Dominique Pouliot v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 1, 2025*
Decided May 2, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 21-2735
DOMINIQUE POULIOT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 2:19-cv-2067
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
Dominique Pouliot appeals the dismissal of her employment-discrimination suit
against the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois and some University
employees. She argues that her failure to prosecute her case resulted from ineffective
assistance of counsel and her husband’s illness and that, therefore, she should not be
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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held responsible. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Pouliot’s case under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we affirm.
From 2011 to 2016, Pouliot worked as a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the
Physics Department of the University of Illinois’ Urbana-Champaign campus. In
September 2018, Pouliot sued the Board and several University employees, alleging
discrimination on the basis of age and national origin as well as retaliation for her
complaints about discriminatory treatment.
After the defendants answered the complaint, they attempted to conduct
discovery—to no avail. Pouliot, who was represented by three successive retained
attorneys during the discovery phase, did not respond to any of the requests within the
required 30-day period (or, indeed, for the next two years). The defendants timely
responded to Pouliot’s discovery requests and attempted to engage her in settlement
negotiations. They repeatedly rescheduled Pouliot’s deposition at her request, and they
continued to remind her counsel that she had failed to respond to any discovery
requests. Pouliot’s counsel explained that Pouliot could not participate in discovery—
including even a virtual deposition—because she was acting as the primary caretaker
for her ill husband.
In June 2021, the defendants filed a motion to compel Pouliot to respond to their
discovery requests and sit for a deposition. In response, the district court ordered
Pouliot to show cause for her failure to prosecute her case. The court noted that
although “delays were inevitable with the COVID-19 pandemic,” Pouliot was not
excused from her “duty to prosecute her case.” It ordered Pouliot to respond to “all
written discovery requests” by August 2 and sit for a deposition by August 6, warning
her that no extensions of either deadline would be allowed.
On August 3, 2021, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of
prosecution. They stated that on June 30, Pouliot had sent them a “woefully deficient”
production—“an incomplete response” by the admission of Pouliot’s own counsel—
totaling 22 pages of documents that did not “relate[] in any way” to her legal claims.
The defendants further asserted that they had sent Pouliot a letter outlining the
deficiencies in her discovery responses. Pouliot did not respond to the letter or to the
defendants’ notice seeking to depose her on August 5.
The day after the defendants filed their motion (and one day before the noticed
deposition date), Pouliot filed a motion for an extension of time to complete discovery.

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She stated that she would be “unable to complete discovery and be available to be
deposed until October 31, 2021 or later” because of her husband’s illness, and she
requested that discovery be continued until November 30, 2021.
The district court denied Pouliot’s motion to extend discovery and granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the case. The court noted that, despite its show-cause
order and warning that no further extensions to discovery would be granted, Pouliot
had chosen, “bafflingly and as though earlier orders of the court did not exist,” to seek
another extension of time. It explained that, although it was sympathetic to Pouliot’s
role as caregiver for her husband, her “absolute failure to prosecute her case, and her
utter disregard for court orders,” justified dismissal under Rule 41(b). Further, the court
determined that because Pouliot’s “pattern of dilatory conduct” was clear, there was no
need to impose less severe sanctions before ordering dismissal.
On appeal, Pouliot, who is now proceeding pro se, concedes that she failed to
prosecute her case, but she argues that her case should nonetheless be revived for two
reasons. First, she contends that her attorney failed to timely respond to discovery
requests and that she should not be penalized for her counsel’s actions. Second, she
urges us to “recognize the exceptional circumstances” of her husband’s illness as an
excuse for her lack of prosecution.
Under Rule 41(b), the district court has authority to dismiss a case if the “plaintiff
fails to prosecute.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 41(b). The court may “infer a lack of intent to
prosecute a case from a pattern of failure to meet court-imposed deadlines.” Dickerson v.
Bd. of Educ. of Ford Heights, 32 F.3d 1114, 1117 (7th Cir. 1994). And the court does not
need to impose less severe sanctions before dismissing the case “[w]here the pattern of
dilatory conduct is clear.” Id. (citing Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.
1993)). The district court need only provide “due warning” to the plaintiff’s counsel that
an imminent threat of dismissal is likely. In re Bluestein & Co., 68 F.3d 1022, 1026
(7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ball, 2 F.3d at 755).
We review the dismissal of a case for lack of prosecution for abuse of discretion.
See Aura Lamp & Lighting, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Corp., 325 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2003). Our
review is “highly deferential,” and we will affirm the dismissal unless the decision
“strike[s] us as fundamentally wrong.” Id. at 907–08.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss
Pouliot’s case. The court correctly observed—and Pouliot herself admits—that she

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engaged in a yearslong pattern of dilatory conduct by failing to comply with court
orders and ignoring discovery requests. See Dickerson, 32 F.3d at 1117. And even after
the court warned Pouliot that no further extensions would be granted and provided her
due warning—a show-cause order—that dismissal was imminent, she persisted in her
dilatory behavior. See In re Bluestein & Co., 68 F.3d at 1026.
Pouliot’s argument that her failure to prosecute resulted from ineffective counsel
is unavailing. Litigants are bound by “the acts and omissions” of their lawyers, Choice
Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Grover, 792 F.3d 753, 754 (7th Cir. 2015), including the failure to
respond to discovery requests, see Tolliver v. Northrop Corp., 786 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir.
1986). If, as Pouliot alleges, the dismissal of her case resulted from her lawyer’s
shortcomings, she could seek relief against the attorney, but it is not the defendants’
burden to bear protracted litigation resulting from a failure to proceed with her own
case. See Grover, 792 F.3d at 754.
Further, although we sympathize with Pouliot’s personal circumstances, the
district court’s determination that her role as caretaker did not excuse her from her
discovery obligations does not strike us as fundamentally wrong. See, e.g., Moffitt v. Ill.
State Bd. of Educ., 236 F.3d 868, 872–76 (7th Cir. 2001) (no abuse of discretion in
dismissing case for want of prosecution while plaintiff was hospitalized for drug and
alcohol rehabilitation on eve of trial); Dickerson, 32 F.3d at 1117–19 (affirming dismissal
where plaintiff’s counsel failed to meet court-ordered deadlines because of his mother’s
incapacitating illness).
AFFIRMED

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