United States of America v. Kevin P. O’neill

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 20, 2026*
Decided January 21, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1977
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KEVIN P. O’NEILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 97-CR-98-JPS-1
J.P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kevin P. O’Neill, a federal prisoner, appeals an order denying his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Because O’Neill did not
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1977 Page 2
challenge the district judge’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors in his opening brief, we
affirm.
In 2000, O’Neill, a former leader of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club, was found
guilty of racketeering offenses including murder, car bombings, and other related
crimes. Consistent with the then-mandatory guidelines range, O’Neill was sentenced to
a total term of life imprisonment.
In May 2022, O’Neill moved for compassionate release, claiming numerous
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons warranted his early release from prison.
See § 3582(c)(1)(A). As pertinent to this appeal, O’Neill pointed to his age, then 65, and
health-related challenges he experienced in prison—delayed treatment for a ruptured
Achilles tendon, multiple concussions, bouts of COVID-19, and basal cell carcinoma. As
an additional ground, he asserted that his sentence was considerably longer than that of
a co-defendant, who was sentenced to only 15 years’ imprisonment. O’Neill also argued
that the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) weighed in favor of his release, contending that
he posed a low risk of recidivism, had taken meaningful steps towards rehabilitation,
and had minimal disciplinary issues during his incarceration.
The district judge denied O’Neill’s motion, concluding that O’Neill had not
shown extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant his release. As relevant here,
the judge rejected O’Neill’s age-related arguments because he had not established that
he was suffering from a serious physical or medical condition, experiencing
deteriorating physical or mental health, or had a condition requiring long-term or
specialized care that was not being provided. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)–(C). The
judge also rejected O’Neill’s argument that the disparity between his sentence and that
of his co-defendant was an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. See id.
§ 1B1.13(b)(5). The judge questioned whether such a challenge was properly raised in a
compassionate-release proceeding and, in any event, concluded that it failed on the
merits: the co-defendant’s sentence had followed a plea agreement, while O’Neill had
been convicted and sentenced after a jury trial. Finally, the judge explained that even if
O’Neill could show an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release, the
sentencing factors in § 3553(a) would strongly militate against it. The judge
acknowledged O’Neill’s personal growth but emphasized the seriousness of his crimes,
his continued efforts to litigate factual issues related to his crimes, and the community’s
need for just punishment.

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No. 24-1977 Page 3
On appeal, O’Neill presses only two arguments, both of which focus on the
district judge’s conclusion that O’Neill did not establish extraordinary and compelling
reasons for relief as set out in the Guidelines. First, he contends that the district judge
misapplied the Guidelines provision describing age-based circumstances for
compassionate release, § 1B1.13(b)(2), by “conflat[ing]” the standard with a different
subsection of the Guidelines. O’Neill also argues that the district judge erred by
concluding that the disparity between the length of his sentence and that of his
co-defendant was not an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.
We need not reach O’Neill’s arguments to resolve his appeal. To prevail, he
needed to establish both extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction
and show that the district judge abused his discretion in concluding that the § 3553(a)
factors counseled against early release. See United States v. Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 346
(7th Cir. 2023). But O’Neill has not properly challenged the district judge’s conclusions
regarding the § 3553(a) factors.† This issue serves as “an independent basis for the
court’s resolution of [a compassionate release] motion,” id. at 349, and O’Neill has not
challenged it. Because O’Neill failed to address an independently dispositive reason for
the denial of his motion, the issue is forfeited. See Bradley v. Vill. of Univ. Park, 59 F.4th
887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).
AFFIRMED
† In his opening brief, O’Neill alludes to the § 3553(a) factors but does not
develop an argument addressing the district judge’s conclusion. See Greenbank v. Great
Am. Assurance Co., 47 F.4th 618, 629 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that perfunctory and
underdeveloped arguments are waived). And his attempt to do so in his reply brief
comes too late. See White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that
arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived).

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