Juliánanderson-Martín v. Catholic Charities

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 21, 2025*
Decided October 24, 2025
Before
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2113
JULIÁN ANDERSON-MARTÍN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CATHOLIC CHARITIES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:23-CV-592-GSL-MGG
Gretchen S. Lund,
Judge.
O R D E R
Julián Anderson-Martín, a counselor formerly employed by Catholic Charities,
appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his employment-discrimination
complaint as untimely. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2113 Page 2
According to documents that Anderson-Martín attached to his complaint,
Catholic Charities, a community-services provider, hired him as a counselor in 2020.
Two years later, he filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) against Catholic Charities alleging retaliation and that his
supervisors had discriminated against him based on his disabilities (Dyslexia and
Muscular Tourette’s), national origin (Puerto Rican), and sex (male).1 An EEOC
representative investigated the claims and on March 23, 2023, issued Anderson-Martín
a Notice of Right to Sue via email, specifying that he had ninety days to file a lawsuit
against the organization.
Ninety-five days later, on June 26, 2023, Anderson-Martín filed his complaint,
alleging that Catholic Charities created a hostile work environment, retaliated against
him for requesting reasonable accommodations, and violated his rights under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112–12117.
On Catholic Charities’ motion, the district court dismissed the action as time-
barred.2 Both Title VII and the ADA required him to file suit within ninety days of
1 The nature of the alleged discriminatory conduct is not clear. Anderson-Martín
alleged, for instance, that the organization instructed him to comply with burdensome
office protocols, threatened to fire him if he failed to pass a state counselor licensing
exam, and transferred him to a school with predominantly white students.
2 The parties litigated the statute of limitations under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). But the expiration of a statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, see F ED. R. C IV. P. 8(c)(1), that plaintiffs need not anticipate in a complaint. And
Rule 12(b)(6) is therefore not the appropriate basis to seek dismissal. Richards v. Mitcheff,
696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). An affirmative defense may be resolved on the
pleadings, see F ED. R. C IV P. 12(c), but if a court considers evidence outside the
pleadings, it must treat the motion “as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,”
see F ED. R. C IV P. 12(d). The district court here considered a matter outside the
pleadings—a March 23, 2023, email from Anderson-Martín to Catholic Charities
acknowledging receipt of the Notice of Right to Sue—but it did not treat the motion as
one for summary judgment or give Anderson-Martín an opportunity to dispute his
receipt of the email on that date. But, that error is harmless because Anderson-Martín
submitted the email himself and has never disputed that he received the notice on

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No. 24-2113 Page 3
receiving notice of the right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (incorporating 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5). Although Anderson-Martín urged that the limitations period was not
triggered until he first read the notice on March 26, 2023, the court found that he had
received the notice on March 23, 2023, and that the ninety-day filing period was
controlled by the date the notice is received, not the date it was read. See Lax v.
Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 1178, 1182–83 (7th Cir. 2021).
Nearly a month after entry of judgment, Anderson-Martín moved to have
counsel recruited for him. The district court denied the motion. The court pointed out
that there was no constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in federal civil
litigation; that the case, at this stage, did not appear to involve unusually complex facts
or legal issues; and that he was able to present his case, given that the facts arose from
his personal experience.
Anderson-Martín devotes his brief on appeal to challenging only the district
court’s denial of his motion to recruit counsel. He argues that his disabilities made him
incapable of litigating the case himself and that he was unable to afford paid counsel.
But the court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying Anderson-
Martín’s motion for counsel. At the time of the motion, the court already had dismissed
his complaint as untimely. The court adequately justified its decision by noting that the
relevant facts of the case were within his knowledge and that he was able to litigate the
relevant legal issues himself. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en
banc).
To the extent Anderson-Martín intends to challenge the court’s ruling that his
complaint was untimely, he has not developed any argument that would provide a
basis to disturb the district court’s order. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). We have
independently reviewed the record and agree with the district court that his complaint
was untimely. Anderson-Martín needed to file his complaint within ninety days of
receipt of the notice, not the date when he read it. Lax, 20 F.4th at 1182–83. Relatedly,
equitable tolling cannot save his action because he failed to explain how he exercised
reasonable diligence in pursuing his claims. Id. at 1183.
AFFIRMED
March 23, 2023. See Loeb Indus. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2002) (cited
in Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 2020)).

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