Kendall Harlson v. Government Employees Insurance Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 19, 2025 *
Decided June 24, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2692
KENDALL HARLSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-01965-TWP-MKK
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Kendall Harlson appeals the district judge’s screening order dismissing his
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We see no error and affirm.
* The appellee was not served with process and is not participating in this appeal.
We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2692 Page 2
Harlson sued the Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) in
federal court in 2023, complaining that it wrongfully denied car insurance claims that he
filed after a car crash. The district judge screened his complaint three times, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2), each time concluding that Harlson had not established subject-matter
jurisdiction and granting him leave to amend. The court explained in its screening
orders that Harlson had not pleaded sufficient facts to determine GEICO’s citizenship,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (c)(1), and the complaint revealed no possible non-frivolous
federal question, see id. § 1331. In his third amended complaint, Harlson asserted that
GEICO’s “primary address” is in Maryland and that GEICO is incorporated in
Washington, D.C., because that is the location of its “primary mailing address.” Harlson
said that he is a citizen of Indiana. Harlson sought at least $90,000: the total of the
unpaid claims he submitted to GEICO. He also argued that GEICO is a state actor that
had committed constitutional violations. And he moved to seal financial documentation
in the case, explaining that he wished his business matters to be kept private.
The district judge dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
judge explained that Harlson had not provided sufficient information to determine
GEICO’s citizenship. Moreover, GEICO was not a state actor or acting under color of
state law, so Harlson could not maintain his constitutional claims against it. The judge
also denied the motion to seal.
On appeal, Harlson reasserts that there is diversity jurisdiction because he and
GEICO are not citizens of the same state, and he maintains that there is federal-question
jurisdiction because GEICO is a state actor that violated his constitutional rights. He
also disputes the district judge’s denial of his motion to seal financial documents,
arguing that the judge’s ruling prevented him from submitting the necessary evidence
to support his claim.
Harlson has failed to establish diversity jurisdiction. The party invoking
diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of persuasion on its existence. See Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010); Ware v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 6 F.4th 726, 731 (7th Cir.
2021). “Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94. When
jurisdiction is challenged, whether by a party or sua sponte by the judge, the party
asserting jurisdiction must support the allegations concerning jurisdiction with
“competent proof.” Yancheng Shanda Yuanfeng Equity Inv. P’ship v. Wan, 59 F.4th 262,
267–68 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96–97); see also McNutt v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). If the party asserting jurisdiction fails to

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No. 24-2692 Page 3
adduce sufficient facts to establish the citizenship of the parties, the case must be
dismissed. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998).
Here, the district judge questioned the existence of diversity in all three of its
screening orders. Each time, the judge told Harlson that he had failed to establish
GEICO’s primary place of business and place of incorporation. But Harlson continued
to assert only that GEICO has a primary address in Maryland and must be incorporated
in Washington, D.C., based on its primary mailing address. These statements do not
constitute “competent proof” of GEICO’s citizenship. First, a corporation’s primary
mailing address does not necessarily establish its state of incorporation. Second, a
corporation’s “primary address” does not establish its principal place of business. A
corporation’s principal place of business, called the “nerve center,” is the location where
its “officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz, 559 U.S.
at 92–93. Typically, a corporation’s headquarters constitutes its nerve center, id. at 93,
and it is true that various public records suggest that GEICO’s headquarters is either in
Washington, D.C., or Maryland. But “some corporations may divide their command
and coordinating functions among officers who work at several different locations.” Id.
at 95–96. And it appears that GEICO has offices throughout the United States, including
a location in Indiana.
The district judge gave Harlson three chances and nearly five months to support
his allegations. In each screening order, the judge explained that Harlson must allege
GEICO’s state of incorporation and state in which it had its principal place of business,
yet Harlson never clearly stated either one. Moreover, Harlson never requested that
GEICO be served so that he could conduct jurisdictional discovery to determine its
primary place of business or place of incorporation. See Qin v. Deslongchamps, 31 F.4th
576, 582 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that “[c]ourts sometimes authorize [jurisdictional
discovery] after suit is filed when doubt emerges regarding whether, as alleged, the
parties are in fact diverse”). Without more, the district court did not err in determining
that Harlson failed to carry his burden to establish diversity jurisdiction.
The district judge also correctly concluded that Harlson failed to establish
federal-question jurisdiction. Harlson maintains that he may pursue a claim that GEICO
violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. But a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of constitutional rights is available only against those
acting under color of state law. See Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194–95 (2024). Harlson
insists that GEICO must be a state actor because its name includes the words

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No. 24-2692 Page 4
“government” and “employees.” But a corporation’s name does not establish that it is a
state actor, and Harlson’s complaint provides no other reason to believe GEICO is
acting under color of state law.
Finally, the district judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Harlson’s
motion to seal all financial documents. Before granting a motion to seal, the judge must
determine that there is good cause. See Citizens First. Nat. Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178
F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 1999). Harlson did not provide to the district court the documents
he sought to have sealed, making it impossible for the judge to assess good cause.
AFFIRMED

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No. 24-2692 Page 5
M ALDONADO, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. In my view, Harlson’s pro se
complaint includes sufficient facts to establish GEICO’s citizenship for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction—at least at the screening stage. The majority declines to liberally
construe Harlson’s citizenship allegations and instead holds him to a heightened
requirement that he produce “proof” of GEICO’s citizenship without the benefit of any
discovery. I would therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and
remand the case for service of process on GEICO, leaving it to GEICO to contest the
issue if it believes jurisdiction is lacking.
This appeal rests at the intersection of notice pleading standards, the liberal
construction standard for pro se litigants, and the court’s obligation to ensure subject
matter jurisdiction. When courts screen pro se complaints under the Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), they generally apply the same standards
that govern motions to dismiss, including accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true
and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Arnett v. Webster, 658
F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Further, it is well-established that courts should construe
pro se complaints “liberally, holding [them] to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)
(cleaned up). These pleading standards apply equally when we evaluate jurisdiction on
the face of the pleadings. Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015). All that is
required is that the plaintiff “sufficiently allege[] a basis of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Apex Digit., Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009). The same
obligation to liberally construe pro se filings applies to jurisdictional questions. See, e.g.,
Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 1986).
Applying these standards, Harlson has alleged complete diversity of citizenship
at the screening stage. There is no dispute over the amount in controversy; all agree that
Harlson alleges Indiana citizenship. We diverge on the citizenship of GEICO. Harlson
alleges that GEICO’s “primary address” is in Maryland and that it is incorporated in
Washington, D.C., a fact he deduced from GEICO’s website listing a Washington, D.C.
address for all corporate mailings. While inartful, these allegations can reasonably be
construed as asserting that GEICO’s “nerve center,” i.e. its principal place of business, is
in Maryland, and that its place of incorporation is Washington, D.C. At a minimum, the
allegations support a plausible inference that this is what Harlson intended to do,
semantics aside.
The majority’s contrary conclusion is hard to square with the settled pleading
standards for pro se plaintiffs. Rather than construe Harlson’s allegations in his favor,

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the majority rejects them as insufficient “proof” of GEICO’s citizenship. But that
demand for proof is misplaced at this early screening stage when GEICO has not been
served and discovery has not started. Of course, once jurisdiction has been called into
question, the party asserting it must support their allegations with competent proof.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010). But that requirement ordinarily arises
when the opposing party has appeared and challenged jurisdiction, or when an
allegation in the complaint or record raises questions triggering the court’s duty to
examine jurisdiction sua sponte. A demand for proof is inappropriate where, as here, no
party has appeared and contested jurisdiction, the allegations plausibly allege diversity,
and nothing in the complaint casts doubt on their truth. It is especially problematic to
require proof when publicly available information, such as GEICO’s state of
incorporation and location of its headquarters, aligns with the plaintiff’s allegations of
citizenship.
To be sure, a company’s headquarters may not always be its “nerve center,” and
a primary mailing address may not establish a state of incorporation. But it is
inappropriate to presume such uncertainties here—and to use them against Harlson—
absent any contrary indication in the record. Nor is it realistic, as the majority suggests,
to fault Harlson for not requesting service or early jurisdictional discovery to back up
his citizenship claims. Setting aside the impractical burden this imposes on pro se
litigants unfamiliar with civil procedure, there is no justification for requiring additional
steps to prove what the complaint and public records already make plausible.
I recognize that screening under the PLRA serves an important role in weeding
out frivolous suits from packed dockets, of which the Southern District of Indiana is
one. And courts must always assure themselves of jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). But, in my view, the screening here prematurely dismissed a
complaint that, on its face, plausibly established a basis of federal jurisdiction. Applying
a heightened screening standard undermines the purpose of our notice pleading
regime, which is to “focus litigation on the merits of a claim rather than on technicalities
that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up).
Harlson’s claims may ultimately have lacked merit, and it could have come to
light that he sued the wrong GEICO entity or that diversity was, in fact, lacking. But
these are issues that should have been tested in the adversarial process after GEICO
appeared. Because the majority prematurely ends Harlson’s lawsuit before that process
can play out, I respectfully dissent.

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