United States of America v. Bradley A. Caudle

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2025*
Decided March 28, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2809
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BRADLEY A. CAUDLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 19-cr-40034-JPG-2
J. Phil Gilbert,
Judge.
O R D E R
Bradley Caudle, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion for
compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court denied the
motion after ruling that he had not established an extraordinary and compelling reason
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2809 Page 2
for compassionate release, and that, even if he did, the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) weighed against release. The second reason alone is adequate, and we affirm.
In 2019, Caudle pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. At his sentencing, the district court found that
Caudle conspired to distribute at least 853 grams of meth that was pure enough to be
considered “ice,” thus increasing his base offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3) & n.3.
The court sentenced him to 188 months in prison—the bottom of his guidelines range.
Caudle did not appeal. Four years later, having served less than a third of his sentence,
Caudle moved for compassionate release. He argued that a sentence reduction was
appropriate because, under our recent decisions, the government did not adequately
prove that the “ice” Guideline, rather than the Guideline for meth of a lower purity,
should apply. See, e.g., United States v. Carnell, 972 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2020). In his view,
had the district court held the government to its burden, he would have been entitled to
a lower base offense level. He added that a sentence reduction was also warranted
because he had made significant efforts toward rehabilitation.
The district court denied the motion for two reasons: First, Caudle had not
demonstrated an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction, because
we have held that new judicial decisions do not justify a sentence reduction, and, on its
own, neither does rehabilitation. See United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 595 (7th Cir.
2022). Second, and independently, the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
counseled against release because Caudle had a significant history of theft, he had
committed a serious drug crime, and releasing him with two-thirds of his sentence still
left to serve would not promote respect for the law.
Caudle appeals, reiterating his argument that our recent decisions and his
rehabilitation provide extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. But Caudle
does not challenge the district court’s alternative conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors
independently weighed against release, and “[o]ne good reason for denying a motion
such as [Caudle’s] is enough.” United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021). We
review the denial of relief based on § 3553(a) factors for abuse of discretion, id. at 597,
and the court did not abuse its authority. It reasonably ruled that Caudle’s long criminal
history and his recent conviction for conspiring to sell almost a kilogram of pure
methamphetamine, for which he had served only 4 years of a 15-year sentence,
counseled against the deterrent-weakening effect of immediate release.
AFFIRMED

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