United States of America v. Monisha Rhodes

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 17, 2026*
Decided February 17, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2577
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MONISHA RHODES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:21-cr-00258-JMS-TAB-1
Jane Magnus-Stinson,
Judge.
O R D E R
Monisha Rhodes, a federal prisoner, appeals from an order denying
compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied relief
based largely on the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2577 Page 2
Rhodes pleaded guilty in January 2023 to possessing more than 400 grams of
fentanyl with intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vi). She was on
supervised release at the time. The district court sentenced her to 120 months’
imprisonment to be served consecutively to the 24 months she received for violating the
terms of her supervised release.
Rhodes moved in March 2024 for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing her role as the only available caregiver for her children as an
extraordinary and compelling reason for release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A). Her
disabled daughter lived with a relative who no longer could manage the daughter’s
medical care, and her two sons lived with her mother who had recently been
hospitalized with leukemia. Rhodes added that poor prison conditions exacerbated her
own serious medical issues. See id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). In support of her motion, Rhodes
emphasized her participation in rehabilitation programs and her ability to find housing
and work upon release. She also asked the court to recruit counsel to help her argue in
favor of compassionate release.
The district court denied Rhodes’s motions. Addressing first her request for
counsel, the court explained she had not shown that she tried to procure counsel on her
own. As for her request for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the court assumed that her
reasons for relief were extraordinary and compelling but concluded that the § 3553(a)
factors weighed against her. The court explained that she had an extensive criminal
history (including eight felony convictions), committed a serious offense while on
supervised release, and served less than half of her 120-month sentence. The court
acknowledged mitigating aspects of her history and characteristics (among them her
work in the prison, participation in prison programming, and job offer upon release)
but concluded those factors did not support compassionate release.
On appeal, Rhodes contends that the district court overemphasized old,
nonviolent offenses in her criminal history. But the § 3553(a) factors permitted the court
to consider her history and characteristics, including her nonviolent offenses.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Moreover, the need to protect the public from further crimes
is a valid reason to deny compassionate release, and here the court was concerned that
Rhodes would reoffend based on her long criminal history and her commission of the
current offense while on supervised release. See United States v. Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 563
(7th Cir. 2022).
Rhodes also argues the district court gave short shrift to her difficult childhood,
rehabilitation, and time served. But this argument essentially asks us to reweigh the

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No. 24-2577 Page 3
§ 3553(a) factors, which we decline to do on appeal because the court applied the factors
logically. See United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th 786, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2022).
As for the denial of counsel, Rhodes next asserts for the first time that the district
court failed to permit her to supplement the record with evidence that she had tried and
failed to secure representation. But Rhodes did not press this argument in the district
court, and “appellate courts ordinarily abstain from entertaining issues” not raised in
the district court. Anderson v. United States, 981 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 473 (2012)). And even if Rhodes supplemented the record,
the district court would not be required to revisit its earlier ruling to deny counsel.
See Thomas v. Anderson, 912 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2018).
Rhodes also asserts for the first time that the Bureau of Prisons prevented her
from participating in child-protection proceedings for one of her children, and she
requests that we order the Bureau to allow her to attend future hearings. But because
she did not raise this issue in the district court, we also decline to consider it on appeal.
See Anderson, 981 F.3d at 572.
AFFIRMED

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