United States of America v. Eric Sorenson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 24, 2025*
Decided February 24, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2092
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ERIC SORENSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Western Division.
No. 12 CR 50062-1
Philip G. Reinhard,
Judge.
O R D E R
Eric Sorenson, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion for
compassionate release. See 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court denied the
motion after determining that he had not established an extraordinary and compelling
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2092 Page 2
reason for compassionate release, and that, even if he did, the sentencing factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against release. We affirm.
Sorenson pleaded guilty in 2013 to illegally possessing a firearm as a felon. See 28
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 40 months.
Noting that Sorenson had pending state charges (for firearm possession and an earlier
armed robbery), the court explained that if he were convicted in state court, he would
serve his state sentence “first,” though he might receive credit for time spent in state
custody “for the same offense.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)(1).
The state court later dismissed the firearm charge but convicted Sorenson of
armed robbery, sentencing him to 25 years.
In 2024, Sorenson—now in federal custody after completing his state sentence—
moved for compassionate release. As relevant to this appeal, he argued that he is
serving an unintended and unusually harsh sentence because his 40-month federal
sentence was not supposed to run consecutively to his state sentence.
The district court denied the motion. First, Sorenson had not demonstrated an
extraordinary and compelling reason for his release based on the length of his sentence:
the court had intended for the federal sentence to run consecutive to the anticipated
state robbery sentence because the convictions concerned “different conduct, occurring
on different dates, and different charges.” In the alternative, the court explained that the
§ 3553(a) factors counseled against release based on Sorenson’s significant, violent
criminal history and commission of a serious crime involving an “arsenal of weapons.”
On appeal, Sorenson argues only that the district court did not address his
argument that § 5G1.3(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines required his federal sentence to
be concurrent to his state sentence. Under § 5G1.3(c), “[i]f … a state term of
imprisonment is anticipated to result from another offense that is relevant conduct to
the instant offense … the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run
concurrently to the anticipated term of imprisonment.”
But even though the district court did not specifically cite § 5G1.3(c), it provided
enough analysis on the issue to give us “reasonable assurance” that it considered
Sorenson’s argument. See United States v. Newton, 996 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2021). As
the court explained, it imposed Sorenson’s federal sentence to run consecutively to the
state armed robbery sentence because the crimes consisted of “different conduct, on
different dates, and different charges.” Moreover, § 5G1.3(c) applies only where the

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No. 24-2092 Page 3
anticipated state term of imprisonment is for “relevant conduct” to the federal offense,
and Sorenson cannot establish this. After his state firearm charge was dismissed, only
his state conviction for armed robbery remained, and that offense preceded his federal
offense by a few weeks. The state armed robbery conviction is not relevant conduct to
his federal firearm conviction because it “constituted materially different conduct and
[the offenses] were at least somewhat separated in time.” See United States v. Boyle,
28 F.4th 798, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2022). Regardless, this appeal must fail because Sorenson
does not challenge the district court’s alternative conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors
weighed against release. See Rongere v. City of Rockford, 99 F.4th 1095, 1103 (7th Cir. 2024)
(citing Maher v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2008)).
AFFIRMED

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