Aaron Braxton Iii v. Indianapolis Public Schools

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 20, 2025*
Decided June 23, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2621
AARON BRAXTON III,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-01052-JMS-MJD
Jane Magnus-Stinson,
Judge.
O R D E R
Aaron Braxton, a former teacher with the Indianapolis Public Schools (“IPS”),
appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment rejecting his claims that IPS
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2621 Page 2
discriminated against him based on a disability and then retaliated against him when he
complained. We affirm.
We briefly outline the facts, viewing them in the light most favorable to Braxton,
the nonmoving party. See Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 942 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir.
2019). Braxton is a former IPS teacher who experiences anxiety. After IPS determined
that he had multiple documented deficiencies as a teacher, it decided not to renew his
contract. Braxton then sued IPS in Indiana state court under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, arguing that his anxiety was a disability, that he was harassed by a
coworker because of his disability, that IPS fired him in retaliation for reporting the
harassment, see 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), and that IPS discriminated against him based on
his disability. See id. § 12112. Soon thereafter, IPS removed the case to federal court.
In a thorough order, the district court entered summary judgment for IPS. The
court accepted IPS’s statement of material facts as uncontested because Braxton’s
statement of facts (submitted by counsel) failed to conform to the court’s local rule
governing summary judgment. See S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1(b). The court then ruled
that no reasonable juror could find that Braxton was (or was perceived to be) disabled
within the meaning of the Act, so he could not prevail on any of his theories.
On appeal, Braxton has not meaningfully developed an argument challenging
the district court’s reasoning, see F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a); Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544,
545 (7th Cir. 2001), but we touch upon three arguments that we can discern. First,
Braxton faults his lawyer for failing to present relevant evidence and for filing an
improper response to IPS’s motion. But Braxton is bound by his lawyer’s actions, and
an attorney’s alleged errors and omissions in a civil case do not justify reopening a
judgment. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Grover, 792 F.3d 753, 754 (7th Cir. 2015); see also
Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming summary
judgment against plaintiff, who had to “pa[y] the price” of counsel’s failure to comply
with Local Rule 56-1).
Braxton also proposes two arguments for the first time in his reply brief: that the
district court did not adequately consider his evidence of retaliation, and that IPS
violated Indiana state labor law. See I ND. C ODE § 20-29-4-1. But he waived these
arguments by not presenting them in his opening brief. See Bradley v. Village of
University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).
AFFIRMED

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