Randall N. Martin v. Robert A. Goldsmith

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2277
R ANDALL N. M ARTIN ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
R OBERT A. GOLDSMITH , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:22-CV-226 — Philip P. Simon, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 23, 2024 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 31, 2025
____________________
Before S CUDDER , JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and PRYOR , Circuit
Judges.
PRYOR , Circuit Judge. Randall Martin, a former lieutenant
with the Tippecanoe County Sheriff’s Office, faced allegations
of excessive force. He agreed to resign from his post and
waive his hearing before the merit board. In return, the sher-
iff—Robert Goldsmith—promised to give Martin a neutral
reference letter and withdraw pending disciplinary charges.

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2 No. 23-2277
In the days that followed Sheriff Goldsmith’s promise,
however, Sheriff Goldsmith and two county prosecutors—
Patrick Harrington and Jason Biss—broadly shared the exces-
sive-force allegations with would-be employers and the legal
community in Tippecanoe County. These disclosures essen-
tially rendered Martin unemployable as a police officer. And,
according to Martin, that was the whole plan: Harrington,
Biss, and Goldsmith conspired to induce Martin to resign his
position—and waive his due process rights—with every in-
tention of disseminating the excessive-force allegations
against him.
Martin sued, alleging that Goldsmith, Harrington, and
Biss coerced him into resigning in violation of Martin’s rights
under state law and his procedural due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The district court dismissed Martin’s claims. It found absolute
and qualified immunity protected the prosecutors. The court
also determined that the sheriff could not be liable for viola-
tions of Martin’s due process rights as Martin had voluntarily
given them up by resigning.
For the reasons we discuss below, we reverse in part, af-
firm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts come from Martin’s complaint. At this
stage in the case, we accept Martin’s allegations as true and
draw all plausible inferences in his favor. Martin v. Haling, 94
F.4th 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2024).
A. Factual History
The events giving rise to this lawsuit start in 2018, when
Robert Goldsmith was elected as the Sheriff of Tippecanoe

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No. 23-2277 3
County. Several deputies within the Sheriff’s Office sup-
ported Goldsmith’s candidacy. Lieutenant Randall Martin,
however, was not one of those officers. In fact, Martin re-
ported his colleagues for unlawfully campaigning for Gold-
smith while in uniform. Martin maintained that his col-
leagues’ campaigning violated both the department code and
state law. In November of that year, Goldsmith was elected
sheriff, and he took office in January 2019.
In late 2020, Martin allegedly used excessive force while
conducting arrests of two people. Although neither of the ar-
rested individuals complained about Martin, Sheriff Gold-
smith initiated an internal affairs investigation and sus-
pended Martin pending its outcome. Martin invoked his stat-
utory right to a public hearing on the charges before the
Tippecanoe County Sheriff’s Merit Board, see I ND. C ODE § 36-
8-10-11(a), and was issued hearing dates of April 29–30, 2021.
Martin alleges that in the lead-up to the hearing, Sheriff
Goldsmith took steps to ensure that the investigation would
be biased and the hearing unfair. As for the preliminary in-
vestigation, Sheriff Goldsmith replaced the administrative
personnel that ran internal affairs with new officers, one of
whom the sheriff selected for his political loyalty. Also, one of
the officers Martin had filed a complaint against was assigned
to conduct the investigation and thus had a motive to seek
retribution. As for the merit board, Sheriff Goldsmith alleg-
edly manipulated its composition by replacing members who
traditionally had been favorable to Martin with the sheriff’s
own “hand-picked” choices.
The looming merit board hearing was not Martin’s only
concern. Sheriff Goldsmith had started a campaign against
Martin by issuing “embarrassing and humiliating” press

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4 No. 23-2277
releases to local media outlets. Sheriff Goldsmith also collab-
orated with two county prosecutors—Patrick Harrington and
Jason Biss—to refer the excessive force issue to a special pros-
ecutor for criminal prosecution.
Facing biased investigators, a loaded merit board, poor
publicity, and the threat of criminal charges, Martin offered
to resign from his position. Through counsel, Martin ap-
proached Sheriff Goldsmith, offering to leave the force on the
condition that the departmental excessive force allegations be
withdrawn. Sheriff Goldsmith accepted the offer. The “Agree-
ment to Resolve Employment Status” that both parties signed
on April 28, 2021, formalized that the pending charges before
the merit board would be withdrawn. It also stated that Sher-
iff Goldsmith would provide a “neutral reference” to Martin’s
prospective employers and note only that Martin resigned
“for personal reasons.” Per the agreement, Martin resigned on
May 3, 2021.
While he was employed as a lieutenant in the Tippecanoe
County Sheriff’s Office, Martin also worked part-time as a
marshal with the Town of Dayton, Indiana, and he believed
that resigning under the terms of the Agreement would allow
him to transition into a full-time job as a Deputy Marshal with
the Town of Dayton.
Things did not go as planned. On the same day that Mar-
tin’s resignation became effective, county prosecutors Har-
rington and Biss shared the details of the investigation into
Martin through multiple outlets. Martin claims this action vi-
olated the Agreement with Sheriff Goldsmith. He further al-
leges that it was part of a planned scheme concocted by the
prosecutors and Sheriff Goldsmith to convince Martin to give
up his right to a hearing.

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No. 23-2277 5
The prosecutors shared the details of the investigation into
Martin through so-called Brady/Giglio disclosures. These dis-
closures are named after two Supreme Court cases—Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972)—which obligate prosecutors to disclose excul-
patory and impeachment evidence with the defense in crimi-
nal proceedings.
The prosecutors’ Brady/Giglio disclosures contained vari-
ous allegations. They noted, for example, that Martin unnec-
essarily tased and pepper sprayed two individuals in late
2020. The disclosures also stated Martin later completed a re-
port of the incident that was inconsistent with his bodycam
footage. Martin denies these allegations, alleges that they
have never been proven, and claims that the prosecutor’s of-
fice never even spoke to him about them. Regardless, the
prosecutors shared these disclosures in three ways.
First, the prosecutors disseminated the unsigned Brady/Gi-
glio disclosure to members of the Tippecanoe County Bar As-
sociation on May 3, 2021, the day Martin’s resignation became
effective. The disclosure to the Bar Association contained the
information about Martin’s use of force, but it appeared to be
a template. The disclosure had blanks for the name of the
prosecutor, the name of the defendant, and the cause number.
Second, that same day, the prosecutors emailed the disclo-
sure to the Town of Dayton, Martin’s part-time employer and
potential full-time employer. In the email, Biss warned Mar-
tin’s supervising officer that prosecutors would face difficulty
in bringing claims against suspects arrested by Martin. Biss
maintained that Martin’s testimony as a key witness would
be “unusable—proving disastrous to our success on a convic-
tion.” Martin contends that because of that email, he was

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6 No. 23-2277
suspended from his part-time position with the Town of Day-
ton and never received an offer for a full-time job.
Third, more than a week later, on May 11, 2021, the pros-
ecutors filed Brady/Giglio disclosures in dozens of cases in
which Martin was an arresting officer. Sometime later, Martin
was rejected from consideration as a law enforcement officer
for the Town of Flora, Indiana, an out-of-county municipality,
despite previously being proactively recruited by the town.
Martin believes this was, at least in part, because Sheriff Gold-
smith, in concert with the prosecutors, provided the Town of
Flora with “false, misleading[,] and defamatory information”
about Martin during his application process. Now, Martin
maintains he cannot find comparable gainful employment, ei-
ther as a law enforcement officer or otherwise.
B. Procedural History
In August 2022, Martin filed a nine-count complaint
against Sheriff Goldsmith and the two prosecutors, Harring-
ton and Biss. Eight of the nine counts arose under Indiana law,
including claims for breach of contract and defamation. The
remaining claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged a
conspiracy to pressure Martin into resigning from his job and
foreclose his chance to find future employment, all without
due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The district court later granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss.1 The court determined that the prosecutors were en-
titled to a combination of absolute and qualified immunity.
1 See generally Martin v. Goldsmith, No. 2:22-CV-226, 2023 WL 3737048
(N.D. Ind. May 30, 2023).

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No. 23-2277 7
The district court found that Harrington and Biss were pro-
tected by absolute immunity for their disclosures of Martin’s
alleged conduct to the members of the Tippecanoe County
Bar and in certain criminal cases. The district court then de-
cided that this immunity likely extended to the prosecutors’
disclosures to the towns of Dayton and Flora, but that even if
they did not, the actions were covered by qualified immunity
because Martin did not have a clearly established right to pre-
vent the disclosures.
As for the claim against Sheriff Goldsmith, the district
court concluded it was without merit. The court determined
that because Martin had voluntarily chose to resign, he
waived any due process protections afforded to him. With the
sole federal claim dismissed, the court relinquished supple-
mental jurisdiction over Martin’s state-law claims and dis-
missed them without prejudice.
This appeal followed, with the National Fraternal Order
of Police filing an amicus brief supporting Martin.
II. A NALYSIS
We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint on a
motion to dismiss de novo. Watkins v. Mohan, 144 F.4th 926,
933 (7th Cir. 2025). To survive a motion to dismiss, the com-
plaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the rea-
sonable inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon-
duct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
We review a district court’s conclusions that defendants
have absolute or qualified immunity de novo. See Fields v.

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8 No. 23-2277
Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2012); Fosnight v. Jones, 41
F.4th 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2022).
Martin sued Sheriff Goldsmith and prosecutors Harring-
ton and Biss under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This statute lets people
hold state and local officials accountable for violating the
Constitution. See id. While nothing in the text of § 1983 pro-
vides for any immunities, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
417–18, 417 n.10 (1976), the Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that government officials “are entitled to some form of
immunity from suits for damages,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 806 (1982). These immunities have been read into
§ 1983 because we read the statute “in harmony with general
principles of tort immunities and defenses.” Imbler, 424 U.S.
at 418.
Most executive officials—including police officers—have
a qualified immunity from suit. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807; United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 694 n.12 (1987) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). This protects them
from civil damages unless they violated a “clearly estab-
lished” right. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). We presume that qualified
immunity “is sufficient to protect government officials in the
exercise of their duties.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486–87
(1991).
But other government officials—legislators, judges, pros-
ecutors, and similar officials—sometimes carry a stronger
shield: an absolute immunity from liability. Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 807. To determine whether this shield is available to the of-
ficial, we “appl[y] a ‘functional approach.’” Jones v. Cum-
mings, 998 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Buckley v. Fitz-
simmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993)). This approach “looks to

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No. 23-2277 9
‘the nature of the function performed, [and] not [to] the iden-
tity of the actor who performed it.’” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269
(quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). By way of
example, a prosecutor does not get absolute immunity from
liability for damages under § 1983 for everything he does. In-
stead, he gets it only when conducting “actions” in his role as
an “advocate[].” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363 (2012). The
Supreme Court has explained this is necessary to ensure that
this historically important governmental function can be per-
formed “with independence and without fear of conse-
quences.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Absolute immunity, however, is “strong medicine.”
Brunson v. Murray, 843 F.3d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 2016). In some
cases, it may “leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishon-
est officers.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.)). Given this real-
ity, courts must be “quite sparing” in recognizing absolute
immunity. Burns, 500 U.S. at 487 (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S.
at 224). When a government official seeks to convince us that
absolute immunity is appropriate, he “bears the burden of
showing that such immunity is justified for the function in
question.” Id. at 486; see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268. And the
contours of the immunity must be drawn precisely, as it can-
not extend “further than its justification would warrant.”
Burns, 500 U.S. at 487 (citation omitted).
All of the defendants in this case—Sheriff Goldsmith and
prosecutors Harrington and Biss—claim that they are im-
mune from liability. We start by evaluating whether and to
what extent the prosecutors are entitled to the heightened
protection of absolute immunity. Because we conclude that
some of the functions the prosecutors were alleged to perform

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10 No. 23-2277
are not protected by absolute immunity, we then decide
whether all defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Absolute Immunity for the Prosecutors
Martin alleges the prosecutors shared Brady/Giglio disclo-
sures in ways that violated his constitutional rights. Harring-
ton and Biss claim absolute immunity for these actions.
1. Absolute Immunity for Functionally Prosecutorial Conduct
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for “con-
duct that is functionally prosecutorial; this immunity is un-
derstood to broadly cover all conduct associated with the ju-
dicial phase of the criminal process.” Bianchi v. McQueen, 818
F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 2016); see Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555
U.S. 335, 341–43 (2009); Burns, 500 U.S. at 486; Imbler, 424 U.S.
at 430. Prosecutors are therefore absolutely immune from lia-
bility for filing a criminal charge, Foreman v. Wadsworth, 844
F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2016), making an “incorrect legal argu-
ment to [a] state trial court,” Sides v. City of Champaign, 496
F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2007), or for presenting allegedly false
evidence to a grand jury, Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641,
647 (7th Cir. 2016).
On the other hand, prosecutors are not entitled to absolute
immunity when serving as an investigator or an administra-
tor. Lewis v. Mills, 677 F.3d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 2012). This means
that prosecutors do not have absolute immunity for provid-
ing legal advice to the police, Burns, 500 U.S. at 495–96, for
firing an employee, Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 824–25
(7th Cir. 2013), or for giving a press conference, Buckley, 509
U.S. at 276–78.
The distinction between these two categories aims to free
only “the judicial process from the harassment and

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No. 23-2277 11
intimidation associated with litigation.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 494
(emphasis in original). So, the absolute immunity “analysis
hinges on whether the prosecutor is, at the time, acting as an
officer of the court, as well as on his action’s relatedness to the
judicial phase of the criminal process.” Fields, 672 F.3d at 510
(citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 431 n.33). This analysis is admit-
tedly not always clear-cut. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 (not-
ing that “[d]rawing a proper line between” administrative
and prosecutorial functions “may present difficult ques-
tions”).
2. Absolute Immunity in the Brady or Giglio Context
For more than 50 years, prosecutors have been required to
disclose material, exculpatory evidence and impeachment ev-
idence to the defense in criminal cases. Roldan v. Stroud, 52
F.4th 335, 338–39 (7th Cir. 2022). This obligation stems from
two seminal Supreme Court cases, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153
(1972).2
We have held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for
“his actions and decisions pertaining to his fulfillment of
Brady and Giglio” in criminal cases. Fields, 672 F.3d at 513–14.
This is because, when fulfilling his Brady or Giglio obligations,
“the prosecutor acts as an officer of the court embroiled in the
judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 514. Subjecting
prosecutors to financial liability for making a Brady or Giglio
2 Under Brady, a prosecutor violates a criminal defendant’s due process
rights when he fails to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant and
material to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. at 87. Under Giglio, a prosecutor
is also required to disclose to the defense any material evidence which
could undermine the reliability of a government witness. 405 U.S. at 154.

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12 No. 23-2277
disclosure in court “could ‘dampen the prosecutor’s exercise
of his … duty to bring to the attention of the court … all sig-
nificant evidence suggestive of innocence or mitigation.’” Id.
at 516 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 n.25).3
The question remains how to resolve the absolute immun-
ity defense when a prosecutor takes another step and dissem-
inates the Brady and Giglio information in some other way. In
Stockdale v. Helper, the Sixth Circuit held that prosecutors did
not have absolute immunity for sending Giglio letters to third
parties. 979 F.3d 498, 501, 504–05 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Krile
v. Lawyer, 947 N.W.2d 366, 379 (N.D. 2020); Beck v. Phillips, 685
N.W.2d 637, 645 (Iowa 2004).4 In Stockdale, a prosecutor sent a
message to a mayor, explaining her concern with two police
officers’ credibility and informing the mayor that she would
file Giglio disclosures in cases that they were involved with.
Id. at 501. The officers were soon fired; this message was the
“sole reason” why. Id. at 501–02.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of absolute immunity
to the prosecutor for several reasons. Id. at 506. First, the
3 The impact of Giglio and Brady is felt outside of the courtroom, too. To
ensure that prosecutors have the most up-to-date information, they often
maintain so-called “Brady lists” or “Giglio lists” that compile the names of
officers with credibility problems. See NFOP Amicus Br. at 8–9. And many
prosecutors also send “preemptive Giglio letters” that are meant to “in-
form an officer’s employer of the state’s refusal to call an officer as a wit-
ness at any future hypothetical trial.” Jeffrey Steven McConnell Warren,
The Scarlet Letter: North Carolina, Giglio, and the Injury in Search of a Remedy,
12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 24, 27 & n.16 (2022).
4 Because § 1983 is read “in harmony with general principles of tort im-
munities and defenses,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418, these state-court decisions
are relevant to the extent they shed light on how absolute immunity for
prosecutors has been understood writ large.

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No. 23-2277 13
prosecutor’s message was completely detached from any
pending criminal case. Id. at 502, 504–05. Given that, the ac-
tion was quite attenuated from the “initiation and conduct of
a prosecution” that forms the heartland of absolute prosecu-
torial immunity. Id. at 504 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 492).
Second, the prosecutor’s actions were solely administrative. Id.
at 503. Third, a blanket Giglio warning is not a part of a prose-
cutor’s duties. Id. at 504. That’s because, to trigger a Giglio ob-
ligation, the evidence at issue must have more than a “tenu-
ous connection” to a pending case to be material—and this is
a decision that cannot be made in a vacuum. Id. (quoting Ho-
gan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996)). We find the anal-
ysis in Stockdale persuasive.
A prosecutor’s decision to communicate Giglio concerns
outside of the judicial process is not “case-related advocacy”;
instead, it’s a “generic letter about generic cases.” Stockdale,
979 F.3d at 504–05. In other words, the prosecutors are
“merely advising [local law enforcement],” Beck, 685 N.W.2d
at 646, or only “acting in an administrative capacity,” Krile,
947 N.W.2d at 379, both things that are unprotected by abso-
lute immunity, Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270.
Bearing in mind that absolute immunity cannot extend
“further than its justification would warrant,” we conclude
that absolute immunity would not cover a prosecutor’s blan-
ket Brady or Giglio disclosures untethered to contemplated or
existing charges. Burns, 500 U.S. at 487 (citation omitted). This
action, though conducted by a prosecutor, would only tenu-
ously be “related[] to the judicial phase of the criminal pro-
cess,” Fields, 672 F.3d at 510, and thus not “functionally pros-
ecutorial,” Bianchi, 818 F.3d at 316, falling outside the bounds
of absolute immunity.

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14 No. 23-2277
3. Brady/Giglio Disclosures
With this legal background, we turn now to the case at
hand. Martin alleges that, after he resigned from his position,
two prosecutors, Harrington and Biss, broadly distributed a
“Brady/Giglio disclosure” document that stated that Martin
used excessive force when conducting an arrest and then
seemingly tried to cover it up with misleading police reports.
Martin’s allegations center on four different prosecutorial dis-
closures:
(1) Cases in which Martin was an arresting officer;
(2) With the Tippecanoe County Bar Association;
(3) With the Town of Dayton, Martin’s part-time (and po-
tential full-time) employer; and
(4) With the Town of Flora, Martin’s potential prospective
employer.5
The district court determined that the prosecutors’ first
two types of disclosures—in criminal cases and with the bar
association—were entitled to absolute immunity. The court
suggested, but did not hold, that the dissemination to Mar-
tin’s current and potential employers would also be entitled
to absolute immunity.
5 In his complaint, paragraphs 44 and 45, Martin alleged that only Sheriff
Goldsmith—and not the prosecutors—shared the disclosure with the
Town of Flora. When asked about this at oral argument, however, Mar-
tin’s counsel claimed that the allegation is “broad-based enough to cover
… the actions of the prosecutors because they are the ones that helped
draft this template disclosure.” Oral Arg. at 5:48–6:01. We leave it to the
parties to substantiate or rebut this assertion in discovery.

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No. 23-2277 15
We agree with the district court as to the disclosures in
criminal cases where Martin was involved. The prosecutors’
decision to file Brady or Giglio disclosures in criminal cases is
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430; Fields, 672 F.3d at 513–14
(“Brady and Giglio violations breach a defendant’s trial rights
and are, thus, inherently prosecutorial in nature.”). Absolute
immunity for making these Brady/Giglio disclosures is there-
fore “justified for the function in question.” Burns, 500 U.S. at
487. This is the case even if the prosecutors’ motives in mak-
ing these disclosures were vindictive or malicious. See Tobey
v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2018) (stating that
“motives are irrelevant to the absolute immunity question”).
Turning next to the prosecutors’ Brady/Giglio disclosures
with the Tippecanoe County Bar Association, the prosecutors
argue that their goal in doing this was to make the infor-
mation about Martin “known to attorneys prosecuting or de-
fending cases in the county.” Regardless of the merits of this
justification, it bears only scant “relatedness to the judicial
phase of the criminal process.” Fields, 672 F.3d at 510. Abso-
lute immunity extends to actions involving the initiation of a
prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case in court, or
actions preparatory for these functions. Buckley, 509 U.S. at
278. The disclosure here had no obvious connection to any ac-
tive criminal cases. Moreover, it was sent to a broad group of
lawyers, many of whom appear to have no connection to
criminal law. The disclosure “may well have been an act of
advocacy; it just wasn’t case-driven advocacy.” Stockdale, 979
F.3d at 502.
Next is Prosecutor Biss’s disclosure to the supervising po-
lice officer of the Town of Dayton, Martin’s part-time

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16 No. 23-2277
employer and potential future full-time employer. Biss told
the officer that the information in the disclosure would have
major impacts on the ability for the county prosecutors to
prosecute suspects arrested by Martin. Martin’s testimony,
Biss asserted, would be “unusable.”
This type of disclosure, unrelated to contemplated or ex-
isting charges, is not “functionally prosecutorial.” Bianchi, 818
F.3d at 316. Even in the prosecutors’ brief, they refer to this
decision as “advising a law enforcement agency” within their
county about Martin’s viability as a witness. But “advising the
police,” does not “qualif[y] for absolute immunity.” Burns,
500 U.S. at 493; see Beck, 685 N.W.2d at 645 (“[A] prosecutor's
mere act of advising police is not a function to which absolute
immunity attaches.”); Stockdale, 979 F.3d at 503 (holding that
absolute immunity did not attach when disclosure of
Brady/Giglio information did not “serve a traditional advocacy
function”).
The same goes for the prosecutors’ involvement in sharing
the Brady/Giglio disclosure with the Town of Flora, where
Martin had hoped to be hired. We cannot see any prosecuto-
rial function here at all. Flora is not in Tippecanoe County, so
the county prosecutors would not charge crimes arising out
of there.6 Viewed in the light most favorable to Martin, the
allegations here reveal nothing more than “meddling with the
hiring … decisions” within Flora’s police department, which
“simply [i]s not ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase
of the criminal process.’” Stockdale, 979 F.3d at 502 (quoting
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).
6 Oral Arg. at 29:31–45.

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No. 23-2277 17
In summary, the prosecutors are entitled to absolute im-
munity as to their filing of Brady/Giglio disclosures within
criminal cases. But they have not met their burden of showing
that absolute immunity applies for their other Brady/Giglio
disclosures to the Tippecanoe County Bar Association, the
Town of Dayton, or the Town of Flora.
B. Qualified Immunity
We now consider whether Sheriff Goldsmith and the pros-
ecutors (to the extent they are not absolutely immune) are en-
titled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects
government officials from civil liability to the extent that their
conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or
constitutional right to which a reasonable person would have
known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). To overcome the defense of qualified
immunity, Martin must show (1) the defendants violated a
constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at
the time of the challenged conduct. Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710,
716 (7th Cir. 2023).
1. Constitutional Violation
To establish step one, Martin relies on the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits state officials from “depriv[ing]
any person of … property, without due process of law.” U.S.
C ONST., amend. XIV, § 1. In Indiana, county police officers like
Martin have a property interest in continued employment, as
they may be fired only “for cause.” I ND. C ODE § 36-8-10-11(a);
Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Merit Bd. v. Peoples Broad. Corp., 547
N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. 1989) (“That statute creates a legitimate
claim of entitlement by the sheriff deputies to their jobs.”). So,
the critical question is therefore whether Martin got all the

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18 No. 23-2277
process he was due before being deprived of this property in-
terest.
The answer to this question hinges on whether Martin vol-
untarily resigned. “The general rule is that an employee who
resigns—voluntarily relinquishing h[is] interest in continued
employment—may not complain of a lack of due process.”
Ulrey v. Reichhart, 941 F.3d 255, 261 (7th Cir. 2019). But a co-
erced resignation may, in certain circumstances, form the basis
of a due-process claim. Id. at 261–63. Notably, “a material mis-
representation that induces resignation can constitute coer-
cion.” Id. at 263; see also Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112–13
(7th Cir. 1992).
Martin, accused of using excessive force, initially re-
quested a merit board hearing as permitted by Indiana law.
I ND. C ODE § 36-8-10-11(a). He subsequently agreed to resign
and forego his hearing only after Sheriff Goldsmith agreed to
drop the pending departmental charges and provide a neutral
reference to future employers. Martin was led to believe these
provisions, which were a part of a written severance agree-
ment, would effectively “clear[] his name.”
But unbeknownst to Martin—and just as the ink was dry-
ing on the severance agreement—the prosecutors, working in
concert with Sheriff Goldsmith, shared details of Martin’s al-
leged use of force and inconsistent reports with the county le-
gal community, Martin’s part-time employer, and Martin’s
prospective full-time employer.
Martin’s allegations, read in the light most favorable to
him, demonstrate that the defendants coerced Martin into re-
signing and forgoing his right to a hearing through “material
misrepresentation[s].” Ulrey, 941 F.3d at 263. If true, these

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No. 23-2277 19
allegations—making promises they never intended to keep
and immediately violating the severance agreement—suggest
that Martin’s resignation was coerced under false pretenses,
which could constitute a due process violation. Id.
2. Clearly Established Right
Having established that Martin properly alleged a depri-
vation of his constitutional rights, we move to the next step.
The question is whether Martin’s right to not be coerced into
resigning was clearly established at the time of the disclo-
sures.
For a right to be clearly established, its contours must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that his conduct violates that right. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
739 (2002). A right can be defined too generally if the unlaw-
fulness of the official’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.”
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). And so alt-
hough establishing a right does not require a case directly on
point, precedent still must place the constitutional question
beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
Prosecutors Harrington and Biss argue that they are
shielded by qualified immunity because no case establishes
that disclosing Martin’s alleged conduct under Brady and Gi-
glio violated his constitutional rights. But that argument
misses the mark—Martin did not allege that the disclosures
themselves violated his rights. Instead, he alleged that the dis-
closures were sent despite Sheriff Goldsmith’s representa-
tions that Martin’s resignation would make the charges go

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20 No. 23-2277
away. The disclosures were therefore part of the misrepresen-
tations that induced Martin into resigning.
The right not to be induced into resigning from public em-
ployment through material misrepresentations was clearly
established at the time of this alleged conduct. See Spreen, 961
F.2d at 112 (holding that plaintiff had a “clearly established
constitutional right” not to be induced into resigning from
public employment through the “making [of] … misrepresen-
tations” about the consequences of resignation); see also
Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1982).
A reasonable official in Sheriff Goldsmith’s position
would be on notice that making misrepresentations to induce
Martin to voluntarily resign is a procedural due process vio-
lation. Based on these facts, at this stage of the case, the de-
fendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. But “while
qualified immunity may not entitle a defendant to dismissal
on the pleadings, qualified immunity may entitle the defend-
ant to summary judgment later on.” Hanson v. LeVan, 967 F.3d
584, 592 (7th Cir. 2020).7
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, the prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity
for their filing of Brady/Giglio disclosures in Martin’s criminal
7 Martin also named the State of Indiana and the Tippecanoe County (In-
diana) Board of Commissioners as defendants. His counsel admitted at
oral argument that these parties were sued only to indemnify the other
defendants were Martin to be awarded money damages. Oral Arg. at 2:19–
3:00. These theories are derivative of any claim against Goldsmith, Har-
rington, and Biss. On remand, we leave it to the district court to decide the
state law claims, including whether it is necessary or appropriate for these
entities to remain as named defendants in the case.

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No. 23-2277 21
cases. The rest of Martin’s allegations against the prosecutors
and the sheriff, however, are sufficient to get past the plead-
ing stage, as none of the defendants—at present—are entitled
to qualified immunity. Because the district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety, we REVERSE in
part, AFFIRM in part, and REMAND for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

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