Tonnette Jones v. Avik Das

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2166
T ONNETTE J ONES ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
A VIK D AS , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:18-cv-01319 — Mary M. Rowland, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 9, 2025 — D ECIDED J ANUARY 22, 2026
____________________
Before ST . EVE , LEE , and KOLAR , Circuit Judges.
KOLAR , Circuit Judge. Tonnette Jones worked as a proba-
tion officer with the Cook County, Illinois Juvenile Probation
Department. In early 2018, the Department terminated her,
citing performance issues and insubordination. But Jones
claims her supervisors created a hostile work environment
based on her race. Through her union, Jones unsuccessfully
challenged her termination at arbitration. She then sued in
federal court, alleging that her employer created hostile

-- 1 of 19 --

2 No. 24-2166
conditions of employment that violated Title VII. The district
court granted summary judgment to Jones’s employer on that
claim. We affirm.
I. Background
In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of Jones’s employer, we construe all facts and
draw all inferences in the light most favorable to Jones. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Jones is African American and was employed as a Juvenile
Probation Officer with Cook County’s Juvenile Probation De-
partment from February 2015 to March 2018. As a probation
officer, Jones’s primary role was to conduct social investiga-
tions, memorialized in written reports and shared with the
court to aid in sentencing. The Department required a super-
visor to review and approve draft reports before submission
to the court. Jones’s claims in this case arise from a series of
incidents between March 2016 and her termination in March
2018 that she argues, taken together, constituted a hostile
work environment.
In 2015 and 2016, Jones reported to Ron Dussman, who is
white. Dussman generally gave Jones positive reviews for her
performance. In January 2017, Eileen Kintzler, who is white,
became Jones’s immediate supervisor. Kintzler reported to
deputy chief probation officer Karen Kelly, who is African
American. Avik Das, who is Indian American, was the De-
partment’s director.
In March 2016, while he was the director, Das said the N-
word during a meeting with a group of African American
probation officers. At the meeting, Das read the epithet aloud

-- 2 of 19 --

No. 24-2166 3
from a document (prepared by a different probation officer)
that quoted a judge who had used the inappropriate language
while moderating a program for juvenile probationers. Jones
was not present at the meeting but learned about the incident
afterward.
Then, in July 2017, Jones had a disagreement with Terri
Griffin, the Department’s liaison with the Illinois State Police
laboratory, over a DNA sample Jones had collected. In com-
plaining about this incident to Kintzler and Kelly, Jones re-
ferred to Griffin as unprofessional and expressed that she
would prefer not to interact with Griffin further.
In a separate series of events beginning in early 2017,
Jones’s children would wait in her office after school until she
finished work. Das and Kelly told Jones that this was prohib-
ited as a matter of Department policy. Jones contests the ex-
istence of this policy, and Das testified that he could not recall
whether it was in writing. Jones’s union representative, Jason
Smith, stated that he had never seen such a policy. In Septem-
ber 2017, Kelly saw Jones and Jones’s son walking in the
building’s lobby, which is open to the public. Kelly emailed
Jones to remind her of the Department’s no-children-in-the-
workplace policy. Jones responded that she felt targeted by
this email, was planning to contact her attorney, and was will-
ing to discuss it further only with the Sheriff’s personnel, who
were responsible for security in the building.
While with the Department, Jones had a modified sched-
ule so that she could complete her workday in time to pick up
her children from school. In August 2017, Jones was unable to
take a particular juvenile client to his scheduled mental health
assessment due to a conflict with her modified schedule.
Jones initially sought Kelly’s approval to modify her schedule

-- 3 of 19 --

4 No. 24-2166
further to accommodate the appointment. As a solution, Kelly
offered Jones “flex time” (where Jones could bank those extra
hours worked), but Jones declined, and did not take the client
to the appointment.
The next month, Jones submitted to Kintzler a draft social
investigation report for the juvenile client with the missed ap-
pointment. In the draft, Jones wrote two paragraphs detailing
that management had denied her request for an accommoda-
tion to her schedule to explain why the appointment had been
cancelled. Kintzler directed Jones to delete these paragraphs,
believing these behind-the-scenes details were inappropriate
to include in a court record. The draft otherwise conveyed
that the assessment had been completed. In Jones’s view, the
deleted paragraphs “exonerated a juvenile client who missed
his mental health assessment.” Following Kintzler’s directive,
Jones submitted the social investigation report to the court
without the two paragraphs. But at the juvenile’s next hear-
ing, Jones gave the judge a separate document containing the
two deleted paragraphs and told the judge that her supervisor
had her remove them from the report.
Kintzler reported that around the same time, she heard
Jones refer to Kelly as “bipolar” during a workplace conver-
sation. Jones denies making this statement.
In October 2017, Kintzler instructed Jones to prepare a so-
cial investigation report for a juvenile, T.L., with a history of
involvement in sex trafficking. Jones was to incorporate the
findings from the Department’s already-completed sex traf-
ficking assessment of T.L. into her report. Probation officer
Kisha Roberts-Tabb had filed the assessment with the court in
April 2017. Jones first asked Roberts-Tabb for the assessment,
but Roberts-Tabb directed Jones to ask the judge’s permission

-- 4 of 19 --

No. 24-2166 5
to obtain a copy from the court. Jones asked the judge for per-
mission to see the assessment, which caused confusion and
prompted the judge to request to speak with Kintzler.
Jones submitted her draft social investigation report to
Kintzler for review two days before T.L.’s hearing in Decem-
ber 2017. The draft included two paragraphs detailing inter-
nal discussions between Jones, Kintzler, and Roberts-Tabb
about the assessment, and reflected that Jones never received
the assessment from the court. Kintzler sent revisions back to
Jones, asking her to delete the paragraphs about the assess-
ment and to report only that Roberts-Tabb had done the as-
sessment, which had been submitted to the court, but that
Jones did not have a copy. Jones declined to make that revi-
sion because she believed it was false to report that the assess-
ment had been submitted to the court. In Jones’s view, Kintz-
ler was thus instructing her to commit perjury. However, at
that time, Roberts-Tabb had already told Jones the assessment
had been submitted to the court.
Over the next two days in the lead-up to T.L.’s hearing,
Jones refused to revise the report despite repeated reminders
from Kintzler. Instead of making the revisions, Jones lodged
a complaint about Kintzler with the Sheriff, claiming that
Kintzler had requested the revisions “or else”—a threat. Ulti-
mately, the hearing went forward with the partially revised
version of T.L.’s report, which Kintzler provided to the court
and the parties. After the hearing, Jones made a complaint
against Kintzler with the Chicago Police Department.
In December 2017, Kelly met with T.L. According to T.L.,
Jones said T.L. was not going to be released from custody be-
cause Jones’s supervisor (referring to Kintzler) was racist. The

-- 5 of 19 --

6 No. 24-2166
next month, T.L. recanted her statement, saying that she had
made it under pressure from Kelly.
The day after T.L.’s hearing, Kintzler made a formal com-
plaint to Das regarding Jones’s conduct. Das placed Jones on
temporary suspension and initiated an investigation. During
the investigation, three documents surfaced that Jones had
authored.
First, in a note that Jones had entered in the Department’s
electronic file for T.L., Jones included her personal grievances
against Kintzler. Second, in a letter that Jones wrote to a juve-
nile’s school, she wrote that the juvenile needed to attend a
meeting with her “or risk going into custody.” Third, in a let-
ter that Jones wrote to a juvenile’s mother requesting that she
enroll her son in a rehabilitation program, she had warned
“[i]f you fail to respond it would force the minor to become a
ward of the Department of Child and Family Services.”
For the first note in the Department’s file, Das deemed it
improper for Jones to include employment issues unrelated
to the child in T.L.’s file, as the juvenile court often requested
that such notes be entered into the public record. And Das
viewed the two client letters as inappropriately coercive.
After the investigation, Jones was terminated in March
2018. Das’s written disciplinary decision terminating Jones
cited her repeated insubordination and performance issues.
In November and December 2017, Jones filed charges with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for discrim-
ination and retaliation. Through her union, Jones also chal-
lenged her termination at arbitration under the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The arbitrator sided with the Department
after a three-day hearing.

-- 6 of 19 --

No. 24-2166 7
Jones then sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, alleging that she faced a hostile work environment
based on race, and the district court granted summary judg-
ment to the Department. Jones appeals.
II. Discussion
We review the district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Paschall v. Tube Processing Corp., 28 F.4th
805, 812 (7th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate
when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). We construe the facts and draw all justifiable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 255. However, we need not credit the nonmovant’s subjec-
tive beliefs where they are belied by the objective record. See
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
A. Jones’s Hostile Work Environment Claim
Jones argues that she marshaled sufficient evidence to es-
tablish that she experienced a hostile work environment
based on her race, and that the district court erred in resolving
questions of fact in Defendants’ favor at summary judgment.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To suc-
cessfully prove a claim for race-based hostile work environ-
ment, Jones must establish that: “(1) [s]he was subject to un-
welcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on [her]
race; (3) the harassment was severe or pervasive so as to alter
the conditions of [her] work environment by creating a hostile
or abusive situation; and (4) there is a basis for employer

-- 7 of 19 --

8 No. 24-2166
liability.” Cole v. Board of Trustees of N. Ill. Univ., 838 F.3d 888,
895–96 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted).
We first assess whether the summary judgment record
demonstrates that Jones experienced harassment that perme-
ated her work environment. We then consider whether
Jones’s employer discriminated against her on the basis of
race.
1. Pervasive Harassment
Employers violate Title VII when “the workplace is per-
meated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972,
982 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). Relevant here,
we “consider the totality of the circumstances when determin-
ing whether conduct is severe or pervasive.” Scaife v. United
States Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 49 F.4th 1109, 1116 (7th Cir.
2022). In making that assessment, we consider:
(1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
(2) how offensive a reasonable person would
deem it to be; (3) whether it is physically threat-
ening or humiliating conduct as opposed to ver-
bal abuse; (4) whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee’s work performance; and (5)
whether it is directed at the victim.
Id. We are mindful that the “standards for judging hostility
are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not
become a general civility code.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotation omitted).

-- 8 of 19 --

No. 24-2166 9
Jones cites several incidents from her time with the De-
partment and argues that considered in their totality, they
show pervasive harassment. First, she claims that the no-chil-
dren-in-the-workplace policy was pretextual and weapon-
ized against her by her supervisors. Further, she argues that
Kintzler’s workplace demeanor toward her reflects pervasive
harassment. Lastly, she identifies six instances of perceived
false accusations she faced while working in the Department.
Taken together, in Jones’s view, these episodes “create[d] an
abusive working environment” giving rise to a Title VII claim.
Casino Queen, 739 F.3d at 982.
We discuss each incident in turn, considering the holistic
record. Morgan v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank of Chicago, 867
F.2d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1989) (“When a rational trier of fact
could not find for the nonmoving party based on the record
as a whole, there is no trial issue.”).
a. No-Children-in-the-Workplace Policy
Jones disputes the existence of the no-children-in-the-
workplace policy. She argues that her supervisors harassed
her by invoking the nonexistent policy against her when no
other employee had faced similar discipline for having their
children in the workplace. Moreover, Jones avers that Kelly
never actually observed her violating the policy, as Kelly saw
Jones with her son in the lobby of the building, which is open
to the public.
But the record as a whole belies Jones’s assessment that
the policy was invoked as a pretext to harass her. The record
instead shows that the Department’s policy predated Das’s
directorship and that Jones’s supervisors had previously told
her that children were not allowed in the workplace. Further,

-- 9 of 19 --

10 No. 24-2166
Jones was never punished for violating the policy. Rather,
Kelly reminded Jones about the policy after seeing Jones with
her son in the lobby. Then, Jones threatened legal action and
told Kelly she was unwilling to discuss the matter with her
unless the Sheriff’s office was involved.
While this incident was mentioned in her termination let-
ter, only Jones’s reaction to Kelly’s reminder was cited as an
example of her insubordination. In this context, the reminder
was neither hostile nor even a formal reprimand. And since
“[w]e expect a certain level of maturity… from employees,”
Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 900 (7th
Cir. 2018), we conclude that no rational jury could find that
Kelly’s reminder rose to the level of harassment.
Moreover, Jones herself admitted to previously violating
this policy in early 2017 when her children were in the office
with her. We thus cannot say that reminding Jones of this pol-
icy—which Jones acknowledges she violated—was “physi-
cally threatening or humiliating” conduct or “unreasonably
interfere[d] with [Jones’s] work performance” as is required
to support a Title VII claim. Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d
832, 840 (7th Cir. 2009).
b. Interactions with Kintzler
According to Jones, Kintzler acted “in an irritated and
frustrated manner” toward her, did not say “excuse me” be-
fore interrupting her, and would politely answer questions
from white and Hispanic employees while responding rudely
to African American employees like Jones and her colleague
Theo Chapman. As in Abrego v. Wilkie, supervisors may be
“short tempered, hostile, unfairly critical, and disrespectful”
without “creat[ing] a workplace permeated with

-- 10 of 19 --

No. 24-2166 11
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” 907 F.3d
1004, 1015 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). Kintzler’s rude behav-
ior reflects the sort of relatively minor slights that, if actiona-
ble, would risk turning Title VII into a general civility code;
they do not amount to severe or pervasive harassment. We
hold that these episodes fail to support Jones’s Title VII claim
on pervasiveness; we separately discuss Jones’s arguments
that she faced race-based harassment in Section II.A.2.
c. False Accusations
Next, Jones points out several instances of purportedly
false accusations levied by her supervisors that she claims
show severe and pervasive harassment. We have recognized
that “creating a false paper trail that include[s] manufactured
details of reports and meetings with [an employee] and other
managers in an effort to hide the true nature of the discharge”
is actionable under Title VII. Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc., 842
F.3d 1010, 1025 (7th Cir. 2016).
However, each episode Jones cites as a false papering of
the record is either not false or was not relied upon by the
Department in disciplining Jones. We discuss each purport-
edly false accusation below.
First, Jones claims that Defendants falsely labeled her as
unprofessional for calling Griffin unprofessional. But Jones
admitted to sending the email accusing Griffin of being un-
professional, so she was not falsely accused. Jones surely dis-
agrees with her employer’s assessment that her reaction to
Griffin was itself unprofessional, and reasonable minds may
differ as to standards of professionalism. But in Title VII cases,
we assess whether the workplace was “both objectively and
subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would

-- 11 of 19 --

12 No. 24-2166
find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did per-
ceive to be so.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.
Here, we agree with the district court that no reasonable
jury could conclude it was even false—much less hostile, abu-
sive, or harassing—for Jones’s supervisors to determine that
she was unprofessional in this interaction with Griffin and
reprimand her accordingly.
Second, Jones claims that Defendants falsely chastised her
without evidence of her children being in the office. Again,
this was not a false accusation: Jones admitted to having her
children in the office in early 2017, for which she never faced
discipline. And as discussed above, Jones was disciplined not
for violating this policy, but for her insubordinate email re-
sponse to Kelly.
At the risk of being repetitive, even if a jury determined
that the policy did not exist, no rational jury could conclude
that Kelly’s reasonable request that Jones keep her children
out of the workplace (particularly in such a sensitive work-
place as a juvenile probation department) constituted harass-
ment. Nor could one find that disciplining Jones for her in-
subordinate response “create[d] an abusive working environ-
ment” within Title VII’s meaning. Casino Queen, 739 F.3d at
982 (internal quotation omitted).
Third, Jones claims that Defendants falsely accused her of
overstating her authority in written work product. Again, this
is not a false accusation: Jones admitted to sending the two
client letters that Das ultimately concluded were inappropri-
ately coercive. Jones merely disagrees with her employer’s as-
sessment that the letters—which warned of incarceration and

-- 12 of 19 --

No. 24-2166 13
removal of custody for non-compliance with her directives—
were inappropriate.
Reasonable jurors could disagree with Das’s assessment of
the letters, but no rational jury could determine that it was
hostile, abusive, or harassing for the Department’s director to
determine that the letters were overly coercive and thus re-
flected poor performance. Facing consequences for her “fail-
ure to meet legitimate employment expectations” of her su-
pervisors cannot support Jones’s claim for hostile work envi-
ronment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 920 (7th Cir. 2016).
Fourth, Jones claims that Defendants falsely accused her of
insubordination after she refused to misrepresent facts to the
court, citing her refusal to include in T.L.’s report that a sex
trafficking assessment had already been submitted. Viewing
the whole record, Jones was not being asked to misrepresent
facts because she was told that the assessment had in fact been
completed by Roberts-Tabb and submitted to the court. And
Kintzler’s revisions explained that Jones personally did not
have a copy of the assessment. The record shows Jones had
other similar instances of insubordination, too: she provided
the court with extraneous detail about her compensatory time
request after Kintzler directed her not to.
We therefore conclude that no reasonable juror could find
that Defendants pressured Jones to make misrepresentations
to the court, let alone that Kintzler requesting Jones to com-
plete her job functions by implementing her edits amounted
to harassment. We have observed that “it is hardly out of line
for a higher level manager to hold subordinates to the satis-
factory performance of a task,” as Kintzler did here. Patton v.
Indianapolis Public School Board, 276 F.3d 334, 339 (7th Cir.
2002).

-- 13 of 19 --

14 No. 24-2166
Fifth, Jones claims that Defendants falsely accused her of
telling her juvenile client T.L. that Kintzler was a racist. Jones
denies she did so, and we accept that denial as Jones is the
nonmovant at summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Jones argues that because T.L. later recanted the false accusa-
tion, a jury could find that Kelly coerced T.L. into making it.
However, Jones submitted in the district court that “her
Title VII claim is not based on her termination, but rather the
hostile work environment she experienced during her employ-
ment.” By the time Kelly reported T.L.’s accusation, Jones had
already been suspended, and she never returned to the De-
partment before she was terminated. Thus, no reasonable jury
could have found that this episode affected the conditions of
Jones’s employment. See Smith v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 936 F.3d
554, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding that the use of a racial slur
did not “alter the conditions of [plaintiff’s] employment” be-
cause the employer had already “initiated termination pro-
ceedings” when it was used).
Sixth, Jones claims that Defendants falsely accused her of
calling Kelly bipolar. Jones denies making this statement and,
as above, is entitled to that denial on summary judgment. But
“isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) are not suffi-
cient” to establish a hostile work environment claim. Dandy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 271 (7th Cir. 2004) (inter-
nal quotation omitted). Thus, no rational jury could conclude
that one instance of reprimanding Jones for a statement she
denied making evinces pervasive harassment.

-- 14 of 19 --

No. 24-2166 15
2. Racial Animus
Even if Jones could establish pervasive harassment, she
has not met her burden of showing that she encountered per-
vasive harassment based on her race.
At summary judgment, Jones submitted a letter from her
co-worker, Theo Chapman, in support of Jones’s allegations
of racial discrimination. The district court did not discuss
Chapman’s letter in its summary judgment ruling, and Jones
charges that it erred by effectively excluding it. The letter is
neither signed nor notarized, though it contains Chapman’s
typewritten name at the bottom. It does not purport to have
been made under penalty of perjury nor is it verified as true
and correct; “[a]s such, we can simply ignore [it]” on appeal.
Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1255 n.13 (7th Cir.
1990). Even if we were to consider Chapman’s letter, it merely
duplicates Jones’s other evidence that is insufficient to estab-
lish pervasive harassment based on race.
To support her claim that she experienced race-based har-
assment, Jones relies most heavily on Das’s reading aloud of
the N-word in a meeting with a coalition of African American
probation officers. This is a troubling incident that we cannot
ignore.
“No other word in the English language so powerfully or
instantly calls to mind our country’s long and brutal struggle
to overcome racism and discrimination against African–
Americans.” Paschall, 28 F.4th at 815 (quoting Ayissi-Etoh v.
Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). Even “[a] one-
time use of the epithet can in some circumstances warrant Ti-
tle VII liability.” Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1116. “We have repeatedly
treated a supervisor’s use of racially toxic language in the

-- 15 of 19 --

16 No. 24-2166
workplace as much more serious than a co-worker’s.” Gates v.
Board of Education of Chicago, 916 F.3d 631, 638 (7th Cir. 2019).
Racial epithets need not be stated directly to a plaintiff to be
actionable, but “remarks that are stated directly to the plain-
tiff weigh heavier than when a plaintiff hears them
secondhand.” Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1116.
The plaintiff in Scaife brought a race-based hostile work
environment claim under Title VII after learning from co-
workers that eight months earlier, a supervisor in another de-
partment had called the plaintiff a “stupid fucking n****r.” Id.
We affirmed summary judgment for the employer, finding
that the plaintiff “failed to show that [the supervisor’s] use of
the N-word outside of her presence, eight months prior, was
severe enough for a jury to find that she experienced a hostile
work environment based on race.” Id. at 1117.
We reach the same conclusion here. The record shows that
Das said the N-word while reading a quote from a document,
contrasting with the Scaife supervisor’s direct use of the slur
to disparage the plaintiff. Jones was not present when Das
said the N-word, and it happened nearly a year before Jones’s
cited instances of harassment began. Perhaps if there were
other instances of Das’s conduct reflecting race-based hostil-
ity, Das’s inexcusable decision to utter the N-word could sup-
ply evidence of racial bias sufficient to preclude summary
judgment. Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1046 (7th
Cir. 2002) (repeated use of racial slurs was one aspect of an
“appalling litany of misconduct”); Johnson, 892 F.3d at 904
(describing a “catalogue of the evidence of racist statements”
by several supervisors that precluded summary judgment for
the employer). But here, as discussed above, there are no

-- 16 of 19 --

No. 24-2166 17
other instances of hostility by Das sufficient to create a genu-
ine issue of material fact.
With that said, a single episode like Das’s meeting may
preclude summary judgment for the employer in a future Ti-
tle VII case. That is because “no single act can more quickly
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment” than a supervisor’s use of the N-word
“in the presence of his subordinates.” Rodgers v. Western-
Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal
quotation omitted). For instance, a similar one-time utterance
of the slur by a supervisor who otherwise engages in hostile,
yet race-neutral workplace conduct could supply evidence
that such hostility is in fact motivated by racial animus. We
have observed that “[e]vidence that a workplace is tainted by
overt racial hostility can support an inference that other har-
assment that at first seems race-neutral also has an undercur-
rent of racial animus.” Cole, 838 F.3d at 896. While that is not
this case, we are mindful that there is no bright-line rule and
“no ‘magic number’ of slurs that indicate a hostile work envi-
ronment.” Cerros, 288 F.3d at 1047.
But here, we hold that because Jones cannot show perva-
sive, race-based harassment, her hostile work environment
claim fails.
B. Jason Smith’s Declaration
Having concluded that Jones’s claim cannot withstand her
former employer’s motion for summary judgment, we turn
briefly to a source of evidence the district court excluded: Ja-
son Smith’s declaration.
Jones argues that the district court erred in declining to
consider testimony from Smith—the former union

-- 17 of 19 --

18 No. 24-2166
representative for Jones’ local AFSCME chapter—because it
supplied crucial evidence supporting her claims. While
Smith’s name appeared in the discovery record and he was
known to Defendants, Jones belatedly disclosed him as a wit-
ness and produced his testimony in the form of a declaration
for the first time in her summary judgment response. The dis-
trict court excluded the declaration as a discovery sanction.
District courts are afforded wide latitude to decide
whether to exclude materials that violate Rule 26(a). David v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003). We review
discovery sanctions for abuse of discretion and uphold a dis-
trict court’s sanction if it is reasonable. Dynegy Marketing &
Trade v. Multiut Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2011).
While Defendants may have known of Smith given his job
with the union, Jones had merely disclosed Smith as a source
of documents she produced, not as a witness Jones intended
to call in support of claims or defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1)(A)(i). We thus cannot say it was an abuse of discre-
tion for the district court to ignore Smith’s declaration where
he was disclosed as a witness only after the close of fact dis-
covery and after Defendants had filed their motion for sum-
mary judgment.
Even if the district court had abused its discretion in strik-
ing Smith’s affidavit, the error would be harmless because
“the stricken evidence was insufficient to support a genuine
issue of material fact for trial” on Jones’s Title VII claim. O'Re-
gan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 986 (7th Cir. 2001).
Consistent with Jones’s own testimony discussed above,
Smith swore that Defendants treated African American em-
ployees “more negatively and harsher than their white

-- 18 of 19 --

No. 24-2166 19
colleagues,” highlighting some colleagues that in his view re-
ceived milder disciplinary outcomes for engaging in conduct
like Jones’s. Smith also echoes Jones on the no-children-in-
the-workplace policy, testifying that he has “never seen this
alleged formal policy.” And Smith backed up Jones’s view
that it was permissible for probation officers to write coercive
letters, calling that approach a “common and expected prac-
tice.” He also corroborated that Das read out the N-word at
the meeting, which Defendants do not dispute.
None of that moves the needle for Jones on her hostile
work environment claim. Smith’s declaration highlights gen-
eral instances of perceived unfairness in the workplace, not
the pervasive, discriminatory harassment required to bring
such claims. At best, Smith’s declaration corroborates Jones’s
testimony, but her testimony is insufficient to support her
claim.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district
court’s judgment.

-- 19 of 19 --