KEITH ROBINSON and EARLINE ROBINSON v. Mutual of Omaha, United of Omaha Life Insurance Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 9, 2025*
Decided October 14, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1098
KEITH ROBINSON and EARLINE
ROBINSON
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MUTUAL OF OMAHA, UNITED OF
OMAHA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23-cv-16461
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1098 Page 2
Earline Robinson and her son Keith appeal from the district court’s judgment
dismissing their complaint against United of Omaha Life Insurance Company for
deceptive and unfair advertising in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. The district court dismissed
their complaint for failure to state a claim under the Act. We affirm.
According to the Robinsons’ amended complaint, which we construe liberally
and accept as true, Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2024), Ms.
Robinson had to take a blood test as part of her application for a life insurance policy
with United—even though United’s website stated that no medical examination was
required. This experience, they alleged, caused Ms. Robinson to “withdraw unnecessary
blood” and Mr. Robinson to incur time and money transporting her to the appointment.
The Robinsons then sued United under Illinois’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.
On August 21, 2024—21 days after the Robinsons filed their amended
complaint—United moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. United argued that the Robinsons could not plead an adequate
claim under the Act because the company’s alleged conduct was neither deceptive nor
unfair, and even if it were, the Robinsons failed to allege how it proximately caused
their damages.
On September 4, the district judge held a status hearing, gave the Robinsons 45
days to respond to United’s motion, and encouraged them to contact the courthouse’s
pro se help desk for legal assistance. The Robinsons then filed an opposition brief,
arguing that United’s August 21 motion was untimely because it had not been filed
within 14 days of their amended complaint (filed July 31). See F ED. R. C IV. P. 15(a)(3)
(“Unless the court orders otherwise, any required response to an amended pleading
must be made within the time remaining to respond to the original pleading or within
14 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever is later.”).
The judge held a hearing on the timeliness of United’s motion to dismiss and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The judge found that United’s delay in filing its
motion was justified because the Robinsons filed their amended complaint earlier than
the court-ordered deadline, and as a result, the filing deadlines were “all off.” The judge
also found that the Robinsons were not prejudiced by United’s delay because she had
given them additional time to respond to United’s motion. The judge added that if she
denied United’s Rule 12(b) motion as untimely, United would move for judgment on

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No. 25-1098 Page 3
the pleadings under Rule 12(c), asserting the same arguments, and no purpose would
be served because the case “is going to come out the same way.” The judge then
concluded that the Robinsons failed to state a claim under the Act because they did not
allege how United’s conduct proximately caused their injuries.
On appeal, the Robinsons fault the district judge for allowing what they regard
as an untimely motion to dismiss. But the judge appropriately accepted the motion to
dismiss—after pointing out that the Robinsons filed their amended complaint within
five days of being given 30 days to do so, likely confusing United about the deadline for
its motion, and United promptly responded anyway. We will not interfere with this
exercise of discretion. See Simstad v. Scheub, 816 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2016). The judge
also reasonably found that the Robinsons were not prejudiced by United’s delay in
filing its motion to dismiss, given the additional time she afforded them to obtain legal
assistance before responding to the motion.
The Robinsons also generally challenge the district judge’s determination that
they could not plausibly allege that United’s conduct and advertising caused their
injuries. But to state a claim under the Act, the Robinsons needed to allege proximate
causation—that, but for United’s conduct, they would not have been harmed. Oliveira v.
Amoco Oil Co., 776 N.E.2d 151, 160 (2002); Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC,
887 F.3d 329, 334 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying Illinois law and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b)). We agree with the judge that the Robinsons failed to do so. As the
judge explained, the Robinsons alleged that they learned about United’s advertising
only after they applied for a policy and Ms. Robinson had her blood drawn, so they
cannot assert that the allegedly false advertisement caused their injuries. Cf. Camasta v.
Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2014) (sales receipt provided to
consumer after a purchase cannot show what was supposedly advertised for purposes
of a claim under the ICFA; “the representation must have been made to him before the
purchase”).
AFFIRMED

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