Michael A. Maxie v. Damon R. Leichty

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 21, 2025*
Decided October 24, 2025
Before
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3171
MICHAEL A. MAXIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAMON R. LEICHTY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:24-CV-741-GSL-SJF
Gretchen S. Lund,
Judge.
No. 24-3187
MICHAEL A. MAXIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Nos. 24-3171 & 24-3187 Page 2
ST. JOSEPH COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 3:24-CV-267 DRL-MGG
Damon R. Leichty,
Judge.
O R D E R
After a state court in St. Joseph, Indiana, ruled against him in his eviction
proceedings, Michael Maxie filed suit in federal court seeking reversal of the state court
judgment. See Maxie v. St. Joseph County, No. 3:24-cv-267-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind.). The
district court dismissed Maxie’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Maxie
then filed a second action in federal court suing the state and federal judges involved in
the first proceeding. See Maxie v. Leichty, No. 3:24-cv-741-GSL-SJF (N.D. Ind.). The
district court screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed it for
failure to state a claim. Maxie appealed. We consolidate Maxie’s two appeals for
disposition, and because he has not shown error in either decision, we affirm.
In fall 2022, when Maxie refused to sign a lease renewal, his landlord sought to
evict him via a “Final Order of Possession” from a state court in St. Joseph, Indiana.
After a hearing at which Maxie appeared, the court granted the eviction order. As a
result of his eviction, Maxie lost housing assistance from the Housing Authority of
South Bend, which had been paying his rent, and became homeless. Maxie then filed a
state-court suit claiming that his apartment’s property manager and a representative of
that company discriminated against him. The state court concluded that Maxie failed to
prove discrimination and ruled in favor of the property manager.
Maxie then turned to federal court. His first federal suit claimed that the parties
involved in his state-court proceedings conspired against him and caused him to
become homeless. The district court dismissed Maxie’s claim for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and later denied his motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b). Maxie then filed a second suit against three judges for their
decisions in the foregoing state and federal cases. The district court dismissed that case
at screening after determining that absolute immunity shielded the judges from
liability. Maxie appealed in both cases.
As to the case dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Maxie argues that
the district court erred in dismissing his complaint, contending that his lawsuit alleged
constitutional violations that fell within the court’s jurisdiction. But Maxie’s notice of

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Nos. 24-3171 & 24-3187 Page 3
appeal was timely only as to the Rule 60(b) motion. Accordingly, we entered an order
limiting the scope of the appeal to review of that order.
Rule 60(b) allows a district court to reopen an order as “an extraordinary
remedy … granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d
806, 809 (7th Cir. 2009). When reviewing the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b)
concerning a district court’s jurisdictional determination, we reverse only if the court
made an “egregious” mistake and there is “no plausible basis for the district court’s”
decision. Word Seed Church v. Vill. Of Hazel Crest, 111 F.4th 814, 823 (7th Cir. 2024).
Maxie has not identified anything in the record suggesting there was no plausible basis
for the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to review a state-court
eviction order. Id. at 824. Maxie is correct that due process applies in state-court
proceedings. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). But Congress has not
empowered lower federal courts to review final state-court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). Instead, Maxie should have challenged the state court’s
judgment by appealing to the state appellate court and, if necessary, sought review in
the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. We discern no error in the
district court’s judgment, much less an “egregious” error that would justify relief under
Rule 60(b).
As to Maxie’s suit against the judges, we discern no error in the district court’s
judgment. Maxie complains of judges’ actions that involved the exercise of judicial
functions in the context of judicial proceedings. The district court correctly concluded
that each of the judges was immune from suit. Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 661
(7th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED

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