Lonnial L. Roundtree, Jr. v. Thomas J. Dart

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 27, 2025*
Decided February 5, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2576
LONNIAL L. ROUNDTREE, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THOMAS J. DART, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23 CV 2948
Lindsay C. Jenkins,
Judge.
O R D E R
Lonnial L. Roundtree, Jr., a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Jail, sued jail
officials and the county, alleging that he was punished with segregation in
unconstitutional conditions after a defective hearing, in violation of the Due Process
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Clause. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened and dismissed Roundtree’s
complaint, concluding that his placement in segregation and the conditions of his
confinement did not implicate a protected liberty interest. Because the
atypical-hardship standard for convicted prisoners does not apply to a pretrial detainee,
and we are unable to determine whether Roundtree’s time in segregation implicated a
liberty interest, we vacate the judgment as to his procedural due process claim and
remand so that the defendants can respond to the complaint; otherwise, we affirm.
We accept the allegations in the complaint as true, viewing them in the light
most favorable to Roundtree. See Otis v. Demarasse, 886 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2018). On
April 5, 2023, Roundtree was transferred to his division’s “rehabilitation unit” for
allegedly violating jail rules. There, he “awaited to be served a ticket to inform him of
the charges against him.” Two days later, a correctional officer and a hearing board
officer came to Roundtree’s cell to conduct a hearing on the charged violation, asking
Roundtree how he wished to plead. Roundtree responded that he was not given notice
of the hearing or a copy of the disciplinary ticket, having learned of the charge only at
that moment. He also stated that he wished to present witnesses and evidence. In reply,
the officials slid him a copy of the hearing notice and pointed to the final page, which
stated that the notice was delivered the day he was transferred to restrictive housing.
As a result, the correctional officer stated that there was “reason to believe” Roundtree
received adequate notice. Before Roundtree could respond, the officials walked to the
next cell and delivered a hearing notice to another detainee, who stated he was being
“ambushed.” No further hearing took place, and Roundtree never received a decision.
He remained in segregation without knowing why, or how long he would be there.
One month later, Roundtree filed suit against multiple administrators, one
correctional officer, a hearing board officer, and the sheriff (in his official capacity). He
alleged that the correctional officer and hearing board officer violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process by keeping him in restrictive housing without a
proper hearing. He further alleged that as of the date of his complaint, he remained in
segregation with no knowledge of the hearing’s outcome; the administrators denied
him access to cleaning supplies and limited his access to the telephone, the law library,
hygiene items, and his property boxes; while outside his cell in the dayroom, he did not
have access to a functioning water fountain; and in the dayroom, deputies forced him to
wear restraints that they intentionally made “extra tight,” causing Roundtree pain and
making it difficult for him to breathe. Lastly, he broadly alleged that the county
maintains a custom or policy of violating detainees’ constitutional rights by holding
defective hearings, limiting access to the courts, and ignoring health and safety

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concerns, among other things. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (On
appeal, Roundtree says he never learned the outcome of the hearing and languished in
restrictive housing until May 22, 2023—45 days after his perfunctory hearing—when he
was sent back to the general population.)
The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed
it for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Roundtree had not shown that his time in
restrictive housing and the conditions of his confinement amounted to a hardship
atypical of everyday life in jail. The court also dismissed the Monell claim because
Roundtree alleged only violations of jail rules and regulations, which did not give rise
to constitutional concerns. The court gave Roundtree leave to amend his complaint but
ultimately dismissed the complaint with prejudice when Roundtree declined to amend.
Roundtree now appeals, and we review the screening decision de novo.
See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020). Roundtree first argues that the
district court wrongly applied the procedural due-process standard for convicted
prisoners although he is a pretrial detainee. We agree. Unlike convicted prisoners,
pretrial detainees have a protected liberty interest in avoiding any nontrivial
punishment. See Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002). To be entitled to
procedural protections, therefore, a detainee does not have to satisfy the more exacting
standard applicable to a convicted prisoner, who has a liberty interest only when a
punishment results in an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir.
2013) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Further, before being deprived
of a liberty interest, a detainee has a right to receive at least the minimum procedural
protections guaranteed to prisoners. See Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir.
2011). These are “advance written notice of the disciplinary charges,” an opportunity to
call witnesses, and “a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and
the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
We must first decide if, under the standard governing pretrial detainees,
Roundtree was punished and therefore was entitled to procedural due process
beforehand. A measure amounts to punishment—and triggers procedural due-process
safeguards—if, among other things, jail officials show an express intent to punish.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538–39, 561 (1979); see also Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d
816, 822 (7th Cir. 2019). The initial decision of jail officials to transfer Roundtree to
segregation does not constitute punishment. No process is required if a detainee is

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placed in segregation because of an investigation, safety and security reasons, or other
non-punitive purposes. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 540. Roundtree’s complaint states that he
was accused of a disciplinary violation and was placed in segregation pending an
investigation or a hearing. This is not a punitive purpose, and so the initial transfer did
not trigger the need for pre-transfer procedural due process.
But, assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint, Roundtree’s
indefinite (as far as he knew) segregation may have crossed the line to punishment. We
cannot infer that Roundtree remained in restrictive housing after the pretermitted
hearing for a non-punitive purpose; he may well have been found guilty of a
disciplinary violation and sentenced to additional time in segregation. If so, he was
entitled to a proper hearing and other procedural protections first. See Rapier,
172 F.3d at 1005. But in his complaint he alleges he did not receive notice of the hearing,
was not permitted to present a defense, and never learned the outcome, let alone
received a written explanation—the minimum under Hill. 472 U.S. at 454. Drawing all
reasonable inferences in Roundtree’s favor, his complaint states a claim that he was
punished without the required procedural due process.
Roundtree does not, however, state a Monell claim with respect to the alleged
procedural due-process violation. A Monell claim can survive screening if the plaintiff
plausibly alleges that “(1) [he] was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the deprivation
can be traced to some municipal action (i.e., a policy or custom), such that the
challenged conduct is properly attributable to the municipality itself; (3) the policy or
custom demonstrates municipal fault, i.e., deliberate indifference; and (4) the municipal
action was the moving force behind the federal-rights violation.” Thomas v. Neenah Joint
Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Here, Roundtree’s complaint
does not plausibly suggest that the challenged conduct—insufficient procedural
protections in disciplinary proceedings—resulted from the deliberate indifference of the
county. Still, Roundtree needed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Cook County
was responsible for individual officials’ alleged violation of Roundtree’s constitutional
rights. See Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019).
He did not. Roundtree states, in conclusory fashion, that the county had a
widespread practice or custom of violating detainees’ constitutional rights including by
depriving them of “24 hours’ notice before disciplinary hearings” and “not giving
pretrial detainees written dispositions of the disciplinary hearing board officer’s
decisions.” But, beyond his own experience, he alleges only one other instance, when
the two officers left his cell to “ambush” another detainee with an improperly noticed

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hearing. Allegations of “a few sporadic examples of improper behavior” do not suffice
to state a widespread practice. Flores v. City of S. Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2021).
Therefore, Roundtree did not state a plausible claim that the alleged violation of his
rights resulted from a widespread practice or policy of the county.
As for Roundtree’s independent claim that the conditions he endured in
segregated housing violated his constitutional rights, dismissal was proper. Roundtree
needed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that he experienced conditions that posed an
objectively serious risk of harm, and the defendants’ response was objectively
unreasonable under the circumstances. See Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 822. Roundtree alleged
that the relevant officials failed to see that he received hygiene items or cleaning
supplies; prevented him from showering for five days; denied him medical attention
after he was physically assaulted; forced him to wear leg-irons on his ankles and chains
on his body while in the dayroom (causing breathing difficulties); and neglected to
provide a functioning water fountain in the dayroom where Roundtree spent “hours.”
Although the lack of hygiene items (which Roundtree had to borrow from other
detainees) and inconsistent access to drinking water in the dayroom are unpleasant
conditions, they do not rise to the severity and duration necessary to be objectively
serious risks under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 819 (claim
stated by detainees who allegedly lacked any water for three days and had cells infested
with others’ feces). And Roundtree did not describe the alleged assault or mention any
injury, so there is no ground for a reasonable inference that the jail staff’s response was
objectively unreasonable. Finally, with respect to the restraints required in the
dayroom—which the complaint suggests were placed on all detainees there—courts
should ordinarily defer to the expert judgment of correctional officials when it comes to
the need to preserve internal order or maintain institutional security. See Bell, 441 U.S.
at 547–48; see also Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 783 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Without
facts plausibly suggesting that the restraints were a punitive measure, we cannot infer
that it was unreasonable for the jail to require them in common spaces. Thus, Roundtree
failed to state a claim that he faced an objectively serious risk of harm to which the
defendants responded in an objectively unreasonable manner.
Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment as to Roundtree’s procedural due
process claim against the correctional officer and the hearing board officer, and
REMAND to the district court for further proceedings. We express no view about what
further development of the facts might reveal or about any defenses the defendants
might have. The balance of the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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