Martaouse C. Holloway v. RACHEL MATUSHAK and RANDY FISHER

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 12, 2025*
Decided August 12, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1254
MARTAOUSE C. HOLLOWAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RACHEL MATUSHAK and RANDY
FISHER,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 23-cv-1414-bhl
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Martaouse Holloway, an inmate at Green Bay Correctional Institution in
Green Bay, Wisconsin, sued two prison employees, alleging that they were deliberately
indifferent to his arm fracture when he experienced a delay in the return of his brace
after he was transferred into the restricted housing unit. The district court granted
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that no reasonable jury could find
that they acted with deliberate indifference to Holloway’s arm fracture. We affirm.
We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Holloway. See Stewart v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021). On May 11, 2023, Holloway fell
while playing basketball, fracturing his arm. The health unit issued him an arm brace
on May 19, 2023, which he was authorized to use until August 17, 2023.
A month later, on June 19, 2023, Holloway was transferred to the restricted
housing unit without his arm brace. Prisoners in the restricted housing unit are
permitted less personal property than those housed in the general population. When a
prisoner is transferred to the restricted housing unit, staff inventory and sort the
prisoner’s property. Items not permitted in the restricted housing unit are stored until
the prisoner returns to the general population. If a prisoner is authorized medical items,
the staff members who pack up the cell or inventory the property will deliver them to
healthcare staff for redistribution. Any remaining property is turned over to
Randy Fisher, the correctional officer in charge of property for the restricted housing
unit. Fisher then brings the property to the prisoner.
On June 22, 2023, three days after he arrived in the restricted housing unit,
Holloway had not received any of his property (including the arm brace). He submitted
a request to healthcare staff, informing them that he had not received his arm brace,
even though it was in his property and he had told healthcare staff he had recently
“rebroke” his arm. Nurse Rachel Matushak responded the next day, informing
Holloway that she spoke to Fisher. Matushak avers that Fisher told her he would look
for the arm brace. But Fisher does not remember the request and does not recall doing
so.
A week later, on June 30, 2023, a correctional officer packed and inventoried
Holloway’s property. The officer did not list the arm brace on any inventory forms.
Holloway avers that this inventory was inaccurate because he had additional property
that was not listed on the inventory.
In the meantime, on July 3, 2023, Holloway was examined by an orthopedic
physician assistant. The physician assistant noted that, according to an x-ray,
Holloway’s arm was still fractured but showed signs of healing. He recommended that
Holloway transition to wearing a wrist brace, which Holloway received the same day.

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No. 25-1254 Page 3
On July 6, 2023, Fisher delivered Holloway his permitted personal property.
(This was the first day Fisher was working in the restricted housing unit after the
June 30 inventory of Holloway’s property.) The arm brace Holloway was initially
issued in May was still missing.
As relevant here, Holloway sued Matushak and Fisher, alleging that they
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by not ensuring the prompt delivery
of his arm brace. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment. It concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Fisher or
Matushak were deliberately indifferent. Matushak responded reasonably to Holloway’s
request for the arm brace by forwarding the request to Fisher. And Holloway pointed to
no evidence that would support a finding that Fisher intentionally disregarded a known
risk of harm by failing to locate the arm brace.
On appeal, Holloway generally contests the summary judgment order against
him. Because the defendants do not dispute the seriousness of Holloway’s arm fracture,
Holloway must point to evidence that they were deliberately indifferent to his
condition. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference is more
than negligence or even gross negligence. Stewart, 14 F.4th at 763. Instead, there must be
evidence that Matushak and Fisher acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”;
that is, that they ignored a known risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834, 839 (1994).
First, no evidence in the record would allow a rational jury to conclude that
Matushak was deliberately indifferent to Holloway’s arm fracture. On appeal,
Holloway appears to argue that Matushak did not respond reasonably to his health
service request because she did not provide care for his complaint that he “rebroke” his
arm. But he did not make this argument before the district court, and therefore, it is
waived. See Bradley v. Village of Univ. Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023). In any event,
in his healthcare request, Holloway did not ask for medical attention for his injury;
instead, he complained only that he had not received his property and needed his arm
brace. The district court therefore properly concluded that Matushak responded
reasonably by relaying the request for the brace to Fisher, the officer responsible for
managing inmate property. See Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022)
(responding reasonably to risk negates assertion of deliberate indifference, even if harm
was not prevented).
Second, the district court properly granted summary judgment for Fisher.
Although repeated requests for relief that fall on “deaf ears” may suggest deliberate

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No. 25-1254 Page 4
indifference, Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015), the record shows that
Fisher received only one oral request from Matushak to look for the brace, and Fisher
did not remember receiving the request. Even assuming Matushak told Fisher to look
for the brace and Fisher failed to do so, Holloway offers no evidence suggesting that
Fisher knew Holloway would suffer a substantial risk of harm without the arm brace.
Failing to recognize the importance of Matushak’s request, without more, suggests at
most negligence, which cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference. See Rasho,
22 F.4th at 710.
AFFIRMED

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