CHOSEN CONSULTING, LLC, doing business as CHOSEN HEALTHCARE v. Town Council of Highland, Indiana

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2714
C HOSEN C ONSULTING, LLC, doing business as C HOSEN
HEALTHCARE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
TOWN C OUNCIL OF HIGHLAND, I NDIANA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:20-cv-00246 — Philip P. Simon, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 28, 2025 — DECIDED A UGUST 1, 2025
____________________
Before R IPPLE, S T. EVE, and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
R IPPLE, Circuit Judge. Chosen Consulting, LLC, d/b/a Cho-
sen Healthcare, Indiana ATC JV, LLC, d/b/a Hickory Recovery
Network, Highland Recovery, LLC, d/b/a Hickory Treatment
Center at Highland, Chosen Highland, LLC, and Hickory
House Recovery, LLC (referred to collectively as “Chosen”)
brought this action against the Town Council of Highland, In-
diana, the Highland Municipal Plan Commission, and the

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2 No. 24-2714
Town of Highland, Indiana (referred to collectively as “the
Town”). Chosen alleged that the Town discriminated against
patients with addiction-related ailments by refusing to pro-
vide a letter stating that Chosen’s proposed use of its property
complies with local zoning requirements. Chosen claimed
that this discrimination violated the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and re-
quested compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief.
The district court granted summary judgment to the
Town. Chosen now appeals the district court’s denial of in-
junctive relief. Summary judgment on Chosen’s claim for in-
junctive relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act was
proper because that claim is not ripe for adjudication.
I
BACKGROUND
A.
This case concerns a property in Highland, Indiana that
historically operated as a nursing home. In the 1970s, the
property was classified as located in a “Class ‘A-1’ Residence
District.”1 In September 1971, the Town’s Board of Trustees
enacted Ordinance No. 645, which authorized a conditional
use of the property as a nursing home for National Nursing
Home, Inc. and its successors and assigns. At some point after
September 1971, the zoning district in which the property is
located was changed to a R-1A residential district.
Chosen purchased the property in April 2019 and began
transitioning it to treat primarily patients with addiction-
1 R.125-3 at 2.

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No. 24-2714 3
related ailments. As part of this transition, Chosen gave up
the facility’s dual certification as a nursing facility and a
skilled nursing facility. Chosen sought “to operate the facility
as … ‘a dual-certified nursing facility and skilled nursing fa-
cility to focus on providing continued services as (a) a sub-
acute facility pursuant to Ind. Code § 12-22-2 and (b) a Nurs-
ing Home pursuant to Section 18.05.250 of the Highland Mu-
nicipal Code.’”2 To transition to primarily treating patients
with addiction-related disorders as a sub-acute facility, Cho-
sen had to obtain a new license from the Indiana Family and
Social Services Administration. To secure this new license,
Chosen needed a letter from the Town stating that Chosen’s
proposed use of the property satisfies local zoning require-
ments.
In July 2019, Ken Mika, the Town’s Building Commis-
sioner and Zoning Administrator, and Mark Herak, a Town
Councilman, met with representatives of Chosen. Commis-
sioner Mika informed those representatives that Chosen
needed a use variance to convert the facility. To obtain a use
variance, Chosen first would have to apply to the Board of
Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). The BZA has “exclusive jurisdic-
tion for” use variances and would provide a “favorable or un-
favorable recommendation to” the Town Council as to
whether a use variance should be granted.3 The Town
2 R.133 at 4 (quoting R.38 ¶ 17).
3 R.56-1 at 270.

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4 No. 24-2714
Council would then approve or disapprove the BZA’s recom-
mendation.4
Chosen did not seek a variance. Sometime in the fall of
2019, however, it requested a letter from the Town “affirm-
ing” that its proposed use conformed with the property’s al-
leged “‘existing legal nonconforming use’ under Ordinance
No. 645.” Chosen Consulting, LLC v. Town Council of Highland,
No. 2:20-CV-246, 2024 WL 3983742, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 28,
2024). The Town did not issue the requested letter. In March
2020, Commissioner Mika and Councilman Herak met with
Chosen representative Melissa Durkin and reiterated that
Chosen would have to seek a use variance. Chosen still did
not do so.
In May 2020, the Town’s attorney emailed a Chosen rep-
resentative a draft letter. The attorney stated that he did not
have approval to send the letter and therefore Chosen could
not rely on it. This draft letter recited that in the Town’s opin-
ion, “the proposed use as a residential addiction treatment
4 The Town’s attorney also testified that Commissioner Mika and Coun-
cilman Herak suggested that Chosen file an application for rezoning. The
Town’s attorney stated that either rezoning or a use variance was neces-
sary because “the initial approval [for the facility] … did not contemplate
a substance abuse treatment facility.” R.125-5 at 16. We understand the
Town’s zoning ordinance to permit Chosen to apply for rezoning by peti-
tioning the Town’s Plan Commission, which would thereafter consider
the petition and provide a report to the Town Council. See R.56-1 at 264–
65 (providing the zoning code procedure for pursuing an amendment to
the zoning ordinance). The Town Council would then take final action. See
id. at 264.

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No. 24-2714 5
facility is permitted as a legal non-conforming use.”5 No final
letter was ever issued.
On June 5, 2020, Durkin emailed Councilman Herak re-
questing a call to “understand where we are in the process.”6
Councilman Herak responded that day stating that he had
“no knowledge of where the process is, as there is nothing
happening.”7 Councilman Herak explained that there was
nothing on the BZA’s docket, and that “[t]he town attorney
did say he didn’t think it was a protected class and a drug
rehab doesn’t fall under nursing care.”8 He concluded, “I
leave it to the lawyers.”9 Councilman Herak emailed Durkin
again later that day stating that he was “unaware of any letter,
either … being drafted or agreed to” and that the President of
the Town Council, Mark Schocke, was one of three board
members against the project.10 Notably, three members of the
Town Council composed a majority.
On June 9, 2020, Councilman Herak emailed Durkin in-
forming her that President Schocke, whose wife taught at a
school near the property, was “opposed to the idea” and “had
‘brow beate[n] the town attorney and he’s changed his opin-
ion.’” Id. (quoting R.63-1 at 4). The next day, Councilman
Herak emailed Durkin stating that “[t]he teachers at [the
nearby] school are opposed, as well as the neighbors. I assume
5 R.125-7 at 8.
6 R.63-1 at 6.
7 Id. at 5.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.

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6 No. 24-2714
they think that drug addicts will be sent there, able to leave at
will, sign out themselves, [and] walk the neighborhood.”11
B.
Chosen filed this action on June 26, 2020. It requested a
“declaratory judgment regarding proper zoning,” including
declarations that “[t]he Property is properly zoned and may
continue to operate as a legal nonconforming use” and that
Chosen is “entitled to obtain the requested documentation of
its legal nonconforming use.”12 The district court granted
judgment on the pleadings on this count. It reasoned that it
did not have jurisdiction because Chosen had not obtained a
final decision from the local zoning authorities and therefore
had not satisfied the finality requirement set forth in William-
son County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). This claim is not before us on
appeal.
The complaint also alleged that the Town has discrimi-
nated against disabled individuals by failing to provide the
requested letter in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Chosen requested compensa-
tory and equitable relief including the entry of a permanent
injunction ordering the Town “to stop obstructing [Chosen’s]
access to the Property for purposes of serving patients as a
certified sub-acute facility and compelling issuance of the re-
quested letter and [a] declaration that the proposed use of the
Property as a sub-acute facility meets all zoning
11 Id. at 3.
12 R.38 at 9–11.

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No. 24-2714 7
requirements.”13 The district court allowed this count to pro-
ceed to discovery, reasoning that Chosen had plausibly al-
leged that the Town had engaged in an unfair zoning ap-
proval process to inhibit the formal approval of Chosen’s pro-
posed use because of the residents’ disabilities.
The Town later filed a motion for summary judgment on
this count. The district court granted the motion. It first held
that under our decision in Discovery House, Inc. v. Consolidated
City of Indianapolis, 319 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2003), Chosen could
not pursue a claim for damages under Title II of the ADA or
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It next held that Chosen
was required to exhaust its available remedies under local
and state law before pursuing injunctive relief related to a lo-
cal zoning process, and having failed to do so, Chosen could
not obtain injunctive relief. The court indicated that Chosen
had “to further pursue its request for zoning approval to the
BZA and (if necessary) appeal any final decision entered by
the BZA to the state courts, prior to seeking an injunction in
federal court.” Chosen Consulting, 2024 WL 3983742, at *7. The
district court also clarified that even if a use variance were un-
necessary, Chosen still had to address its current grievance to
the BZA. It reasoned that the Town’s “refusal to issue” the re-
quested letter “would be subject to appeal before the [BZA],
at least in the first instance.” Id. The court stated that in the
zoning context, a plaintiff must pursue available remedies un-
der state law before proceeding in federal court.
Chosen appealed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment only as to its claim for injunctive relief under the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
13 Id. at 9.

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8 No. 24-2714
II
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment. Napier v. Orchard Sch. Found., 137 F.4th 884, 891 (7th
Cir. 2025). We construe the record in the light most favorable
to Chosen, the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable in-
ferences in Chosen’s favor. See id. Summary judgment is ap-
propriate if the Town, “the movant[,] shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that the Town “is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A.
The parties disagree as to whether Chosen’s statutory dis-
crimination claims, arising in the context of a local zoning dis-
pute, are sufficiently ripe to warrant injunctive relief. The Su-
preme Court set forth specific ripeness requirements for Tak-
ings Clause claims in Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985). In Williamson County, the Court required the respond-
ent to obtain a final decision regarding the application of the
relevant regulations to its property (“the finality require-
ment”) and to seek compensation through the available state
procedures (“the state-litigation requirement”) before pursu-
ing its Takings Clause claim in federal court. Id. at 186. The
Supreme Court later dispensed with the state-litigation re-
quirement in Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019). It
“held that a plaintiff may bring a ripe federal takings claim in
federal court, without first exhausting state remedies, as soon
as a government takes his property for public use without
paying for it.” Pavlock v. Holcomb, 35 F.4th 581, 589 (7th Cir.

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No. 24-2714 9
2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Knick, 588
U.S. at 184, 189).
Following Knick, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the valid-
ity of the finality requirement in Pakdel v. City & County of San
Francisco, 594 U.S. 474 (2021) (per curiam). In Pakdel, San Fran-
cisco approved the petitioners’ conversion of their property
interest in a multiunit residential building after they agreed
to offer their tenant a lifetime lease. Id. at 475–76. The petition-
ers later “requested that the city either excuse them from exe-
cuting the lifetime lease or compensate them for the lease.” Id.
at 476. The city refused and informed the petitioners that their
failure to execute a lifetime lease could result in an enforce-
ment action. Id. The petitioners then brought a federal action
“alleg[ing] that the lifetime-lease requirement was an uncon-
stitutional regulatory taking.” Id. The Ninth Circuit held that
this claim was not ripe. Id. at 477 (citing Pakdel v. City & County
of San Francisco, 952 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2020)). It rea-
soned that the city’s denial of the petitioners’ requests for an
exemption was not a final decision “because petitioners had
made a belated request for an exemption at the end of the ad-
ministrative process instead of timely seeking one ‘through
the prescribed procedures.’” Id. at 477–78 (quoting Pakdel, 952
F.3d at 1166–67).
The Supreme Court disagreed. It reasoned that a plaintiff
need only show “that there is no question about how the reg-
ulations at issue apply to the particular land in question,” and
here, there was “no question about the city’s position:” the
petitioners had to execute a lifetime lease or face an enforce-
ment action. Id. at 478 (citation modified) (quoting Suitum v.
Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739 (1997)). The Court
explained that by forcing the petitioners to seek an exemption

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10 No. 24-2714
through the prescribed state procedures, the Ninth Circuit im-
properly had required them to exhaust their claim. Id. at 479.
B.
Our court has read Williamson County broadly, Forseth v.
Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2000), and has ap-
plied its finality requirement to various land-use claims other
than Takings Clause claims.14 We have not yet addressed,
however, whether the Williamson County finality requirement
applies specifically to the type of ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims Chosen brings here.
In resolving this issue, we are guided by our decision in
United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
In Village of Palatine, we applied the finality requirement to a
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) discrimination claim concerning a
group home for recovering alcoholics and substance abusers.
Id. at 1231–33. The organizers of the group home declined to
seek a special use approval, although they knew that the Vil-
lage’s zoning ordinance required that they apply for one. Id.
at 1232. The Village later cited the home for code violations,
and the home requested an accommodation to allow it to
“continue to operate in its current condition.” Id. The Village
informed the home that it had to apply for a special use ap-
proval, but the home refused to invoke the special use pro-
cess. Id. Instead, the corporation establishing the group home
14 See, e.g., Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, 361 F.3d 998, 1003–05 (7th
Cir. 2004) (applying the finality requirement to a Telecommunications Act
claim); United States v. Vill. of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1994)
(applying the finality requirement to a Fair Housing Act claim); Forseth v.
Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Williamson
County requirements apply to substantive due process claims).

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No. 24-2714 11
“filed a complaint with the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development alleging that the [Village] had discrimi-
nated against [the home] by failing to make a reasonable ac-
commodation in the Village’s zoning laws.” Id. The United
States then brought a federal action against the Village under
the FHA, which prohibits discrimination in housing based on
handicap and defines discrimination to “include[] ‘a refusal
to make reasonable accommodations … when such accommo-
dations may be necessary to afford [the handicapped] equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.’” Id. at 1232–33 (sec-
ond alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)).
The United States, relying on this definition, claimed that “the
Village did not make a reasonable accommodation in its ap-
plication of its zoning laws” to the home. Id. Relying on Wil-
liamson County, we held that this claim was not ripe because
the home had not requested special use approval, and until it
did so, the Village could not authorize the home’s use. Id. at
1233 (citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 193–94).
Although Chosen’s discrimination claim was brought un-
der the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act rather than the FHA,
we see no meaningful difference from the situation that we
encountered in Village of Palatine that would justify a different
approach here. The rule in Williamson County, as modified in
Knick and clarified in Pakdel, must govern here. Chosen pos-
ited at oral argument that Williamson County was “inapt” for
its claims because the discrimination it alleges “is part and
parcel of the zoning process.”15 But the plaintiff in Village of
Palatine also alleged that the defendant’s failure to provide the
requested zoning approval constituted discrimination, and
15 Oral Argument at 7:43–7:56.

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12 No. 24-2714
we nevertheless applied Williamson County. Requiring Cho-
sen to satisfy the Williamson County finality requirement is
likewise appropriate.
Our conclusion is in accord with the Second Circuit’s de-
cision in Sunrise Detox V, LLC v. City of White Plains, 769 F.3d
118 (2d Cir. 2014). In Sunrise Detox, a developer intended to
convert a former nursing home to a facility for people recov-
ering from addiction. Id. at 119. The city’s zoning ordinance
required the facility to attain a special permit from the city’s
Common Council. Id. The developer applied for a special per-
mit with the city’s Department of Building, which considered
the application complete and forwarded the proposal to the
council. Id. at 120. Before the council acted, however, public
opposition to the proposed facility mounted, and the devel-
oper supplemented its application. Id. The department’s com-
missioner considered the supplemented application and re-
vised the department’s determination, informing the devel-
oper that it would need to seek a variance or appeal the de-
partment’s determination to the Zoning Board of Appeals. Id.
at 120–21. The developer then brought a federal action against
the city “alleging intentional discrimination, disparate impact
discrimination, and failure to grant a reasonable accommoda-
tion in violation of the” ADA. Id. at 119.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment
dismissing the developer’s claims for lack of ripeness. Id. at
121, 124–25. It reasoned that the relief sought by the devel-
oper, “an injunction blocking the disapproval and authoriz-
ing construction of its project, … br[ought] the case squarely
within the compass of Williamson County and its progeny.” Id.
at 123. Further, even if the department’s commissioner had a
discriminatory motive in revising the department’s

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No. 24-2714 13
determination, “that illegal act would not necessarily require,
as a remedy,” issuing a permit to the developer. Id. The Sec-
ond Circuit went on to explain that if the developer “proceeds
with its application, the rejection may be reversed, and the
project may be permitted to proceed—or the application may
be rejected on other, non-discriminatory grounds.” Id. Only
after the process was completed, however, would it be known
whether the commissioner’s allegedly discriminatory deci-
sion “had any effect at all on [the developer’s] application.”
Id. The court ultimately pronounced “that a plaintiff alleging
discrimination in the context of a land-use dispute is subject
to the final-decision requirement unless he can show that he
suffered some injury independent of the challenged land-use
decision.” Id.
Like the developer in Sunrise Detox, Chosen has alleged no
injury independent of the challenged land-use decision. Ra-
ther, Chosen seeks back-door authorization of its proposed
use. Its request for an injunction ordering the Town “to stop
obstructing [its] access to the Property for purposes of serving
patients as a certified sub-acute facility and compelling issu-
ance of the requested letter and [a] declaration that the pro-
posed use of the Property as a sub-acute facility meets all zon-
ing requirements”16 “brings the case squarely within the com-
pass of Williamson County and its progeny.” Id. As in Sunrise
Detox, applying the Williamson County finality requirement to
Chosen’s claim is appropriate.
We therefore hold that the Williamson County finality re-
quirement applies to Chosen’s claim for injunctive relief un-
der Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
16 R.38 at 9.

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14 No. 24-2714
Act. We proceed to determine whether Chosen has satisfied
this requirement.
C.
To satisfy the “relatively modest” finality requirement,
Chosen must show “that there is no question about how the
regulations at issue apply to the particular land in question.”
Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 478 (citation modified) (quoting Suitum, 520
U.S. at 739). The government must be committed to a final,
conclusive position. See id. at 479–80. When “avenues still re-
main for the government to clarify or change its decision,” the
finality requirement is not satisfied. See id. at 480. As we have
described, the Supreme Court determined that the finality re-
quirement was satisfied in Pakdel because the city had
adopted a final position: the petitioners had to execute a life-
time lease or face an enforcement action. See id. at 478, 480. By
contrast, the Court held in Williamson County that the finality
requirement was not satisfied because the developer could
still seek a variance from the appeals board. Knick, 488 U.S. at
187–88 (citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186–94).
The finality requirement has not been satisfied here be-
cause the Town may still issue the letter Chosen requests.
Chosen simply has not invoked the procedures that would
enable the Town to authorize Chosen’s proposed use. See id.;
Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, 361 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th
Cir. 2004) (holding that Sprint’s claim was not ripe because
the board of zoning appeals did not completely foreclose
Sprint from using a property for its intended use, and instead,
the board’s decisions “merely map[ped] a procedural route
that Sprint [had to] take in order to proceed with its project”);
Vill. of Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1233 (holding that because the group
home did not apply for a special use approval, the Village

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No. 24-2714 15
could not authorize its use of the property and thus the
home’s claim was not ripe).17 Chosen must undertake the di-
rected steps to attempt to obtain the Town’s approval of its
proposed use. Until it does so, “it is mere speculation whether
[Chosen] even has an injury to complain of.” Sprint Spectrum,
361 F.3d at 1004.
This case exemplifies the rationale underlying the finality
requirement. The finality requirement “responds to the high
degree of discretion characteristically possessed by land–use
boards in softening the strictures of the general regulations
they administer.” Suitum, 520 U.S. at 738. “When such flexi-
bility or discretion may be brought to bear on the permissible
use of property as singular as a parcel of land, a sound judg-
ment about what use will be allowed simply cannot be made
by asking whether a parcel’s characteristics or a proposal’s
details facially conform to the terms of the general use regu-
lations.” Id. at 738–39. Chosen’s submission that its proposed
use conforms with the property’s existing “legal non-con-
forming use”18 requests the federal courts to make such a pre-
liminary judgment.19 But the Town “may give back with one
17 See also Willan v. Dane County, No. 21-1617, 2021 WL 4269922, at *3 (7th
Cir. Sept. 20, 2021) (unpublished) (the plaintiffs’ claims were not ripe be-
cause their allegations did “not suggest that they took any of the directed
steps to obtain a zoning variance or a conditional-use permit, or that any-
one at the County ever reached a final decision on whether a variance or
permit would be approved if properly sought” (citing N. Mill St., LLC v.
City of Aspen, 6 F.4th 1216, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2021))).
18 Appellants’ Br. 6.
19 We note that we also see no barrier to Chosen obtaining a final decision
by filing a declaratory judgment action in state court for a determination
of whether its proposed use qualifies as a legal non-conforming use. See

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16 No. 24-2714
hand what [it has] taken with the other.” Sprint Spectrum, 361
F.3d at 1004 (first citing MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County, 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986); and then citing Suitum, 520
U.S. at 738). Until Chosen has properly pursued the Town’s
approval and the Town has decided whether it will permit
Chosen’s proposed use, this dispute is not ripe.
Finally, we address Chosen’s assertions during oral argu-
ment that the Town attorney’s draft letter “may not be a deci-
sion but … is certainly a statement” and that there “is a final
statement of what [the Town’s] decision would be” as to Cho-
sen’s proposed use.20 First, the draft letter is just that: a draft.
It is not a conclusive determination by the Town as to “how
the ‘regulations at issue apply to the particular land in ques-
tion.’” Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 478 (quoting Suitum, 520 U.S. at 739).
Nor is the Town’s failure to issue Chosen’s requested letter
prior to any application by Chosen a final decision. Indeed,
this situation mirrors that in Williamson County, where the
county commission’s refusal to approve the respondent’s pre-
liminary plat did not constitute a conclusive determination of
whether the commission would allow the proposed develop-
ment. 472 U.S. at 193–94. The commission’s refusal prevented
development without the necessary variances, but the
Town of Avon v. Harville, 718 N.E.2d 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). If Chosen
were to attain such a declaratory judgment in its favor, and the Town still
would not provide the requested letter, this refusal would indeed be a fi-
nal decision. In such a case, the Town would be taking the final, conclusive
position that it would not provide the letter even though Chosen’s pro-
posed use satisfies local zoning requirements as a legal non-conforming
use. See Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474, 478–79 (2021)
(per curiam).
20 Oral Argument at 6:23–6:27, 7:16–7:19.

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No. 24-2714 17
development was still possible once the variances were ob-
tained. Id. The Supreme Court held that the commission’s re-
fusal was not a final decision. Id. at 194.21 So too here.
Because the Town has not adopted a final, conclusive po-
sition, Chosen’s claim for injunctive relief under the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act is not ripe for review.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
21 See also Sprint Spectrum, 361 F.3d at 1000, 1004 (holding that the BZA’s
finding that Sprint’s proposed use was not permitted under the zoning
ordinance and resulting requirement that Sprint seek a special use permit
was not a final decision in light of Sprint’s ability to apply for a permit);
Sunrise Detox V, LLC v. City of White Plains, 769 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2014)
(concluding that the city’s advisement that the proposed facility did not
qualify as a “community residence” and the city’s failure to take further
action as to the developer’s application were not final decisions given the
“administrative avenues for relief outlined in the zoning ordinance and
the commissioner’s letter”); Willan, 2021 WL 4269922, at *1, 3 (holding that
the county’s rejections of the plaintiffs’ requests to be in a business zone
and for a construction permit were not final decisions; rather, the plaintiffs
had to obtain a zoning variance or a conditional-use permit as directed by
the county).

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