United States of America v. Ronald Haddad, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 19, 2025
Decided June 27, 2025
By the Court:
Nos. 24-2855, 25-1484, 25-2020, 25-2040
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RONALD HADDAD, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:09-CR-00115(1)
Virginia M. Kendall,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Ronald Haddad appeals the revocation of his supervised release and the
sentence he received for violating the conditions. His appointed counsel asserts that the
appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967). Although a defendant does not have an unqualified constitutional right to
counsel in a revocation proceeding, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973), it is still
our practice to apply the safeguards of Anders in this context. See United States v. Brown,
823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit
our review to the subjects that counsel discusses and the responses that Haddad has
filed under Circuit Rule 51(b). See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
We grant counsel’s motion and dismiss the appeal.
In April 2014, a jury found Haddad guilty of 28 counts of mailing threatening
communications, 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), and 2 counts of using interstate commerce to
transmit threatening communications, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The district judge sentenced
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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him to 150 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. He began
serving supervised release in January 2022. From April to July of 2024, the probation
office reported six violations in quick succession. Relevant here are two charged
violations of the condition prohibiting the commission of another local, state, or federal
offense. The first new offense by Haddad was a state conviction for criminal trespass, a
Grade C violation of his federal supervised release, because he had visited a local
library from which he had been banned. 720 I LL. C OMP . S TAT. 5/21-3(a)(2) (2012). The
second charged violation stemmed from Haddad’s arrest for aggravated battery on a
peace officer, id. 5/12-3.05(d)(4), a Grade B violation. According to the police report of
the incident, Haddad became aggressive with police officers when they questioned him
about a bench warrant, and he then scratched one of the officers who was trying to take
him into custody.
In August 2024, the district judge held a status hearing at which she discussed
the alleged violations and announced her intention to revoke Haddad’s supervised
release. The judge noted two supervision violations based on criminal conduct: the
trespass, of which Haddad had already been convicted, and the aggravated battery, for
which Haddad had been arrested and the state court had found probable cause.
In October 2024, the final revocation hearing took place. At the outset, Haddad’s
lawyer told the judge that Haddad “would be prepared to plead guilty to those
violations.” The judge then questioned Haddad to establish that he had been convicted
of the trespass charge and arrested for the aggravated battery. Haddad admitted to the
conviction, that he had been arrested, and that one of the officers stated that Haddad
had scratched him. He maintained, however, that the arrest was improper and that he
had not in fact committed battery on any officer.
The judge proceeded to sentencing, and the government recommended six
months’ imprisonment and two and a half years of supervised release. Haddad
requested time served on the grounds that he was taking care of his ailing mother and
would be rehabilitated more effectively through supervised release than incarceration.
An employee of the library also spoke, testifying that Haddad had scared the staff and
required the library to hire security officers before employees would return.
The court then calculated that, given Haddad’s criminal history score of I and
Grade B violation, the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines
recommended four to ten months’ imprisonment. Moving to the § 3553(a) factors, the
judge discussed the seriousness of the offense, particularly the disruption caused at the
library; Haddad’s need for specific deterrence, given his repeated disregard of court

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orders; the need for general deterrence; and the obligation to promote respect for the
law. The judge imposed six months’ reimprisonment and two and a half years of
supervised release. Her oral pronouncement of the sentence included two conditions of
supervised release that were not included in the written judgment: a requirement not to
“frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, or distributed or
administered” and a prohibition on “associat[ing] with any person convicted of a
felony.”1
Counsel, in her Anders brief, first notes that Haddad wishes to challenge the
revocation of his supervised release. Thus, she appropriately considers whether the
court’s decision to revoke was sound. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857
(7th Cir. 2016). Supervised release violations must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Perez, 99 F.4th 972, 976 (7th Cir. 2024).
Counsel first rightly concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support the
Grade C violation based on Haddad’s trespass in the library building after he had been
banned. Haddad was convicted of criminal trespass in state court, and his appeal was
pending when the revocation hearing occurred. A conviction, even one being appealed,
is sufficient to establish a violation of state law by a preponderance of the evidence,
regardless of whether he admitted to the conduct or the violation of his supervision
conditions. See United States v. Fleming, 9 F.3d 1253, 1254 (7th Cir. 1993); see also
United States v. Jett, 982 F.3d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that reasonable doubt
standard for criminal convictions is more onerous than preponderance of the evidence).
It would be frivolous to contest this violation.
As for Haddad’s battery on an officer, counsel is also correct that the court had a
sufficient evidentiary basis for this violation. Haddad’s lawyer told the court that
Haddad was prepared to admit to both violations, and Haddad did not object. Haddad
himself admitted to certain facts of the violation, namely that he had a confrontation
with police officers and that one officer stated that Haddad scratched him. Moreover,
the police report was in the record; it too stated that Haddad had scratched a police
1 The written judgment also imposed a $100 special assessment that was not
mentioned in the oral pronouncement. This was a clerical error that has since been
corrected in an amended judgment. F ED. R. C RIM . P. 36. Haddad filed two additional
pro se appeals from that amended judgment, but they are frivolous because he was not
injured by this favorable correction. See Levy v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 621, 626
(7th Cir. 2022).

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Nos. 24-2855, 25-1484, 25-2020, 25-2040 Page 4
officer when being arrested. Haddad’s statements, particularly when bolstered by the
police report, suffice to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Cf. United States v. Lopez-Hernandez, 687 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2012) (permitting reliance
on police reports to establish underlying facts in context of criminal sentencing).
Even if Haddad were to challenge the reliability of the police report and thus the
underlying evidentiary basis for his violation, he has forfeited the argument.
Defendants in the supervised release context have a due process right to confront
adverse witnesses; here, that would be the police officer who wrote the report about
Haddad’s arrest. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Perez, 99 F.4th at 976–77.
Haddad never objected to the use of the police report, nor did he request that the
authoring officer testify. His “failure to timely assert a right” is forfeiture. United States
v. Karst, 948 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2020).
We review forfeited arguments only for plain error, United States v. Flores,
929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019), and here Haddad would be unable to satisfy that
standard. Plain error would require Haddad to show that there was error; that it was
plain; and that it affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
733–35 (1993). If those factors are satisfied, we would then grant relief only if we
concluded that the error had a serious effect on the “‘fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 736 (citation omitted). Regardless of whether
the district court should have more clearly established the reliability of the police
report, Haddad still admitted to the Grade C violation of trespass. This violation would
also support the revocation of his supervised release. Further, it carried a policy
statement sentence of three to nine months, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2)(A); 7B1.4(a), as
compared to the practically identical range of four to ten months for the trespass
violation. Haddad would not be able to show with a “reasonable probability,” United
States v. Durham, 967 F.3d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 2020), that the judge would have imposed a
different sentence if faced with a functionally identical guidelines range. Nor would we
conclude that any error seriously affected the reputation of judicial proceedings or
would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id.; Olano, 507 U.S. at 735–36. Haddad has since
been convicted of the battery, and even as of the time of sentencing, he conceded that an
altercation of some sort had occurred, albeit one for which he denied responsibility.
In explaining that it would be frivolous to challenge the revocation decision,
counsel further notes that the district judge substantially complied with Rule 32.1(b)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure at the final revocation hearing. Haddad
received and reviewed notices of his violations with counsel; the evidence against him

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was disclosed; he appeared at the hearing and spoke on his own behalf; and he had
counsel to represent him. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(A)–(E).
Counsel next considers whether the revocation sentence was correctly imposed.
She first concludes that the district judge correctly calculated the applicable range under
the Policy Statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines: four to ten months
based on a criminal history category of I and a Grade B violation. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).
Counsel also notes that the maximum sentence of imprisonment for this charged
violation of supervised release is two years, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), meaning that
Haddad’s six-month sentence of imprisonment is not unlawful. We agree with counsel
that neither of these issues could be the subject of a nonfrivolous challenge.
Counsel also considers whether Haddad’s sentence was substantively reasonable
and concludes that there is no non frivolous argument that it is excessive. Counsel does,
however, note that the judge mentioned the seriousness of the offense and respect for
the law when fashioning the sentence. A district judge is limited to only considering
specific § 3553(a) factors when imposing a revocation sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), and
neither the seriousness of the original offense nor promoting respect for the law is
among them. Esteras v. United States, No. 23-7483, 2025 WL 1716137, at *6 (U.S. 2025).
But Haddad did not object to the judge’s discussion of these factors at sentencing, so we
would review only for plain error. Id. at *10. Even if we were to grant that the judge
erred by mentioning impermissible factors, and that the error was plain, Haddad would
fail to show that it affected his substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733–35. The
judge here only briefly mentioned the seriousness of the offense and respect for the law
and emphasized that the “big problem” was the repeated nature of the offenses and so,
the need for specific and general deterrence. Given the judge’s heavy reliance on
permissible factors, Haddad would be unable to show a “reasonable probability” that
he would have received a lower sentence had the judge not considered in passing two
impermissible factors. United States v. Durham, 967 F.3d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 2020). Nor
would we conclude that the error seriously affected the “fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. Haddad already received a
sentence at the low end of the guidelines policy statement range, and nothing the judge
said suggested she was sentencing for retribution rather than deterrence, incapacitation,
or rehabilitation. See Esteras, 2025 WL 1716137 at *7.
Moreover, even if we were to omit the judge’s discussion of extraneous factors
from our review, she still adequately justified the sentence. A sentence within the
policy-statement range is presumptively reasonable on appeal. And here, the judge

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cited Haddad’s tendency to “challenge and contest” authority, noting that this conduct
suggests a need for specific deterrence. Haddad has not explained why the
presumption of reasonableness should not apply, and this “concise explanation” is
sufficient. United States v. Yankey, 56 F.4th 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2023).
Counsel concludes her discussion of Haddad’s prison sentence by addressing his
argument that the judge should have lowered his sentence in consideration of the time
he spent in state custody before being sentenced for the revocation. Although a judge
has the discretion to reduce a sentence for that reason, Haddad did not request this
relief at sentencing, and we have never required that judges consider a sentencing offset
sua sponte when fashioning an appropriate sentence. See United States v. Carr, 107 F.4th
636, 672–73 (7th Cir. 2024). Moreover, the judge correctly noted that the Bureau of
Prisons could credit Haddad’s time served when calculating his release date.
As to the supervised release portion of the sentence, counsel correctly concludes
that we would find no errors in either the term or the conditions. Upon revocation, the
district judge had discretion to impose a new term of supervised release to follow the
prison sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). The length of two and a half years accords with the
statutory maximum, which caps the term of supervised release imposed after a
revocation at the maximum for the grade of the original offense (here three years),
minus any prison sentence served after the revocation. Id. § 3583(b)(2), (h). And counsel
properly rejects any argument that the new sentence of supervised release is plainly
unreasonable because the judge considered appropriate § 3553(a) factors like Haddad’s
characteristics and the need to avoid sentencing disparities before imposing it.
See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 858.
Haddad also could not raise a nonfrivolous argument about the conditions of his
supervised release. The judge read the conditions out loud, asked Haddad if he had any
objections, and Haddad, through counsel, denied that he did. Because he was given a
clear opportunity to object and stated that he did not want to, Haddad waived any
challenge to his conditions. See United States v. Patlan, 31 F.4th 552, 559 (7th Cir. 2022).
Finally, counsel addresses discrepancies between the oral pronouncement of the
sentence and the written judgment. With regard to the minor differences in wording of
two conditions of supervised release, counsel rightly notes that they did not change the
substantive legal obligations imposed orally, and so there would be no basis for
resentencing. See United States v. Strobel, 987 F.3d 743, 751 (7th Cir. 2021). The larger
change was that two other conditions orally imposed by the judge do not appear in the
judgment. But this would not provide a nonfrivolous ground for appeal because fewer

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conditions—ones this court has found to be unconstitutionally overbroad, see United
States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 848–50 (7th Cir. 2015)—are to Haddad’s benefit. And as
counsel correctly notes, she is not under an obligation to raise issues that might harm
her client. United States v. Caviedes-Zuniga, 948 F.3d 854, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2020).
In his responses, Haddad also argues that the district judge deprived him of due
process by failing to appropriately consider his motion for reconsideration and, further,
that she was biased against him. But the judge denied the motion because Haddad’s
sole argument was that the judge should have credited his time served. (She mentioned
this but left it to the BOP’s discretion.) He asserts that the 11 days between his motion
and the judge’s ruling shows that the judge did not give it sufficient consideration, but
he cites no authority to suggest a judge must spend a certain amount of time with a
motion to demonstrate sufficient process. Nor would we make such a rule given the
district judge’s considerable discretion over matters of case management. And as
evidence for his claim of bias, Haddad points only to adverse rulings in his case. But
adverse rulings, alone, are not sufficient to establish bias. Litecky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2017).
Haddad raises several other complaints in his responses to the Anders brief,
saying that the prison staff are stealing his mail, claiming that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, and arguing that he should not be imprisoned at all. Given the
undeveloped record of counsel’s decisions, it would be frivolous to bring an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. See United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453,
456–57 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003)). And
Haddad’s other complaints are not within the scope of a direct appeal.
Haddad has also filed three additional pro se appeals, which we consolidate with
his first appeal. A litigant who remains represented by counsel is not generally entitled
to file papers pro se. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 962 F.3d 892, 899 (7th Cir. 2020).
Moreover, the government stands on its rights to argue that appeal No. 25-1484 is
clearly untimely, and Haddad’s reply does not argue otherwise, so that appeal must be
dismissed. F ED. R. A PP . P. 4(b)(1); United States v. Townsend, 762 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir.
2014). And to the extent we interpret his other two appeals as supplemental responses
to his counsel’s Anders brief, they do not raise any perceivable arguments we have not
already addressed.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS these appeals.

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