Jason D. Vuletich v. FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 20, 2025*
Decided June 24, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3013
JASON D. VULETICH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-CV-04992
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-3013 Page 2
O R D E R
Jason Vuletich, an artist who struggles with anxiety, appeals the denial of his
application for disability insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). An administrative
law judge (ALJ) found that Vuletich was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act and denied his application. The Appeals Council declined review, and the
district court upheld the ALJ’s ruling. Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision, we affirm.
In 2016, Vuletich applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability
since 2011 from a combination of anxiety, depression, irritable bowel syndrome (IBS),
hypertension, tinnitus, herniated discs, angina, and cognitive and social decline.
Vuletich’s anxiety worsened after two fires damaged his apartment and possessions in
2010. He contended that this trauma, compounded by subsequent legal battles, forced
him to stop working as a union boilermaker and artist.
Between 2011 and early 2016, Vuletich saw various medical professionals.
Vuletich experienced anxiety and difficulty sleeping, so he saw Dr. Anna Costakis in
January 2011 and was prescribed 30 milligrams Valium for his anxiety and Celexa for
his depression. From August 2012 to August 2013, Vuletich saw a different physician,
who observed that Vuletich was intellectually and cognitively normal and reduced his
Valium prescription from 30 milligrams to 25 milligrams per day. In November 2013,
after he had a disagreement with this physician about further reducing his Valium
intake, Vuletich began seeing a third physician. The third physician similarly observed
that Vuletich appeared physically normal and exhibited average intellectual
functioning. Under this physician’s supervision, Vuletich reduced his Valium intake to
10 milligrams per day by February 2014, began taking Ativan to manage any
withdrawal symptoms, and continued his Celexa prescription.
Beginning in December 2014, Vuletich sought Valium prescriptions from five
emergency room physicians over a two-month period. This period was marked by
inconsistent diagnoses, including hypertension and anxiety, despite consistently normal
physical and mental examinations. Four physicians prescribed varying amounts of
Valium, Ativan, and Atenolol (for hypertension). One physician, however, refused to
refill the Valium prescription, citing concerns about drug-seeking behavior and
Vuletich’s reported lack of withdrawal symptoms after a four-day lapse in Valium use.
Starting in January 2015, Vuletich received regular care from a new doctor, who
consistently noted his normal physical and cognitive health. Although recognizing

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No. 23-3013 Page 3
Vuletich’s pattern of “doctor hopp[ing]” for medication, the doctor continued to
prescribe Valium. One year later, a new provider diagnosed Vuletich with anxiety,
depression, hypertension, and drug addiction syndrome. Finally, Vuletich’s current
therapist, Lorene Cameron, deemed him “seriously mentally challenged” and
recommended hospitalization for Valium addiction.
In connection with Vuletich’s application for disability benefits, two state-agency
physicians reviewed his medical records, found Vuletich to have severe anxiety and
non-severe hypertension, and dismissed Vuletich’s tinnitus, IBS, herniated discs, and
angina as non-medically determinable impairments. Two state-agency psychologists
determined that Vuletich was capable of “multiple-step productive activity with
modified social demands.”
In January 2018, an ALJ denied Vuletich’s disability benefits application,
applying the five-step disability analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). At step one, the
ALJ found that Vuletich had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 2011. The
ALJ then determined at step two that Vuletich’s anxiety constituted a severe
impairment, that his hypertension was non-severe, and that he lacked sufficient medical
evidence for IBS, herniated discs, tinnitus, and angina. At step three, the ALJ reasoned
that none of his impairments met a listed impairment. And at steps four and five, the
ALJ found that Vuletich was capable of limited work and specified restrictions on
interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Specifically, she found that
Vuletich had moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying
information; in interacting with others; and in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining
pace. The ALJ then identified potential jobs as a cleaner, packager, and machine feeder.
The ALJ also acknowledged Cameron’s most recent opinion regarding Vuletich’s
mental state. But the ALJ deemed Cameron to be an unacceptable medical source and
thus gave her opinion little weight.
Vuletich requested review by the Appeals Council and submitted new
documents, including deposition testimony from Dr. Costakis in an unrelated 2012 case
involving Vuletich. The Appeals Council found the documents immaterial and denied
his request for review.
With court-recruited counsel, Vuletich sought review of the ALJ’s decision in the
district court. He argued that the ALJ erred in two ways. First, he contended that the
ALJ wrongly concluded that Vuletich did not suffer from a second severe impairment
despite his history of hypertension and the combined effects of his other alleged, non-
medically determinable impairments (IBS, herniated discs, tinnitus, and angina).

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No. 23-3013 Page 4
Second, he argued that ALJ selectively used evidence to support her conclusions about
Vuletich’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and disability status.
The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision. The court concluded that the ALJ
permissibly relied on the state-agency physicians’ and psychologists’ opinions over
other opinions and properly established a logical bridge between the record and her
conclusions.
Vuletich appeals. We will affirm an ALJ’s decision denying disability benefits if it
is supported by substantial evidence—a low threshold—and will reverse only if the
record “compels a contrary result.” Thorlton v. King, 127 F.4th 1078, 1081 (7th Cir. 2025)
(citation omitted).
Vuletich first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to classify his tinnitus and IBS
as severe impairments, both independently and in conjunction with his anxiety
disorder. He further asserts that a reasonable person would deem these conditions
severe. But the ALJ correctly identified the definition for a severe impairment—a
medically determinable impairment that significantly restricts the capacity to perform
basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). The ALJ concluded that
Vuletich did not present medical evidence establishing these conditions’ impact on his
ability to perform basic work activities. Although Vuletich details various ways these
conditions affect his life, the relevant evidence is only what the ALJ reviewed in
reaching her decision unless the Appeals Council first finds later submitted evidence to
be “new and material.” See Farrell v. Astrue, 692 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470). And Vuletich does not point to evidence within the
administrative record that supports his assertions related to his tinnitus and IBS,
leaving us with no reason to doubt the ALJ’s conclusion.
Vuletich next challenges the ALJ’s RFC assessment as unsupported by medical
evidence. Specifically, he argues that the ALJ erred in three ways: (1) by relying on his
casual remarks to providers that he was doing “ok;” (2) by concluding that he could
operate machinery despite medication dependence; and (3) by finding that he could
maintain punctuality and pace despite anxiety. But the ALJ discussed Vuletich’s
medical history and testimony, noted numerous medical evaluations that reported
largely normal cognitive and mental functioning, and observed his focused and
attentive demeanor during his testimony. The ALJ weighed these direct observations
against Vuletich’s unsubstantiated claims of concentration difficulties. Acknowledging
the prevalence of anxiety in the medical record and his testimony, the ALJ limited his
RFC to jobs with minimal coworker interaction and no public contact. Vuletich’s

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disagreement with the ALJ’s assessment, particularly without citing contrary evidence
within the administrative record, does not undermine the substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. See Thorlton, 127 F.4th at 1082.
Vuletich further contends that the ALJ erred by “cherry-picking” evidence,
specifically by downplaying the opinions of Cameron and Dr. Costakis, which he
argues constituted substantial evidence of his inability to work and disability. But the
ALJ correctly found that Cameron did not meet the criteria for an acceptable medical
source because Vuletich did not provide evidence that she was a licensed physician or
psychologist. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a); Grotts v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1273, 1276–77
(7th Cir. 2022). Thus, the ALJ did not need to give her opinion controlling weight. Even
so, the ALJ confirmed that she considered Cameron’s opinion but permissibly found the
state-agency physicians and psychologists more credible. See Thorlton, 127 F.4th at 1082.
As for Dr. Costakis, Vuletich suggests that the ALJ erred by failing to give
sufficient weight to her deposition testimony related to Vuletich’s disability from the
unrelated 2012 case. But this testimony, which Vuletich submitted to the Appeals
Council only after the ALJ’s unfavorable ruling, was rejected as immaterial. And
Vuletich does not argue that the Appeals Council’s materiality finding was erroneous.
Therefore, the testimony “cannot be considered to reevaluate the ALJ’s factual
findings.” Farrell, 692 F.3d at 770; see also Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 366 n.2 (7th Cir.
2012).
Finally, Vuletich argues that we should consider a 2019 form completed by one
of his physicians, which Vuletich attaches to his brief, and the 2021 remarks of
Vuletich’s most recent psychiatrist, Dr. David Downing. But our review is limited to the
ALJ’s assessment of Vuletich’s “condition as it existed at or prior to the time of the
administrative hearing” in January 2018. Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir.
2005). This evidence reflects the treatment Vuletich received after that date.
AFFIRMED

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