Shane T. Lancour v. Jim Verse

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 4, 2025 *
Decided April 11, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2312
SHANE T. LANCOUR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JIM VERSE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 20-cv-726-wmc
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Shane Lancour, a pretrial detainee at the La Crosse County Jail, got caught in the
middle of a fight among other inmates and droplets of blood and saliva landed on his
face, hair, and clothing. Lancour sued members of the jail staff alleging violations of his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At screening the district
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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judge permitted Lancour to proceed on two claims: the first centered on his allegation
that jail staff implemented an unreasonably dangerous policy of temporarily locking
detainees out of their cells; the second concerned his allegation that jail staff did not
give him access to a shower and new clothes quickly enough. The judge later entered
summary judgment for the defendants because nothing in the record suggests that they
acted unreasonably in any respect. We affirm.
Two jail policies are relevant here: the lockout policy and the lockdown policy.
The lockout policy prevented detainees from entering their cells from 8:00 a.m. to
1:00 p.m. each day. The detainees had to stay in a central dayroom to allow jail staff to
confirm their well-being easily and to “find inmates and get them to court, attorney
meetings, classes, medical appointments and other appointments.” The lockdown
policy allowed staff to lock all detainees in their cells if necessary for the safety of the
staff and the detainees, as would be necessary to restore order and to investigate fights.
Lancour’s suit stems from two fights that broke out in the dayroom on a Sunday
in June 2018, while detainees were locked out of their cells. During the second fight, one
detainee tried to spit blood and saliva on another, but Lancour was caught in the
middle and the blood and spit landed on his face, in his hair, and on his clothing. He
described the droplet spray as “a bunch of little droplets … like someone took a paint
brush and like ran their thumb across the end of the bristles to throw some paint.”
The fight prompted jail staff to order the inmates back to their cells and lock
down the cellblock for five and a half hours while they investigated. During that time,
Lancour used the intercom system to ask for clean clothes and a shower, but his
requests were denied; when he continued to press the call button, jail staff stopped
responding. Lancour successfully removed his dirty uniform shirt (he had a clean t-shirt
on underneath) and used a washcloth, soap, and running cold water in his cell to rinse
his mouth and wash his face (the hot water had low pressure). Although the entire
cellblock locked down, one detainee was allowed to leave his cell for a video visit in the
dayroom. Lancour received a clean uniform and access to a shower as soon as he was
released from his cell after the lockdown ended.
Lancour sued seven members of the jail staff alleging Fourteenth Amendment
violations arising from the way in which they responded to the fights and his need to
clean up after the blood and saliva landed on him. The district judge screened the
complaint and dismissed any claim related to Lancour’s vague allegations regarding
inadequate medical care. But the judge permitted Lancour to proceed on two claims:
one centered on the lockout policy that required detainees to be in the dayroom, and

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another related to Lancour’s allegations about delayed access to a shower and clean
clothes.
The judge eventually entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on
both claims. The judge explained that no evidence suggested that the lockout policy
was unreasonable or that the defendants unreasonably implemented it. He also
concluded that the approximately five-hour delay in Lancour’s access to clean clothes
and a shower—a byproduct of the lockdown in the immediate aftermath of the fights—
was not unreasonable.
Lancour appealed the summary judgment. We review the judge’s ruling de
novo. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 757 (7th Cir. 2011). Constitutional claims regarding
the conditions of pretrial detention are governed by an objective standard grounded in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process: the inquiry turns on whether
the challenged action by jail officials is “rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive
governmental purpose” or “excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979));
see also Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2019). When analyzing objective
unreasonableness, we defer to the jail staff’s legitimate methods for preserving order
and security. Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2020).
Lancour argues that the lockout policy was objectively unreasonable because it
risked that detainees confined to the dayroom’s close quarters would fight. He concedes
that the policy serves legitimate objectives such as enabling detainees to meet with their
attorneys, receive visitors, attend classes, and go to medical appointments on weekdays,
but he insists that those justifications did not apply on weekends, when the fights at
issue here occurred. Yet Lancour does not dispute that the lockout policy also allowed
jail staff to more easily monitor and confirm the well-being of detainees every day,
including weekends. As such, the policy is rationally related to keeping order in the jail.
See id. And even if the policy is imperfect because it may at times lead to clashes
between detainees, a jail’s “policy need not be perfect in order to … be rational.” Russell
v. Richards, 384 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2004). Lancour replies that because staff
eventually stopped using the lockout policy, it was unreasonable. But again, the
possibility of better policies—even one later adopted—is not by itself sufficient to show
that the rescinded policy was irrational. See Lapre v. City of Chicago, 911 F.3d 424, 431–32
(7th Cir. 2018).
Lancour next argues that jail staff should have given him access to clean clothes
and a shower before the lockdown ended, but the record does not support a triable

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claim that they behaved unreasonably. It is uncontested that, during the lockdown, staff
allowed Lancour to remove his soiled shirt and to wash all the “droplets” off with soap
and water from the sink in his cell. And even though his cell had inadequate hot water
pressure, Lancour was able to use the soap, washcloth, and cold water to clean his face
and mouth. Further, the jail staff used the lockdown to restore order and investigate the
fights that led to it. Thus, the decision to keep Lancour in his cell during lockdown was
a reasonable solution for maintaining order and security under the circumstances, a
decision to which we defer. See Mays, 974 F.3d at 820.
Furthermore, contrary to Lancour’s view, it does not matter that another detainee
was allowed to leave his cell during the lockdown. “Where disparate treatment is not
based on a suspect class and does not affect a fundamental right, prison administrators
may treat inmates differently as long as the unequal treatment is rationally related to a
legitimate penological interest.” Flynn v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 2016). The
decision to allow one detainee to leave his cell for a video visit—which could not
happen from his cell during lockdown—is rationally related to legitimate management
and security concerns. See Mays, 974 F.3d at 820–21.
Finally, we reject Lancour’s challenge to the judge’s screening order, to the extent
that he even raises such a challenge. As a threshold matter, the defendants incorrectly
contend that Lancour cannot appeal screening decisions; he can. See, e.g., Arnett,
658 F.3d at 751. But as the judge rightly observed, Lancour’s allegations were both
unclear and legally insufficient. He did not allege that he asked any defendant for
medical assistance, and the judge properly concluded that the “bare assertion” that
another prisoner’s blood was on his face and clothes did not “plausibly suggest that
these defendants’ failure to contact medical staff was objectively unreasonable.”
AFFIRMED

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