United States of America v. Alfonso Chavez

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 21, 2025*
Decided March 24, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2032
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALFONSO CHAVEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 08-cr-746-5
Mary M. Rowland,
Judge.
O R D E R
Alfonso Chavez appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court concluded that Chavez failed to
establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release, and alternatively,
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2032 Page 2
that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against granting his motion. Because the court did
not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
In 2011, a jury found Chavez guilty of racketeering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961,
1962(d); conspiracy to distribute and possess at least 500 grams of cocaine, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1)(b), 846; and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C). Chavez’s prison sentence consisted of concurrent terms of 20 years on the
racketeering conviction and 30 years on the drug-trafficking convictions. We affirmed
the judgment on direct appeal. See United States v. Garcia, 754 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2014).
In November 2022, Chavez moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He argued that his drug-trafficking sentence had been wrongly
enhanced under 21 U.S.C. § 851 because of prior state convictions that we have since
determined cannot serve as predicate felony drug offenses. See United States v. De La
Torre, 940 F.3d 938, 949 (7th Cir. 2019). In his view, he was therefore serving an
“unusually long” sentence and was eligible for compassionate release under U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6). He also cited alternative grounds, including his gang renunciation and
rehabilitation, id. § 1B1.13(d); young age, id. § 1B1.13(b)(2); risk of exposure to COVID-
19 and monkeypox, id. § 1B1.13(b)(1); desire to care for his ailing father, id.
§ 1B1.13(b)(3); and harsh prison conditions.
Applying the 2023 Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court
denied Chavez’s motion. It first concluded that Chavez failed to show an extraordinary
and compelling reason for relief. He had not demonstrated that his sentence was
unusually long. His leadership role in the gang belied any impressionable effect of his
young age. He had refused to take vaccines. He was not the only caretaker for his
father. He could not challenge his prison conditions through the compassionate release
motion. And though Chavez had shown much rehabilitation, that reason alone could
not support release. The court alternatively concluded that even if Chavez had
provided an extraordinary and compelling reason, the § 3553(a) factors did not favor
early release. It explained that because Chavez acted as a street section leader for the
Latin Kings, he was tied to various crimes including murder, attempted murder,
aggravated assault, extortion, and drug trafficking. After again acknowledging
Chavez’s rehabilitation, the court concluded that the seriousness of his offense,
§ 3553(a)(2)(A), warned against compassionate release.
Chavez appeals the denial of his compassionate release motion, a decision that
we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 346 (7th Cir.
2023). He primarily argues that the district court erroneously determined that he lacked

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No. 24-2032 Page 3
an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release. But because the district court
also based its decision on its assessment of the § 3553(a) factors, it provided an
independent ground for denying the motion. See id. at 349. Therefore, we need not
address whether Chavez established an extraordinary and compelling reason. See id.
Chavez challenges the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis by first arguing that the
court overlooked what he contends is the most important § 3553(a) factor: the statutory
penalty allowed under the law. In his view, because Congress set the unenhanced
statutory maximum for his drug convictions at 20 years, and he received 30 years
because of a faulty enhancement, the § 3553(a) factors require compassionate release.
But this argument conflates what he maintains is an extraordinary and compelling
reason for compassionate release—the excessive length of his sentence given no-longer-
valid predicate felonies for the § 851 enhancement, see De La Torre, 940 F.3d at 949—with
the court’s discretionary decision under the § 3553(a) factors. Whether the § 3553(a)
factors countenance early release is a separate consideration from whether a defendant
has extraordinary and compelling reasons. See Williams, 65 F.4th at 349. And we have
held that a judicial decision announcing new law alone cannot amount to an
extraordinary and compelling circumstance allowing for compassionate release. See
United States v. Brock, 39 F.4th 462, 466 (7th Cir. 2022).
Chavez next contends that the district court erred because, when considering the
§ 3553(a) factors, it discussed conduct underlying his racketeering conviction, when his
motion concerned only the early termination of his “unusually long” 30-year sentence
for the drug-trafficking convictions. But nothing required the court to limit its
discretionary inquiry in this way. When considering a sentence modification, a court’s
discretion to consider information is restrained “only when Congress or the
Constitution limits the scope of information.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481,
486 (2022) (First Step Act); see United States v. Bridgewater, 995 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir.
2021) (“[no] obvious limits on information that a district court may consider in deciding
[compassionate release] motion”). There is no limit like the one Chavez suggests.
Indeed, the plain text of § 3553(a) required the court to consider Chavez’s past criminal
conduct including his “history and characteristics,” see 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1), and the
need “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” see id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
Chavez lastly argues that the district court erred when it did not consider that his
criminal history consisted of offenses he committed when he was a minor, which he
insists is a mitigating factor. But the court considered his age when it declined to find an
extraordinary and compelling reason for early release given his leadership in gang

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activities. Further, when considering the § 3553(a) factors, the court need only identify
“one good reason” to deny relief. United States v. Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2022).
And the court did that when it discussed Chavez’s actions as a street leader for the
Latin Kings—it stated that granting Chavez early release would not “reflect the
seriousness of the offense [and] promote respect for the law.” See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A). We thus see no abuse of discretion in the court’s § 3553(a) analysis.
As a final note, the district court observed that Chavez did not expressly request
a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) in addition to compassionate release. But the
court analyzed whether he was eligible for that relief because his motion repeatedly
referred to Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Unlike compassionate release
requests, however, motions under § 3582(c)(2) can be brought just once per retroactive
amendment to the Guidelines. See United States v. Beard, 745 F.3d 288, 292 (7th Cir. 2014).
Because, in the district court, Chavez did not clearly request this form of relief nor
develop arguments about the effect of Amendment 782 on his guidelines range, we do
not consider him to have used his single opportunity to seek a reduction based on
Amendment 782. Nor do we opine on the merit of such a motion.
AFFIRMED

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