Bryon K. Champ v. Shirley Forcum

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 13, 2026*
Decided January 13, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3020
BRYON K. CHAMP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHIRLEY FORCUM, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:18-CV-1986-MAB
Mark A. Beatty,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Bryon Champ, formerly a resident at a mental health facility, challenges the
district court’s summary judgment order rejecting his claim that the facility’s staff
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-3020 Page 2
violated his constitutional right to access the courts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because
Champ does not present any ground for reversal, we dismiss this appeal.
Champ had two lawsuits pending in state and federal court when he arrived at
Chester Mental Health Center in Chester, Illinois. During his time at the facility, both
lawsuits were dismissed. Based on those dismissals, Champ sued three of the facility’s
employees, who, he alleges, denied him access to necessary legal materials and violated
his constitutional right to access the courts: Shirley Forcum (his unit director), Carri
Morris (his therapist), and Dr. Nageswararao Vallabhaneni (his psychiatrist). A
magistrate judge, presiding by consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), appointed counsel for
Champ and the case proceeded to summary judgment.
The magistrate judge, faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, denied
Champ’s motion and granted the defendants’. As the judge explained, an access-to-
courts claim required Champ to assert that his claims in either underlying case were
arguably nonfrivolous. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002) (plaintiff must
“describe[ the underlying claim] well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to
show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope”); Marshall v.
Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff must show that “his denial of access to
legal materials caused a potentially meritorious claim to fail”). Champ did not do so,
however, and so his claim could not succeed. Champ filed four motions for
reconsideration, but none addressed whether his claims in the underlying cases were
frivolous and so the district court denied each motion.
On appeal, Champ does not contest the correctness of the magistrate judge's
decision, nor does he provide any caselaw or legal argument that would cast doubt on
the judge’s ruling. Instead, he asks that we take judicial notice of the filings in the two
proceedings underlying the current suit. This is insufficient; we are not responsible for
developing an appellant’s arguments or scouring the record. See Greenbank v. Great Am.
Assurance Co., 47 F.4th 618, 629 (7th Cir. 2022). Even a pro se litigant’s brief must contain
his “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of
the record on which [he] relies.” F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8)(A); Anderson v. Hardman,
241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001). Because Champ’s brief does not do so, we dismiss
the appeal. See Anderson, 241 F.3d at 545–46.
We DISMISS this appeal and DENY Champ’s pending motions requesting
“review evidence from case” and “application of fee waiver and letter requesting
docket sheet.”

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