David Edward Jackson Iii v. Bernard Carter

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 27, 2025*
Decided May 30, 2025
Before
DIANE S. S YKES , Chief Judge
F RANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2743
DAVID EDWARD J ACKSON III,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BERNARD C ARTER , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:24-CV-9-PPS-APR
Philip P. Simon,
Judge.
O R D E R
David Edward Jackson III complains in this suit about events concerning his
criminal convictions, revocations of probation, child-custody proceedings, and other
events.
According to Jackson’s complaint, whose allegations we must accept for current
purposes, he pleaded guilty in 2021 to sexual misconduct with a minor. Nadia Wardrip,
a prosecutor in Lake County, Indiana, proposed a harsher bargain than her predecessor
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

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No. 24-2743 Page 2
sought. Jackson took the revised offer but contends that Wardrip was biased against
him because he had sued the employer of her spouse; he also asserts that she knew
about some false statements by the victim but did not turn over exculpatory evidence.
After being sentenced to a term of probation, Jackson was supervised by Jacob
Otto. Jackson asserts that Otto imposed conditions in addition to those included in the
plea agreement and judgment, refused to approve his chosen therapist, and required
him to undergo an unnecessary assessment for addiction.
While on probation, Jackson was involved in a child-custody proceeding. War-
drip testified during this proceeding and furnished counsel with some records from the
criminal prosecution. Otto asked the court to revoke Jackson’s probation; Wardrip testi-
fied during the revocation proceedings. Although the court revoked Jackson’s proba-
tion, he obtained collateral relief in state court. He pleaded guilty again, and his proba-
tion was revoked again (on Otto’s request). In this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 he seeks
money damages for these events and other perceived wrongs.
The district judge observed that most of Jackson’s legal theories rest on state ra-
ther than federal law, but that state-law theories do not support federal jurisdiction un-
der 28 U.S.C. §1332 because all parties are citizens of Indiana. A non-frivolous claim un-
der federal law comes within federal jurisdiction even if it is doomed to fail, see Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), but the judge thought Jackson’s theories too feeble to support
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). The judge observed that
some of the claims are blocked by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), because the convictions and revocation deci-
sions remain in force, while other theories are blocked by principles of immunity (such
as prosecutorial immunity, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), and witness im-
munity, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)).
The district judge invited Jackson to amend his complaint to establish federal ju-
risdiction. Instead of doing that, Jackson filed a 355-page document that named 49 addi-
tional defendants, including his landlord, several other private entities, the State of Indi-
ana, and federal agencies and officials. The district court observed that the joinder of
many unrelated claims and defendants violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 and 20 without solv-
ing the jurisdictional problem, so it rejected the new filing and dismissed the case.
Although frivolous claims do not support federal jurisdiction, the district court’s
main concerns—improper joinder, immunity, and Heck—do not stem from frivolous-
ness. A suit barred by Heck and Edwards is premature (because the claim does not ac-
crue until the conviction is set aside), not frivolous. (A given claim may be substantively
frivolous, but not because of Heck.) Immunities are affirmative defenses, which

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No. 24-2743 Page 3
complaints need not anticipate and plead around. Improper joinder can be solved by
severance and other management devices, see Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir.
2017); putting unrelated claims into one complaint does not establish that all of them
must be frivolous. Nor does the fact that the complaint did not identify a good legal the-
ory. Complaints need not plead law. See Johnson v. Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
Still, Jackson cannot surmount the difficulties the district judge identified. The
suit is premature in large part for the reasons given in Heck and Edwards. See Savory v.
Cannon, 947 F.3d 409, 418–19 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Heck continues to apply even af-
ter state custody ends). Briscoe offers immunity to Wardrip and Otto for their testimony.
Wardrip enjoys prosecutorial immunity for her role in negotiating the terms of the plea
bargains and managing the prosecutions; the assertion that she had a retaliatory motive
does not deprive her of immunity. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2018).
Tobey also shows that Otto has immunity for his role in the probation-revocation pro-
cess. Ibid. And the district judge was right to reject the proposed amended complaint,
which flagrantly violated the rules of joinder without showing why any of Jackson’s
claims belongs in federal court.
Because this suit is going nowhere in federal court, Jackson was not entitled to
the district judge’s aid in recruiting counsel. See Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755 (7th Cir.
2022).
The district judge dismissed this suit without prejudice, which is proper to the
extent that the decision rests on Heck and Edwards, and also to the extent that it rests on
improper joinder. Absolute immunity entitles the defendants to dismissal with preju-
dice on some of the claims, but the lack of a cross-appeal prevents us from modifying
the judgment to be more favorable to defendants. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237
(2008). Because all federal claims and theories have been dismissed, it would be inap-
propriate for the federal court to resolve any claim under state law. See 28 U.S.C.
§1367(c)(3). The resolution of this federal suit does not prevent Jackson from pursuing,
in state court, any non-frivolous claims under state law.
A FFIRMED

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