Roy Dunbar v. Rebecca A. Kiefer

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 19, 2025*
Decided May 19, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1009
ROY DUNBAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
REBECCA A. KIEFER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-CV-1592-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
No. 25-1010
ROY DUNBAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JACK L. DAVILA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-CV-1593-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
* The appellees in No. 25-1010 were not served with process and are not
participating in this appeal. Appellees Ruckdashel and Zoril in No. 25-1009 are not
participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the cases without oral argument
because the appeals are frivolous. F ED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(A).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Nos. 25-1009 & 25-1010 Page 2
O R D E R
Roy Dunbar appeals the dismissal of his two lawsuits based on the abstention
doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Because the cases involve similar issues,
we hereby consolidate the appeals for disposition. And because Dunbar’s briefs do not
contest the rationale for the dismissal of his cases, we dismiss the appeals.
In each initial complaint, Dunbar sued individuals involved in two ongoing
criminal cases against him in Wisconsin state court.† He alleged, without elaboration,
that the defendants were violating his constitutional rights during the prosecutions. The
district judge dismissed each complaint for failure to state a claim, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and advised Dunbar that federal courts generally should not exercise
jurisdiction over constitutional claims that seek to interfere with ongoing state criminal
proceedings, see Younger, 401 U.S. at 43. After Dunbar amended his complaints, the
judge again dismissed them without prejudice and entered final judgment. The judge
explained that he had to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Dunbar’s claims
because the state criminal proceedings were ongoing, see id., and, further, that
dismissing rather than staying the cases was proper because Dunbar did not appear to
seek damages. The judge also noted that Dunbar “casts his claims in terms of estates,
trusts, sureties, and other legal terms that have nothing to do … with a criminal
prosecution.”
In his briefs on appeal, Dunbar does not contest the correctness of abstaining
under Younger nor cite any relevant authorities. He also does not dispute the district
judge’s decision to dismiss, rather than stay, the cases. His briefs merely restate his
grievances and, as the judge observed, spout “sovereign citizen”-type theories that we
have deemed frivolous repeatedly. See United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir.
2011) (collecting cases). Although we construe pro se filings generously, an appellate
brief must contain a discernible argument that the district judge erred somehow.
See F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8)(A); Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001).
Briefs “that [do] not even try to engage the reasons the appellant lost [have] no prospect
of success.” Klein v. O'Brien, 884 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original).
Dunbar’s appeals are frivolous and must be dismissed. Anderson, 241 F.3d at 545–46.
DISMISSED
† The defendants in No. 25-1009 are two state judges, a prosecutor, Dunbar’s
defense attorney, and a court clerk. The defendants in No. 25-1010 are a state judge, a
prosecutor, and a court clerk.

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