Deandre A. Hughes v. Indiana Department of Corrections

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 21, 2025*
Decided October 24, 2025
Before
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3179
DEANDRE A. HUGHES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Evansville Division.
No. 3:23-cv-00228-RLY-CSW
Richard L. Young,
Judge.
O R D E R
Deandre Hughes, an Indiana prisoner, appeals the judgment dismissing his civil
rights suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-3179 Page 2
In his amended complaint, Hughes sued the Indiana Department of Corrections
and several employees of Branchville Correctional Facility for (1) tampering with his
mail, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702; (2) discriminating against him with respect to
employment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; and (3) depriving him of due process when reviewing
his security classification, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Hughes adds that his inability to
overturn his security classification rendered him ineligible for work-release.
The district court screened Hughes’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and
dismissed it for failure to state a claim. The court explained first, with regard to the
mail-obstruction claim, that Hughes lacked standing to bring this claim because private
persons generally have no right to enforce criminal statutes. Next, the court ruled that
Hughes could not state a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, because that statute prohibits
discrimination by employers, and none of the defendants here was his employer or
potential employer. Hughes also could not state a due process claim based on his
classification status, the processing or outcome of his classification appeals, or his
inability to participate in a work-release program because he had no liberty or property
interest in his custody classification or work release. And Hughes could not state an
equal protection claim because he failed to allege facts to support his suggestion that he
was being treated differently because of his race.
On appeal, Hughes challenges only the dismissal of his obstruction-of-mail claim
and does so only in a general sense. His claim fails on that basis alone. Argyropoulos v.
City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 738 (7th Cir. 2008) (“perfunctory and undeveloped”
arguments are waived). In any event, the district court’s analysis of that claim was
correct. Neither of the two criminal statutes that Hughes relies on specifies personal
entitlements or civil remedies or otherwise implies a private right of action. See Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (“We
have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition
alone … And we have not suggested that a private right of action exists for all injuries
caused by violations of criminal prohibitions.”); Chapa v. Adams, 168 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“Criminal statutes, which express prohibitions rather than personal
entitlements and specify a particular remedy other than civil litigation, are accordingly
poor candidates for the imputation of private rights of action.”).
Hughes did not challenge the district court’s dismissal of any of his other claims
in his opening brief, so he has abandoned them on appeal. White v. United States, 8 F.4th

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No. 24-3179 Page 3
547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021) (“A party that omits from its opening appellate brief any
argument in support of its position waives or abandons that party’s claim on appeal.”).
AFFIRMED

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