Harry Barnett v. City of Chicago

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 15, 2025*
Decided April 16, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2509
HARRY BARNETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 18 C 7946
Sara L. Ellis,
Judge.
O R D E R
Harry Barnett sued Alexander Kulisek, a police officer for the City of Chicago,
and the City of Chicago, alleging that they violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment by unlawfully causing him to be detained pretrial. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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The district court entered judgment for the defendants. We affirm because probable
cause supported Barnett’s detention.
In September 2016, Barnett met with a former employee who wanted to sell him
a scooter. The employee told Barnett that he had been hired to clean out the contents of
a home and had acquired the scooter during the “cleanout.” Barnett purchased the
scooter for $60. He then posted an advertisement on Craigslist seeking to re-sell the
scooter, explaining that he did not have the title or a key. His post included a picture of
the vehicle identification number (VIN), but Barnett did not attempt to run the VIN to
determine the last registered owner.
Kulisek, an officer with the Chicago Police Department, saw the advertisement
and recognized the scooter as his. The scooter recently had been reported stolen from a
shed on his parents’ property. He contacted Barnett to arrange a meeting to see the
scooter. Kulisek and a fellow officer met Barnett in plainclothes. When Barnett showed
them the scooter, Kulisek confirmed that it was his and arrested Barnett.
At the police station, Barnett explained to Kulisek and other officers how he
came to possess the scooter. Barnett showed them the text messages he had exchanged
with his former employee, identified the employee from police mugshots, explained
that the employee acquired the scooter in a “cleanout,” and confirmed that he did not
run the VIN. The incident narrative section on Barnett’s arrest report stated in relevant
part:
[Barnett] was arrested in that he was found to be in possession of a 1987
Yamaha moped, that was taken in a burglary … [Barnett] attempted to sell
said property to [officers] working in covert capacity. … [Barnett] made no
attempt to identify the owner and failed to take reasonable measures to
restore the property to the owner, intending to deprive the owner
permanently of the use/benefit of the property.
Barnett was charged with theft of lost or mislaid property. 720 ILCS 5/16-2. A
person violates the statute where he obtains control over lost or mislaid property and
“(a) … knows, or is aware of, or learns of a reasonable method of identifying the owner,
and (b) [f]ails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to the owner, and
(c) [i]ntends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property.” Id.
A judicial officer determined that probable cause existed to detain Barnett for
theft of lost or mislaid property. In total, Barnett was detained for about six hours

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before being released on bond. Eleven days later, after a bench trial, the trial judge
found Barnett guilty of theft of lost or mislaid property. At a post-trial hearing two
months later, however, the trial court acquitted him. The court reasoned that the
scooter, which Kulisek had testified at trial was stolen, did not qualify as lost or mislaid.
In 2018, Barnett brought this federal suit, alleging that Kulisek fabricated
evidence in the arrest report to secure a judicial determination of probable cause to
detain Barnett on a charge of theft of lost or mislaid property. Specifically, Barnett
objected to Kulisek’s statements that Barnett had made no attempt to identify the owner
of the scooter and intended to deprive the owner of the property. According to Barnett,
this information, which matched the elements of the offense of theft of lost or mislaid
property, see 720 ILCS 5/16-2, was inaccurate and tainted the judicial determination of
probable cause. Barnett also alleged that the City of Chicago has a practice of allowing
police to fabricate evidence in police reports to support improper pretrial detention.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).1
The district court characterized Barnett’s allegations against Kulisek as arising
under the Fourth Amendment. The district court determined that Kulisek was entitled
to summary judgment on Barnett’s claim that Kulisek deliberately misled the judicial
officer by providing false information in the arrest report, which caused Barnett to be
detained pretrial without probable cause.2 The district court reasoned that because
probable cause existed to detain Barnett for a different crime—theft, see 720 ILCS
5/16-1—Kulisek could not be held liable for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Because there was no underlying constitutional violation, the City of Chicago also was
1 Barnett also alleged that State’s Attorneys Anita Alvarez and Kimberly Foxx
prosecuted him based on fabricated evidence and without probable cause. The district
court dismissed these claims, and Barnett does not challenge their dismissal.
2 At an earlier stage of the proceedings, the district court granted Kulisek’s
motion to dismiss Barnett’s claims of “malicious prosecution.” The court reasoned that
there was not a free-standing, federal theory of malicious prosecution, see Manuel v. City
of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018), and the statute of limitations had expired on
any similar state-law claim. To the extent that the court was incorrect about the
availability of a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution,
see Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43–44 (2022), that conclusion was harmless. As we
will discuss, because probable cause supported Barnett’s pretrial detention for theft of
lost or mislaid property, any claim under the Fourth Amendment fails.

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entitled to summary judgment on the Monell claim. See Haro v. Porter Cnty., 129 F.4th
992, 999 (7th Cir. 2025). Barnett appeals.
Barnett first argues that the district court was wrong to conclude that the
existence of probable cause for a different charge insulated Kulisek from liability.
See Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 561 (2024) (“[T]he presence of probable
cause for one charge does not automatically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-
prosecution claim alleging the absence of probable cause for another charge.”). But the
existence of probable cause to detain Barnett for the charged offense—theft of lost or
mislaid property—is a defense to any claim under the Fourth Amendment for unlawful
pretrial detention. See Washington v. City of Chicago, 98 F.4th 860, 863 (7th Cir. 2024).
Thus we begin and end our analysis there.
A judicial determination of probable cause is entitled to a presumption of
validity. See id. at 870; Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019). But the
presumption can be rebutted by a showing that an officer “knowingly or intentionally
or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements to the judicial officer,
and that the false statements were necessary to the judicial officer’s determination that
probable cause existed for the arrest.” Lewis, 914 F.3d at 477 (quoting Whitlock v. Brown,
596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Barnett maintains that Kulisek included false information in his arrest report—
namely, the elements for the offense of theft of lost or mislaid property. He argues that
Kulisek was deliberately misleading: Kulisek knew the evidence did not support a
charge of theft of lost or mislaid property because he believed the scooter was stolen.
Probable cause requires an objective assessment based on the information known
to the officer and the conclusions that reasonably can be drawn from that information.
Washington, 98 F.4th at 875. The assessment must be specific to the charge: It depends on
the elements of the predicate criminal offense as defined by state law. Doe v. Gray,
75 F.4th 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2023). Probable cause is “not a high bar,” and requires “only a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
activity.” Washington, 98 F.4th at 875 (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,
57 (2018)). Probable cause exists at the time of pretrial detention if the officer had
sufficient knowledge of facts and circumstances, based on reasonably trustworthy
information, that would lead a prudent person to believe the plaintiff had committed
the crime. Id.

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Here, even if we omit Kulisek’s alleged false statements, “there remain[s] enough
uncontested, reliable evidence to support probable cause as a matter of law.” Id. at 874.
Barnett’s own admissions and the remaining undisputed facts were sufficient for a
reasonable person to believe that Barnett committed the crime of theft of lost or mislaid
property. Barnett explained to officers that he purchased the scooter from his former
employee even though it did not have a key or title, and that the employee told Barnett
that he had obtained the scooter while cleaning out items from a vacated property.
After obtaining the scooter, Barnett attempted to re-sell it on Craigslist. And although
Barnett identified the scooter’s VIN in the advertisement, he did not attempt to run a
search to identify who had title to the scooter. Barnett also admitted that he did not
have a receipt for his purchase of the scooter from his former employee and did not take
any “reasonable measures” to return the scooter to its registered owner. These facts
surpass the threshold for probable cause to support Barnett’s detention for theft of lost
or mislaid property.
Barnett counters that Kulisek misled the judicial officer by asserting that the
known facts supported a charge of theft of lost or mislaid property despite Kulisek’s
belief that the scooter was stolen. But Kulisek did not mislead the judicial officer. The
arrest report recounted that the scooter had been taken in a burglary. To be sure,
Barnett was acquitted based on Kulisek’s testimony at trial that the scooter was stolen.
But “probable cause demands much less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at
876. And here, a reasonable jury could not find that the information known to Kulisek
at the time of Barnett’s pretrial detention did not support probable cause to believe
Barnett committed the offense of theft of lost or mislaid property.
AFFIRMED

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