Edward C. Snukis , J R . v. Matthew O. Taylor

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1946
EDWARD C. SNUKIS , J R . and SAMANTHA SNUKIS , Co-Adminis-
trators of the Estate of Edward C. Snukis,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MATTHEW O. T AYLOR , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.
No. 3:21-cv-00135-MPB-MJD — Matthew P. Brookman, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED FEBRUARY 25, 2025 — D ECIDED J ULY 28, 2025
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and KIRSCH and J ACKSON-
A KIWUMI, Circuit Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Officers Matthew Taylor and Trevor
Koontz stopped Edward Snukis after receiving a dispatch that
a man matching his description was impaired and refusing to
leave the parking lot of a local business. The encounter
quickly turned violent. After Snukis refused commands and
struck Officer Koontz, Officer Taylor tased Snukis twice,

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Koontz and Taylor pinned him to the ground, and Taylor
struck Snukis in the head six times. Officers Taylor, Koontz,
and Nicholas Hackworth secured Snukis in handcuffs but
then noticed that Snukis had lost consciousness. They imme-
diately called for emergency assistance and monitored his
breathing and pulse. When Snukis no longer had a pulse, the
officers performed chest compressions until the paramedics
arrived. Snukis died later that evening.
Snukis’s children—co-administrators of his estate—sued
the officers and the City of Evansville. Relevant to this appeal,
the estate brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The estate appeals only the claims against the officers. Be-
cause the officers’ use of force was reasonable considering
Snukis’s resistance and they provided prompt medical care,
we affirm.
I
An employee of a Honda dealership reported to a 9-1-1
emergency dispatcher that an impaired man had repeatedly
entered a rear parking lot, was peering into windows, and
was refusing to leave. The caller expressed concern that the
man would be hit by a passing car.
Evansville police officers Matthew Taylor and Trevor
Koontz responded to the call. As they arrived on the scene,
both officers activated their bodycams; the footage firmly es-
tablishes many of the facts that follow. See Pryor v. Corrigan,
124 F.4th 475, 483–84 (7th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). In
the parking lot they encountered Edward Snukis, who
matched the description of the man identified in the 9-1-1 call
and appeared to be intoxicated. Officer Koontz approached

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No. 24-1946 3
Snukis and asked him (twice) to put his hands on his head.
When Snukis failed to do so, Officer Koontz grabbed Snukis’s
arm and told him to turn around. Snukis resisted and a brief
struggle ensued. As Snukis tried to get away, he struck Officer
Koontz with his arm. Both men fell to the ground. At that
point, Officer Taylor fired his taser into Snukis and ordered
him to get on the ground with his hands up. When Snukis
rolled over and started removing the barbs from his chest, Of-
ficer Taylor tased him a second time. Snukis removed the
barbs, got up, and fled.
After a brief foot pursuit, Snukis tripped and fell. Officers
Taylor and Koontz got on top of Snukis and attempted to
handcuff him. Snukis continued to resist: while the officers
commanded him to put his hands behind his back, Snukis
grabbed at Officer Taylor’s genitals, reached for his holster,
and took hold of his leg. To get free of Snukis’s grasp, Officer
Taylor struck Snukis in the head approximately six times.
Eventually the officers were able to get Snukis’s hands behind
his back and handcuff him. A third officer, Nicholas Hack-
worth, arrived on the scene as Snukis was being secured.
Although Snukis was initially shouting and swearing at
the officers when they got on top of him, Snukis became qui-
eter as they struggled to handcuff him. Snukis also began
making guttural and snoring sounds. Once Snukis was se-
cured in handcuffs, one of the officers observed that he ap-
peared to be unconscious. The officers turned Snukis over to
check that he was still breathing. He was, though he remained
unresponsive. An officer began applying sternum rubs and
Officer Hackworth called for medical assistance. The officers
continued to monitor Snukis’s breathing and pulse. When
they could no longer detect a pulse, the officers removed his

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4 No. 24-1946
handcuffs and administered chest compressions until para-
medics arrived. Snukis was pronounced dead later that even-
ing.
Edward Snukis, Jr. and Samantha Snukis are co-
administrators of Snukis’s estate. The estate filed this action
against the City of Evansville and Officers Taylor, Koontz, and
Hackworth, asserting various claims under federal and state
law. Relevant to this appeal, the estate brought claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers for violating Snukis’s
Fourth Amendment rights. The estate alleged that (1) Officers
Taylor and Koontz used excessive force against Snukis; (2)
Taylor failed to intervene when Koontz used excessive force;
and (3) Officers Taylor, Koontz, and Hackworth failed to
render medical aid. The officers moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion and the estate
appealed.
II
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 769 (7th
Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is warranted if there is no gen-
uine dispute of material fact and the officers are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In applying
this standard, we view the facts in the light most favorable to
the estate and resolve all disputed issues of fact in their favor.
Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 769. However, “[w]e will not consider
factual arguments that were not raised below nor shall we
consider evidence that was not properly cited to the court be-
low.” Packer v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. Sch. of Med., 800 F.3d 843, 849
(7th Cir. 2015). Our review is limited to the reasons for the
district court’s decision based on what was argued and pre-
sented to it by the parties. Id. at 848–49.

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No. 24-1946 5
A
First, we consider the estate’s excessive force claim. When
an officer uses physical force to restrain an individual, he ef-
fects a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 309 (2021). Determining
whether the force the officers used is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment requires a case specific analysis
that “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable of-
ficer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind-
sight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). We consider
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Id.
The estate challenges three uses of force as excessive: (1)
Officer Koontz grabbing Snukis’s arm, (2) Officer Taylor tas-
ing Snukis, and (3) Taylor repeatedly striking Snukis in the
head. We consider each in turn.
1
The estate first argues that, by grabbing Snukis’s arm, Of-
ficer Koontz immediately and unreasonably escalated to
physical force. However, the estate has forfeited this argu-
ment by failing to raise it in the district court. See Packer, 800
F.3d at 849 (“It is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a
summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the
reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not
be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot
raise such reasons on appeal.”) (quotation and emphasis
omitted).

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6 No. 24-1946
In opposing the motion for summary judgment, the estate
failed to explain how Officer Koontz’s initial contact was un-
reasonable. The closest it came to doing so was when the es-
tate argued that the officers’ motion did not “address any of
the other uses of force by Koontz described elsewhere in this
brief.” But the estate did not include any reference or citation
as to what those other uses of force might be, or explain why
those uses of force were unreasonable. In opposing the mo-
tion, the estate needed to identify the reasons—legal or fac-
tual—why their excessive force claim was viable. Vague ref-
erences to Officer Koontz’s arm grab were not sufficient to
alert the district court or the officers that this use of force was
a basis for the excessive force claim, so we will not consider
the argument on appeal. See id.
2
The estate next argues that Officer Taylor’s use of his taser
was excessive force. Tasers “fall[] somewhere in the middle of
the nonlethal-force spectrum.” Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705
F.3d 706, 726 (7th Cir. 2013). While it may be unreasonable to
use a taser against suspects that are passively noncompliant
or uncooperative but subdued, courts have generally held
that it can be appropriate to use tasers against suspects who
are actively resisting officers. Id. at 727–28, 730–31 (collecting
cases); Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 467–68 (7th Cir.
2018) (collecting cases). Active resistance includes “kicking
and flailing, declining to follow instructions while acting in a
belligerent manner, and swatting an arresting officer’s hands
away while backpedaling.” Dockery, 911 F.3d at 467 (quota-
tion and citations omitted).
Officer Taylor’s two uses of his taser were reasonable. He
and Officer Koontz approached Snukis while looking for

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No. 24-1946 7
someone suspected of minor crimes—a man matching
Snukis’s description had been trespassing and was potentially
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Snukis then refused
Officer Koontz’s commands to put his hands on his head.
When Officer Koontz attempted to grab Snukis’s arm, Snukis
struggled to break free of his grasp. He struck Officer Koontz
in the process, knocking him to the ground. Officer Taylor
then tased Snukis for the first time, but Snukis continued to
resist. Snukis rolled over and started to remove the barbs from
his chest, ignoring Officer Taylor’s commands to stay on the
ground with his hands up. Taylor then tased Snukis a second
time. “In short, [Snukis’s] combative demeanor never
changed, and he did nothing to manifest submission.” Id. at
468; cf. Abbott, 705 F.3d at 732 (suspect “fell to the ground and
convulsed but made no movement after the first tasing”); Cy-
rus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir. 2010)
(suspect had not violently resisted and was “unarmed and …
face down … with his hands underneath him and having al-
ready been shocked twice with the Taser”). Given Snukis’s ac-
tive resistance and the physical threat he posed to the officers,
Officer Taylor’s decisions to tase Snukis were objectively rea-
sonable attempts to gain control and prevent the encounter
from escalating further.
The estate says it is disputed whether Snukis punched or
struck Officer Koontz because the blow is not shown in the
video evidence. But because the estate did not challenge this
factual assertion in the district court, it is forfeited on appeal.
Packer, 800 F.3d at 848–49. Regardless, the estate does not pro-
vide any evidence that would create a genuine dispute. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact … is gen-
uinely disputed must support the assertion by … citing to
particular parts of materials in the record ….”). The contact at

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8 No. 24-1946
issue is also clear enough in Officer Taylor’s bodycam footage:
the two were grappling with one another, Snukis’s arm came
into forceful contact with Koontz’s upper body, and the two
men then fell to the ground.
3
Finally, the estate argues that Officer Taylor used excessive
force when he struck Snukis in the head six times while
Snukis was on the ground. The estate contends that Officer
Taylor should have paused between blows to give Snukis time
to comply with his commands.
For Officer Taylor’s strikes to be excessive, he must have
used greater force than was reasonably necessary to subdue
Snukis. Abbott, 705 F.3d at 724. “Force is reasonable only when
exercised in proportion to the threat posed, and as the threat
changes, so too should the degree of force.” Cyrus, 624 F.3d at
863 (citation omitted). However, we do not require officers to
alter the degree of force they use “at the precise second” the
threat changes. Brumitt v. Smith, 102 F.4th 444, 448 (7th Cir.
2024); see also Sallenger v. City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 504
(7th Cir. 2010) (“The Fourth Amendment requires reasonable-
ness, not immediacy.”). When officers are forced to make
“split-second judgments” in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving” circumstances, we give them considerable leeway
“about the amount of force that is necessary” to subdue a sus-
pect. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.
Given the threat posed by Snukis, Officer Taylor’s use of
force was a reasonable means of gaining control. When Of-
ficer Taylor punched him, Snukis was struggling beneath the
officers: he was refusing their commands, grabbing at Taylor’s
genitals and holster, and actively gripping Taylor’s inner

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No. 24-1946 9
thigh. Prior attempts at pain compliance had not deterred
Snukis. Even after officers had tased him twice and pinned
him to the ground, Snukis continued to actively resist. It was
reasonable, then, for Officer Taylor to believe that significant
force was necessary to subdue Snukis, and there is no evi-
dence that Taylor continued striking Snukis after he released
his grip on Taylor’s inner thigh. We will not second guess Of-
ficer Taylor’s split-second judgment under these circum-
stances. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Nor did Officer Taylor
need to interrupt his delivery of force to give Snukis time to
comply between each strike. See Brumitt, 102 F.4th at 448.
Snukis had several opportunities to comply with the officers’
commands but forcefully refused, putting the officers and
himself at risk of further harm.
On appeal, the estate disputes that Snukis grabbed at Of-
ficer Taylor. The estate argues that this was impossible be-
cause one of Snukis’s hands was trapped underneath him and
Officer Koontz had control of the other one. But the fact that
Officer Koontz had control of Snukis’s hand at one point in
the encounter does not show that Snukis did not grab at Of-
ficer Taylor. Regardless, the estate did not challenge this fac-
tual assertion in the district court, so it is forfeited on appeal.
Packer, 800 F.3d at 848–49. Because Snukis was actively resist-
ing the officers, the cases the estate cites involving no re-
sistance or only passive resistance are inapposite. See Frazell
v. Flanigan, 102 F.3d 877, 884–85 (7th Cir. 1996); Lester v. City
of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 1987); Herzog v. Village of
Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 2002).
B
The estate next contends that Officer Taylor failed to inter-
vene to prevent Officer Koontz from using excessive force.

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10 No. 24-1946
Because the estate does not have a viable excessive force claim
against Officer Koontz, this claim fails as well. See Harper v.
Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In order for there
to be a failure to intervene, it logically follows that there must
exist an underlying constitutional violation ….”).
C
The estate’s final § 1983 claim concerns the officers’ failure
to render medical aid. Officers violate a suspect’s Fourth
Amendment rights when their response to his medical needs
is objectively unreasonable. Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941,
953 (7th Cir. 2018). In assessing the reasonableness of an of-
ficer’s response, we consider four factors: “(1) whether the of-
ficer had notice of the medical needs; (2) the seriousness of the
medical needs; (3) the scope of the requested treatment; and
(4) police interests that might inhibit providing treatment.” Id.
The Fourth Amendment requires a reasonable response, not
an immediate one, Sallenger, 630 F.3d at 504, and the reasona-
bleness inquiry “takes into account the sufficiency of the steps
the officers did take,” Florek v. Village of Mundelein, 649 F.3d
594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).
We find that the officers’ response to Snukis’s medical
emergency was prompt and appropriate. The officers noticed
that Snukis appeared to be unconscious seconds after he was
secured in handcuffs. They immediately turned him over, ap-
plied sternum rubs, and called for medical assistance. As they
waited for help, they continued to monitor Snukis’s pulse and
breathing. When he no longer had a pulse, they took the
handcuffs off and applied chest compressions until paramed-
ics arrived. We have held that similar responses satisfy the
Fourth Amendment. See Sallenger, 630 F.3d at 502, 504 (offic-
ers began CPR and summoned ambulance as soon as they

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No. 24-1946 11
realized suspect was not breathing); Florek, 649 F.3d at 597, 601
(officers promptly called for an ambulance after learning of
suspect’s chest pains but did not administer medical treat-
ment themselves).
The estate raises two issues with the officers’ response.
First, the estate faults the officers for failing to attend to
Snukis’s medical needs until they had him handcuffed. In
their view, the officers were on notice that Snukis needed
medical care when he began making guttural and snoring
sounds. Even if we assume these sounds were sufficient to put
a reasonable officer on notice of Snukis’s medical need, the
officers had a countervailing interest in securing him before
providing medical care. Snukis was fighting with the officers
even after he had been pinned to the ground. It was reasona-
ble for them to first ensure that he would not present a con-
tinuing threat before they administered first aid. See Horton,
883 F.3d at 954 (holding that it was objectively reasonable for
an officer to delay medical care where armed suspects were
still at large). Moreover, the officers began attending to Snukis
less than one minute after the estate argues that it was obvious
Snukis was in medical distress. That is not an unreasonable
amount of time given the circumstances. Our decision in Sal-
lenger is instructive:
Everyone agrees that the officers endured a
tense and dangerous physical ordeal to subdue
and restrain Sallenger, a very large man who
was actively psychotic. Events unfolded rap-
idly: The officers arrived at the home just after 2
a.m., a violent struggle ensued, Sallenger was
brought under control and stopped breathing
some minutes later, and at 2:23 a.m. paramedics

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12 No. 24-1946
were summoned. On this record, the district
court was right to conclude that the evidence
does not support the Estate’s claim that the of-
ficers’ response to Sallenger’s medical needs
was unreasonable.
630 F.3d at 504.
Second, the estate argues that the officers unreasonably
delayed performing chest compressions on Snukis for about
four minutes after he was secured. Bodycam footage shows
that the officers repeatedly checked Snukis’s vital signs, how-
ever, and began CPR within one minute of losing his pulse.
This case isn’t like Bradich ex rel. Estate of Bradich v. City of Chi-
cago, 413 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2005), because the officers here pro-
vided care and called for medical help quickly. See id. at 690–
92 (finding that a ten minute delay in seeking care for an in-
mate who had stopped breathing was deliberate indiffer-
ence). It was reasonable to not perform chest compressions on
a suspect that had a pulse and was still breathing, and the of-
ficers provided care and called for an ambulance as soon as
they learned of Snukis’s medical emergency.
A FFIRMED

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