Daniel C. Stanton, Jr. v. Ron Neal

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 17, 2025 *
Decided July 17, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3188
DANIEL C. STANTON, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
RON NEAL,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division
No. 3:24-CV-382-GSL-JEM
Gretchen S. Lund,
Judge.
O R D E R
Daniel Stanton, an Indiana prisoner, lost 180 days of accumulated good-time
credit and was demoted to a lower credit-earning class as punishment for an incident
involving his battery of a prison officer. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-3188 Page 2
see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that he had been denied the right to due process in the
disciplinary proceeding. The district court denied the petition. We affirm.
In September 2023, after an altercation between Stanton and other inmates,
Stanton was placed in a holding area. When officers arrived to move Stanton to a new
dorm, Stanton resisted, insisting that the officers place him in protective custody. An
officer then wrote a conduct report charging Stanton with battery against a staff
member. IND. D EP’ T OF C ORR ., ADULT D ISCIPLINARY P ROCESS , C ODE NO. 117 (2023). The
procedure manual defines battery as “[k]nowingly or intentionally touching another
person in a rude, insolent or angry manner; or in a in a rude, insolent, or angry manner
placing any bodily fluid or bodily waste on another person.” See IND. D EP’ T OF
C ORR ., A DMIN. P. No. 02-04-101, § III(F) (2023). The officer’s report stated that Stanton
had resisted officers’ attempt to move him, became “combative,” and injured her hand.
After receiving copies of the conduct report and notice of the charge and upcoming
hearing, Stanton signed a form entering a plea of not guilty and requested a lay
advocate. On that form, Stanton did not request any witnesses or physical evidence.
The next month a disciplinary hearing officer held a hearing. Although the
hearing report says that Stanton was present and stated, “I didn’t do it,” Stanton asserts
that he was not at the hearing. The hearing officer found Stanton guilty based on the
conduct report, a photograph of the officer’s hand injury, and Stanton’s statement. As a
sanction, Stanton lost 180 days of accumulated good-time credit and was demoted one
credit-earning class. Stanton’s administrative appeals were denied.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Stanton filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that he was deprived of liberty without due
process. Specifically, Stanton asserted that inadequate evidence supported the finding
of guilt and that prison officials improperly held the disciplinary hearing without him.
The district court denied the petition, concluding that there was some evidence of
Stanton’s guilt and any error related to Stanton’s presence at the hearing was harmless.
Stanton appeals. We review the denial of his petition de novo. Love v. Vanihel,
73 F.4th 439, 445 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied Love v. Neal, 145 S. Ct. 138 (2024).
On appeal, Stanton maintains that insufficient evidence supported the finding of
guilt. Stanton has a liberty interest in his good-time credit and his credit-earning class,
so he is entitled to due process before either can be taken away. See Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016); Piggie v.

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No. 24-3188 Page 3
Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003). This right requires only that the decision of the
hearing officer be supported by “some evidence.” Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 849
(7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007)). Reviewing a
decision for some evidence “does not require examination of the entire record,
independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.”
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985). Rather, we must determine only
whether the decision is supported by some factual basis. See id.; McPherson v. McBride,
188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, the conduct report alone provides “some
evidence” to support the hearing officer’s decision. See McPherson, 188 F.3d at 786
(concluding that description in disciplinary report is “some evidence”). The report
describes the incident and infraction in sufficient detail, stating that Stanton “began to
resist” when officers attempted to move him, became “combative,” and injured the
officer’s hand. This is sufficient to support the finding that Stanton knowingly touched
an officer in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.
Stanton raises two counterarguments. First, he says that his absence from the
hearing prevented him from refuting the officer’s conduct report. But we agree with the
district court that any error related to Stanton’s absence from the hearing would be
harmless. See Jones, 637 F.3d at 846–47 (applying harmless-error analysis in prison
disciplinary context). Stanton states that had he attended the hearing, he would have
denied committing the battery. But Stanton’s denial was noted by the hearing officer,
and Stanton provides no further detail about what his testimony might have been or
how it would have aided his defense.
Second, Stanton asserts that prison officials withheld photo and video evidence
that would have invalidated the report. Stanton would be entitled to view exculpatory
evidence so that he could prepare an adequate defense and ensure the hearing officer
considered all relevant evidence. See Piggie, 344 F.3d at 678. But Stanton never raised
this argument in the administrative appeal process, so it is procedurally defaulted. Love,
73 F.4th at 446. Even if he had preserved this argument, however, nothing in the record
suggests that any other evidence related to the incident existed. Indeed, on the form
providing notice of the hearing, Stanton did not request any physical evidence or ask to
present any witnesses.
Finally, Stanton argues for the first time on appeal that the hearing officer
misunderstood the elements of the offense. Specifically, he says that battery against a
staff member requires the use of a weapon or serious bodily injury, and prison officials
presented no evidence to prove those elements. But Stanton waived this argument by

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failing to raise it in the district court. Bradley v. Vill. of Univ. Park, Ill., 59 F.4th 887, 897
(7th Cir. 2023). In any event, Stanton is incorrect about the elements of the offense.
Battery requires only a knowing or intentional touch in a rude, insolent or angry
manner. Prison officials were not required to prove that Stanton committed the battery
with a weapon or that his actions caused serious injury.
AFFIRMED

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