James Reed v. Illinois Appellate Court, First District

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 15, 2025*
Decided April 21, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2803
JAMES REED
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT, FIRST
DISTRICT,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-cv-14321
John F. Kness,
Judge.
O R D E R
James Reed appeals the judgment dismissing his civil lawsuit for want of
prosecution. The district court dismissed his suit after he fell out of contact with his
* The defendant-appellee was not served with process and is not participating in
this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2803 Page 2
counsel and then failed to comply with the district court’s directive to appear at a status
hearing. We affirm the judgment but modify the dismissal to be without prejudice.
This case has a protracted history. For more than a decade, Reed has been
involved in a foreclosure suit in Illinois state court. The suit was initiated by his
mortgage broker, Silverleaf Funding, LLC, after Reed failed to pay property taxes.
See Silverleaf Funding v. 7942 Country Club, No. 2013CH28231 (Il. Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 24,
2013). In 2018, the state court confirmed the judicial sale of the property from
Silverleaf—then in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings—to a company known as
Inverse Asset Fund, LLC. See 735 ILCS 5/15-1508; In re 7942 Country Club, No.
2017COTD3838 (Il. Cir. Ct. July 23, 2018).
Reed appealed the state court’s confirmation order. He asserted first, that the
state court violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by failing to provide
him notice of the judicial sale, and second, that the state court lost jurisdiction of the
case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–52 upon Silverleaf’s filing for bankruptcy. In 2019, the
state appellate court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. See Inverse Asset
Fund v. 7942 Country Club, No. 1-18-1842 (Il. App. Ct. May 2, 2019). Broadway Irving
Park LLC purchased the property in 2020.
Nearly two years later, Broadway Irving Park requested an order of possession
to evict Reed. See 35 ILCS 200/22-40(c). Although Reed challenged Broadway Irving
Park’s purchase in state court on jurisdictional and due process grounds, the court
granted Broadway Irving Park’s request and entered an order of possession. Reed’s
appeal of that order led the trial court to stay execution pending the directive of the
appellate court. See In re 7942 Country Club, No. 2017COTD3838 (Il. Cir. Ct. Jan. 9, 2023).
With the state court’s stay order in effect, Reed in 2023, filed in federal court
what appeared to be a petition to remove his state court case based on its relationship to
a federal bankruptcy case that involved him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). He also asserted
that federal question jurisdiction existed because—as he argued in his state court
appeals— the state court violated his constitutional rights when it sold his property. See
28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district court asked Reed to file a jurisdictional statement. Reed
then obtained counsel. In the ensuing ten months, Reed did not cooperate with his
counsel’s attempts to submit this filing, so counsel moved to withdraw. Counsel argued
at a telephonic motions hearing on August 1, 2024, that they had not heard from Reed
for nearly two months despite multiple attempts to contact him. The district court
continued the motion until August 8, warning Reed that his failure to appear at a

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No. 24-2803 Page 3
scheduled in-person status hearing that day would result in the dismissal of his case for
want of prosecution.
Reed did not appear at the August 8 hearing. Counsel stated that they last heard
from him on June 5, 2024, but asked the court for an additional week’s continuance to
give Reed an opportunity to be heard before his case would be dismissed. At the
hearing, Broadway Irving Park, appearing as intervenor, argued that it would be
prejudiced by any further delay, given Reed’s intent to use the federal suit as a means to
put off his eviction. The district court then dismissed Reed’s case with prejudice for
want of prosecution. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 41(b). The court cited its prior warning about the
risk of dismissal, Reed’s lack of communication with his counsel, his failure to submit a
jurisdictional statement, and the prejudice that further delay would have on Broadway
Irving Park.
Reed timely moved to alter the district court’s judgment, see F ED. R. C IV. P. 59(e),
insisting that he had not received the relevant correspondence and was not aware that
his case could potentially be dismissed. The court denied his motion, pointing out that
counsel—his agents in the case—had received notice of the relevant hearings, and Reed
“apparently chose not to stay in contact with his lawyers.”
On appeal, Reed first challenges the dismissal for want of prosecution by
targeting the district court’s underlying order that granted counsel’s motion to
withdraw. Invoking Illinois Supreme Court Rule 13(c) (addressing manner of service of
motion for withdrawal on party represented), Reed argues that the court’s decision to
grant that motion was marred by its failure to serve him or confirm receipt of counsel’s
motion to withdraw.
But federal courts follow federal and not state rules. See, e.g., Schrott v. Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2005). The Northern District of Illinois has
its own local rule governing attorney withdrawal, see N.D. I LL. C IV. R. 83.17, which—as
relevant here—requires counsel to file a form entitled Notification of Party Contact. The
record here contains the attestation of Reed’s counsel that they completed this form and
sent notice to Reed’s address on record.
Reed maintains, relatedly, that he did not receive the court’s order warning him
that further inaction would result in dismissal of his case for want of prosecution. But a
party is bound by the acts of the attorney he chooses to represent him, just as a principal
is bound by the acts of its agent, see, e.g., Al-Nahhas v. 777 Partners LLC, 129 F.4th 418,

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No. 24-2803 Page 4
427 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing cases), and Reed’s counsel stated that they received the court’s
warning about possible dismissal.
Reed finally asserts that the dismissal for want of prosecution is an “overly
punitive” disposition under the circumstances. Indeed, dismissal for want of
prosecution is the “most severe sanction that a court may apply,” requiring the careful
exercise of discretion. McMahan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 892 F.3d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted). Even so, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing Reed’s case and denying his request for reconsideration. Reed failed
repeatedly to meet with his counsel to complete his pending jurisdictional statement,
and he failed to comply with the court’s directive that he appear at the August 8
hearing or his case would be dismissed. Such conduct is an appropriate ground for
dismissal. See id. at 931–33.
We close with a word about the disposition. Although the district court rightfully
dismissed Reed’s suit after he failed to appear, it is not apparent to us—nor was it to the
district court—that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss with prejudice. Because
this issue has not been conclusively decided, we modify the judgment to be without
prejudice. Given Reed’s pattern of dilatory behavior, we also warn Reed that any
further frivolous suits may result in sanctions against him.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

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