Timothy G. Henson v. Ron Neal

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 22, 2025*
Decided January 13, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3093
TIMOTHY G. HENSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RON NEAL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:22-CV-00119-DRL
Damon R. Leichty,
Judge.
O R D E R
Officials at the Indiana State Prison (“ISP”) in Michigan City, Indiana, initiated
proceedings to transfer Timothy Henson to a different prison but cancelled the process
when Henson administratively appealed. Henson sued the officials, alleging that the
transfer process reflected retaliation for protected speech and therefore violated his
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-3093 Page 2
rights under the First Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for
the defendants, concluding that Henson had not suffered any adverse action. Henson
now appeals, but because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate
the judgment and remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss the action
without prejudice.
In December 2021 and January 2022, Henson complained to prison officials that,
among other things, his limited access to the law library prevented him from meeting
impending filing deadlines in a suit against the prison. Warden Ron Neal instructed the
manager of Henson’s housing unit, Christine Vorrier, to ensure that Henson have more
time in the library if he could establish a need.
Believing that Henson would have access to more library resources at a different
institution, Vorrier wrote a memorandum requesting that he be transferred to the
Westville Correctional Facility. Vanessa Cuevas, a member of ISP’s classification
department, received Vorrier’s memo and determined that there was good cause to
transfer Henson to Westville. The transfer received approval the following week. But
before leaving ISP, Henson appealed the classification (and effectively the transfer)
decision, arguing that he had no further court-ordered deadlines or need for additional
access to the law library. That was not the end of the matter for Henson, however.
The following week Henson invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed this suit, alleging
that the transfer decision reflected retaliation for his grievances and a prior lawsuit
against Warden Neal, in violation of his First Amendment rights. A month later Henson
prevailed in his administrative appeal, the result of which meant that he remained at
ISP and did not relocate to Westville.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. For his part, Henson opposed,
claiming that the Westville’s library was inferior to that at ISP and therefore that any
transfer, which he contended remained pending despite his successful administrative
appeal, would violate his First Amendment rights, including by deterring him from
engaging in further protected speech.
The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that
the differences between the library resources available within the two prisons were
insufficient to deter speech and so did not constitute adverse action for the purposes of
assessing retaliation. See Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 881–82 (7th Cir. 2020)
(concluding that inmate transfers, absent other demonstrated deprivations of rights, are
not adverse action). Between the entry of summary judgment and Henson’s notice of
appeal, he was released from ISP.

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No. 24-3093 Page 3
In challenging the district court’s award of summary judgment, Henson
maintains that he established that the defendants retaliated against him and that a
transfer, which he continues to argue is pending despite having been released, would
be an adverse action. But we begin, as we must, with jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Henson’s complaint requested both damages
and an injunction preventing his transfer from ISP to Westville, and we evaluate our
jurisdiction over each form of requested relief. See DaimlerChrylser Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (citations omitted).
As an initial matter, Henson’s request for injunctive relief is moot because he is
no longer in prison and therefore cannot be transferred to Westville. See McDaniel v.
Syed, 115 F.4th 805, 820 (7th Cir. 2024) (determining that release rendered moot a
plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief concerning treatment in prison).
As for the request for damages caused by the mere initiation of transfer
proceedings not subsequently executed, Henson lacks Article III standing. The
“irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing contains three elements: an injury in
fact, which means the invasion of a legally protected interest; a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and a likelihood that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560–61 (1992). With respect to the first element, an injury in fact must be concrete and
particularized and actual or imminent, not hypothetical or speculative. Id. at 560.
Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on the ground that a law
restricts speech, we require a showing of “an objectively reasonable chilling effect”
generally and that the plaintiff personally “self-censors [his speech] as a result.” Kilborn
v. Amiridis, 131 F.4th 550, 565 (7th Cir. 2025). We would not require any more than that
from a plaintiff, such as Henson, who also seeks damages for past violations of the First
Amendment.
Although Henson claimed that the approved transfer to Westville chilled his
speech, the record shows otherwise. The only speech that Henson testified he forwent
was the submission of further formal grievances about the conditions at ISP’s law
library. But Henson acknowledged that he had a different reason not to file those
duplicate grievances: because the prison’s policy is to return repeated grievances
unprocessed, “it would be fruitless for [him] to file any grievances with the grievance
officer concerning the law library … .” Even more, Henson admitted in his deposition
testimony that the perceived threat of a transfer did not deter him from other speech
directed at the defendants. Because he has not established that the proposed transfer

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No. 24-3093 Page 4
caused him to forgo any protected speech, Henson has not shown that he suffered a
concrete injury sufficient to confer standing.
We therefore VACATE the judgment and REMAND with instructions to dismiss
this action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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