing
Commission has lowered the guidelines range. In this case,
the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to en-
tertain the motion because Easterling’s sentence was already
on appeal.
As a result, Easterling now raises two issues on appeal: (1)
whether the district court should resentence him in light of
the updated Guidelines, and (2) whether his sentence was
substantively unreasonable. He answers yes to both

-- 4 of 7 --

No. 23-1143 5
questions. We agree on the first question and therefore need
not reach the second.
II
Appellate courts have the authority to issue remands
when “just under the circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2106. As we
reasoned in United States v. Claybron, 88 F.4th 1226, 1230 (7th
Cir. 2023), it is presumptively in the interest of justice to re-
mand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1206 when the district court had
no opportunity to consider a retroactive amendment to the
Sentencing Guidelines that reduces a defendant’s recom-
mended sentence. That is the case here.
The government argues that we should not remand for re-
sentencing because, in its view, the record makes clear the dis-
trict court would impose the same sentence. Typically, if the
district court makes an error in calculating the guidelines
range, we will remand for resentencing unless it is “apparent
from the sentencing hearing that the judge would have im-
posed the same sentence even if the amendment had been in
force.” Id. We require an “unambiguous” statement by the
judge to that effect, United States v. Caraway, 74 F.4th 466, 468
(7th Cir. 2023), and we must be able “to determine from the
judge’s explanation why the disputed issue would not have
mattered.” United States v. Baker, 56 F.4th 1128, 1132 (7th Cir.
2023). But this typical practice is a poor fit for this case. The
Guidelines amendments at issue had not even been proposed
when the district court sentenced Easterling, so the court was
unable to address the disputed issue and unable to explain if
it would have imposed the same sentence regardless. Under
these circumstances, we cannot accept the government’s

-- 5 of 7 --

6 No. 23-1143
hypothesis that the district court would impose the same sen-
tence on remand.
The government resists this conclusion. It does so by fo-
cusing on what it argues are affirmative statements by the dis-
trict court that it would impose the same sentence on remand.
The government points to a box the district judge checked on
the judgment’s Statement of Reasons form that says: “In the
event the guideline determination(s) made in this case are
found to be incorrect, the court would impose a sentence
identical to that imposed in this case.” Putting aside the fact
that the district court could not grapple with a Guidelines
amendment that did not exist yet, this checked box is insuffi-
cient to prevent remand. We have previously held that “a
bare, boilerplate assertion—‘a conclusory comment tossed in
for good measure’—will not ordinarily suffice to hold a
Guidelines error harmless.” United States v. Ingram, 40 F.4th
791, 796 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 341 (2022) (quoting
United States v. Asbury, 27 F.4th 576, 581 (7th Cir. 2022)). The
checked box is just the type of bare, boilerplate assertion we
disapproved of in Ingram, and it does not insulate this case
from remand.
In addition to the checked box, the government argues
that the district court’s reasoning at Easterling’s prior sen-
tencings strongly suggests that it would impose the same sen-
tence again. The government notes the district court already
chose the same sentence again once, and the court grounded
its decision on Easterling’s criminal history and characteris-
tics and on the nature and circumstances of the offense, none
of which have changed. But our circuit law requires more. We
require a district court to assure us that it would impose the
same sentence again by specifically addressing the contested

-- 6 of 7 --

No. 23-1143 7
issue. See Asbury, 27 F.4th at 581. Here, the court was unable
to do so. We will not presume that a district court is so intran-
sient that nothing the Commission does and no possible
change to the Guidelines could sway its prior decision.
Accordingly, we remand for resentencing in light of the
amended Guidelines. Because this resolves the appeal, we do
not consider whether Easterling’s sentence is substantively
reasonable.
REMANDED.

-- 7 of 7 --