United States of America v. Thomas Lindstrom

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1395
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS LINDSTROM ,
Defendant,
and
R YAN BUILDING GROUP , I NC .,
Third-Party Citation Respondent-Appellee.
A PPEAL OF DAVID V ENKUS,
Restitution Judgment Creditor.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 16-cr-00631 — Lindsay C. Jenkins, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED DECEMBER 9, 2025 — DECIDED F EBRUARY 23, 2026
____________________
Before HAMILTON , S T. EVE, and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.

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2 No. 25-1395
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. This appeal stems from David Ven-
kus’s attempt to enforce a $13,776,518 criminal restitution
judgment against Thomas Lindstrom, his former employee
and a convicted fraudster who caused the collapse of Ven-
kus’s trading firm. Venkus served Lindstrom’s then-em-
ployer, Ryan Building Group, Inc. (“RBG”), with a citation to
discover assets, pursuant to Illinois law. The citation prohib-
ited RBG from transferring certain of Lindstrom’s assets that
RBG controlled. When RBG later terminated Lindstrom (after
discovering he had embezzled from the company), it gave
him $73,090—a “hypothetical” calculation it based on the
value of stock options Lindstrom accumulated during his em-
ployment but never exercised offset by debt Lindstrom owed
RBG. RBG called the payment a “severance” and claimed it
was a goodwill gesture it gratuitously gave a former em-
ployee who it terminated for stealing.
After Venkus discovered the severance payment, he
moved in the district court for a finding that RBG had violated
the citation and sought a judgment ordering RBG to pay him
the value of the stock options. The district court denied Ven-
kus’s motion. Because Venkus has raised material questions
of fact surrounding the nature of the severance payment and
whether RBG violated the citation, we reverse and remand for
an evidentiary hearing and further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I. Background
In 1991, Venkus started Rock Capital, a now-defunct pro-
prietary trading firm based in Northfield, Illinois. Lindstrom
worked for Rock Capital as a trader for over 20 years—nearly
the firm’s entire existence. Lindstrom earned 80% of any net

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No. 25-1395 3
profit on his trades, while Rock Capital kept the remaining
20%.
In 2016, the United States charged Lindstrom with eight
counts of securities and wire fraud. The indictment detailed
Lindstrom’s scheme to defraud Rock Capital by falsely mak-
ing it appear as though his trades were profitable.
Lindstrom’s scheme boosted his compensation but caused
Rock Capital to lose $13,776,518 and ultimately cease opera-
tions. Lindstrom eventually pleaded guilty to one count of
wire fraud. In 2019, the district court sentenced Lindstrom to
60 months in prison and 2 years of supervised release. It also
ordered Lindstrom to pay Venkus restitution in the amount
of $13,776,518. Venkus subsequently registered the restitution
as a civil judgment and began attempts to collect on it.
Lindstrom started working for RBG in March 2015, before
his indictment; he worked at the company until his incarcer-
ation and RBG reemployed him upon release. Lindstrom’s
time at RBG, like his time at Rock Capital, was tumultuous, to
say the least. Over the course of his employment, RBG com-
pensated Lindstrom through a semi-monthly salary and stock
options.1 Lindstrom also racked up debt owed to RBG, includ-
ing (i) $230,000 he used to fund his criminal defense;
(ii) $69,016 charged to RBG’s corporate credit card for per-
sonal expenses, which he then claimed as business expenses;
and (iii) $10,000 that RBG spent uncovering these wrongful
expenses. In total, Lindstrom owed RBG $372,543.
1 The stock options Lindstrom earned during his employment vested
over time. According to the stock options agreement, the options would
expire 30 days after termination by RBG if unexercised.

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4 No. 25-1395
In 2022, Venkus moved in the district court for a citation
to discover assets against RBG, pursuant to Illinois’s judg-
ment enforcement law, 735 ILCS 5/2–1402. Through the cita-
tion, Venkus sought to discover assets controlled by RBG that
Lindstrom owned or that RBG owed Lindstrom. The district
court granted Venkus’s motion, and Venkus served it on RBG.
Upon service, the citation created a perfected lien on the as-
sets to which it applied. § 2–1402(m). The order also included
a provision prohibiting RBG from transferring assets under
the citation. § 2–1402(f). And, because RBG never perfected a
lien on the debt Lindstrom owed the company, the parties do
not dispute that Venkus’s citation was the most senior lien on
the assets.2
RBG responded to the citation. First, it explained it paid
Lindstrom a semi-monthly salary. Illinois law applies a 15%
garnishment cap to “wages” a judgment debtor earns.
735 ILCS 5/12–803. So RBG’s citation response determined
Venkus was entitled to $918.75 per month—15% of
Lindstrom’s semi-monthly salary. Second, RBG also ex-
plained that Lindstrom had an interest in vested stock options
that “have been pledged as a security for a loan and the
amount owed on the loan is more than the value of any vested
options.”
Following RBG’s response, Venkus moved for a turnover
order as to the 15% of Lindstrom’s semi-monthly salary. His
motion did not request turnover of the stock options. Rather,
2 In addition to Venkus’s citation and Lindstrom’s debt to RBG, a third
lien existed—a family court order entitling Lindstrom’s ex-wife to a por-
tion of his earnings. That order, which the court entered in 2023, also did
not have priority over Venkus’s lien.

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No. 25-1395 5
he reserved his “right to seek relief as to the stock options
identified by [RBG].” The district court entered the turnover
order, directing RBG to pay Venkus Lindstrom’s non-exempt
wages pursuant to § 12–803. Following the order, RBG made
monthly payments to Venkus.
In October 2023, RBG discovered Lindstrom had embez-
zled funds by charging personal expenses to his RBG expense
account. It terminated Lindstrom and stopped paying Venkus
the 15% of Lindstrom’s semi-monthly salary. Three weeks
later, it informed Venkus it had terminated Lindstrom and
that it was “still working out any severance.” Over the next
one to two months, Venkus, through counsel, repeatedly re-
quested that RBG send him information about Lindstrom’s
termination and about the severance RBG claimed it was cal-
culating. But RBG barely responded to Venkus’s counsel, pro-
vided no information, and delayed its response. Meanwhile,
Lindstrom allegedly never exercised his vested options,
which, pursuant to the options agreement, expired 30 days af-
ter his termination. Venkus never moved for a turnover order
as to the options.
In late December 2023, RBG paid Venkus $10,963 without
any explanation. Venkus asked RBG for the “basis” of the pay-
ment, but, as was becoming a common theme, RBG continued
to delay. In January 2024, Lindstrom (not RBG) sent Venkus a
document titled “Ryan Building Group Tom Lindstrom Op-
tions Net Payout.” The document, which Lindstrom signed,
first detailed the “Fully Vested Options Payout”—valuing
Lindstrom’s supposedly now-expired options at $445,633.
Next, it deducted $372,543—the debt Lindstrom owed RBG.
Finally, it arrived at Lindstrom’s $73,090 severance

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6 No. 25-1395
payment—the difference between the value of options and
the debt Lindstrom owed RBG.
Venkus then moved in the district court for an order di-
recting RBG to show cause based on this document, which the
district court granted. In response, RBG explained:
Lindstrom received gross severance in the amount of
$73,090. RBG calculated this amount by taking the
amount that Lindstrom would have received had he
exercised his stock options ($445,633) and subtracted
amounts Lindstrom owed to RBG, including repay-
ment of personal loan[s] for which the options were
collateral, totaling $372,543, for a gross severance in the
amount of $73,090. Of that gross severance amount,
RBG paid 15% ($10,963) to [Venkus] based on its un-
derstanding of the Court’s turnover order [] that RBG
is required to pay 15% of amounts due to Lindstrom to
[Venkus].
Continuing, it said the stock options “ha[d] expired” and the
“value of the stock options is $0.” RBG used the previous
value of the options as a “hypothetical” benchmark from
which to calculate the severance. In its supplemental re-
sponse, RBG reiterated that “the Stock Options were offered
as security for the Lindstrom Loan pursuant to an oral agree-
ment between the Defendant and RBG; this agreement was
not reduced to writing.” But it acknowledged “it did not make
a public filing to perfect a secured interest in the Stock Op-
tions.”
Venkus, dissatisfied with this response, moved in the dis-
trict court for a finding that RBG had violated the citation. He
asked the district court to order RBG to pay him the full value

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No. 25-1395 7
of the stock options (minus the $10,963 RBG had already
paid). Venkus argued RBG violated the citation when it trans-
ferred the value of Lindstrom’s stock options ($445,633) to it-
self, outside the lien priority, because RBG deducted the debt
Lindstrom owed RBG ($372,543)—a junior lien—from the
value of the options. By doing so, Venkus claimed RBG im-
permissibly recovered the debt Lindstrom owed it ahead of
his superior claim to the value of the options. Venkus further
argued that RBG violated the citation by paying him only 15%
of the severance, as, according to Venkus, a lump-sum sever-
ance payment is not subject to § 12–803’s 15% garnishment
cap. Finally, Venkus sought attorney’s fees.
Opposing Venkus’s motion, RBG reiterated that the sever-
ance payment was “hypothetical.” Claiming the options had
no value by December 2023, RBG said it used their previous
value as a baseline from which to calculate the severance
package, offsetting that value with the debt Lindstrom owed
as “[Lindstrom] was required to repay those debts before ex-
ercising the options.” But, RBG said, because the options had
no value by the time it calculated the severance payment, it
could not have violated the citation by transferring the value
of the stock options to itself. Nor could it have recovered the
debt Lindstrom owed the company. Continuing, RBG viewed
a severance payment as “wages” under § 12–803 and subject
to the 15% cap.
The district court denied Venkus’s motion based on the
briefs. United States v. Lindstrom, No. 16 CR 631, 2025 WL
524028 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2025). First, it found RBG did not vi-
olate the citation in calculating Lindstrom’s severance. Id. at
*4–*6. Agreeing with RBG, the district court found that be-
cause the options had expired, they had no value by

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8 No. 25-1395
December 2023—thus, the severance was a “hypothetical”
calculation, and RBG did not subvert the citation. Id. Second,
the district court interpreted § 12–803 to cover severance pay-
ments and found that RBG did not violate the citation by pay-
ing Venkus only 15% of Lindstrom’s severance. Id. at *6–*9.
Because it found RBG had not violated the citation, the district
court concluded RBG was not liable for attorney’s fees. Id. at
*9. Venkus appealed.
II. Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1) governs enforce-
ment of money judgments and directs federal courts to apply
“the procedure of the state where the court is located.” To en-
force a judgment, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure permits
a judgment creditor to serve a citation to discover assets on
individuals and entities the creditor believes control assets
owned by the judgment debtor. 735 ILCS 5/2–1402(a) (judg-
ment creditor may “prosecute citations to discover assets for
the purposes of examining the judgment debtor or any other
person to discover assets or income of the debtor not exempt
from the enforcement of the judgment”); see also Mendez v. Re-
public Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2013). Section 2–
1402(m) explains that “[t]he judgment or balance due on the
judgment becomes a lien when a citation is served.” Sec-
tion 2–1402(f) provides that the citation may prohibit a party
served under the citation from transferring assets to which the
citation applies and states that a party who makes such a
transfer may be liable to the judgment creditor. As discussed
earlier, the district court granted Venkus a citation to discover
assets against RBG pursuant to § 2–1402, and the citation in-
cluded a provision prohibiting RBG from transferring assets:

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No. 25-1395 9
YOU ARE PROHIBITED from making or allowing any
transfer or other disposition of, or interfering with, any
property not exempt from execution or garnishment
belonging to the judgment debtor or to which he may
be entitled, or which may be acquired by or become
due to the judgment debtor and from paying over or
otherwise disposing of any money not so exempt,
which is due or becomes due to judgment debtor, until
further order of court or termination of the proceed-
ings. You are required to withhold the payment or
transfer of any money or other property no more than
twice the amount of the unsatisfied judgment.
Venkus seeks to recover against RBG for violating the ci-
tation by transferring Lindstrom’s assets. To prevail, Venkus
must show “(1) that [he] has an enforceable judgment, (2) that
[he] properly served a citation upon [RBG], and (3) that [RBG]
transferred assets of the judgment debtor in violation of the
citation’s restraining provision.” Mendez, 725 F.3d at 663.
Only the third element is in dispute.3
Venkus contends RBG twice violated the citation:
(1) through its calculation of Lindstrom’s severance and (2) by
determining that a “severance” payment is “wages” for
3 The parties also dispute the standard of review we apply to a motion
for a finding of § 2–1402 liability. Our case law is admittedly limited. In
Mendez, we reviewed such a motion de novo because we found that the
question presented was “of law rather than fact.” 725 F.3d at 662. This
makes sense and is in line with our approach to similar issues, where we
review questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. But
we leave for another day resolution of the standard of review we apply
when reviewing a motion for a finding of § 2–1402 liability because the
resolution of this appeal does not turn on the standard of review.

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10 No. 25-1395
purposes of § 12–803 and therefore paying Venkus only 15%
of the payment. We turn first to the severance calculation. We
then move to the § 12–803 question. Finally, we briefly ad-
dress Venkus’s request for attorney’s fees.
A. Severance Calculation
Whether RBG violated the citation hinges on whether its
calculation of Lindstrom’s $73,090 severance impermissibly
transferred the value of Lindstrom’s stock options to itself ra-
ther than to Venkus. In other words, should Venkus have re-
ceived payments derived from the full $445,633 value of the
stock options because RBG calculated the severance based on
the options’ full value offset by the debt Lindstrom owed it?
Section 2–1402(f)(1)’s “restraining provision” requires a
third party under a citation “to freeze assets” of the judgment
debtor that the citation entitles the judgment creditor to claim.
Door Props., LLC v. Nahlawi, 188 N.E.3d 806, 811 (Ill. App. Ct.
2020) (quoting Kauffman v. Wrenn, 46 N.E.3d 805, 812–13 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015)); see also United States v. Sheth, 759 F.3d 711, 717
(7th Cir. 2014). The citation is not an injunction; rather, it puts
the party subject to the citation on “notice … that if [it] trans-
fers property subject to the supplementary proceeding,
thereby attempting to impede the administration of justice,
and places the property beyond the reach of the court, [it] will
be punished either by having a judgment entered against [it]
for the amount of the judgment creditor’s claim or the value
of the property, whichever is less, or may be punished as and
for contempt.” Bank of Aspen v. Fox Cartage, Inc., 533 N.E.2d
1080, 1083 (Ill. 1989) (citation modified); see also BMO Harris
Bank N.A. v. Joe Contarino, Inc., 74 N.E.3d 1091, 1099 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2017). The citation is meant to “prevent the judgment
debtor or third party from disposing of those assets before the

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No. 25-1395 11
judgment creditor can reach them.” Door Props., 188 N.E.3d at
811.
Once the citation is served, the judgment debtor or the
third party cannot “frustrat[e] the supplementary proceed-
ings.” Bank of Aspen, 533 N.E.2d at 1083 (quoting Kirchheimer
Bros. Co. v. Jewelry Mine, Ltd., 426 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1981)); cf. 740 ILCS 160/5(a)(1) (debtor may not “hinder,
delay, or defraud any creditor”). A party who engages in
“evasive conduct” may “frustrate the purpose of the restrain-
ing provision.” Nat’l Life Real Est. Holdings, LLC v. Scarlato, 83
N.E.3d 44, 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). The citation “requires that
the party hold property which is subject to the reach of the
judgment creditor in status quo until the judgment creditor’s
rights can be determined.” Kirchheimer Bros. Co., 426 N.E.2d at
1113; see also Illinois Law & Practice, Executions § 112 (Nov.
2025) (citing Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 438 N.E.2d 933, 938 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1982)). RBG could not “dispos[e] of [the] assets before
[Venkus could] reach them,” Door Props., 188 N.E.3d at 811,
nor could it interfere with Venkus’s right to eventually claim
them, see Bank of Aspen, 533 N.E.2d at 1083.
Venkus has raised questions of fact as to whether RBG in-
terfered with or “frustrated” his right to claim the stock op-
tions. We are skeptical of the nature of this transaction given
the strange manner in which RBG treated the stock options,
Lindstrom’s debt to the RBG, and the purported gratuitous
“severance” payment it decided to pay Lindstrom upon ter-
mination after he stole from the company. Although not di-
rectly analogous to the facts at issue here, decisions by Illinois
courts examining potential citation violations help inform this
skepticism.

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12 No. 25-1395
Consider National Life Real Estate Holdings, for example, in
which the Appellate Court of Illinois found that a party under
a citation engaged in “evasive conduct” to avoid a judgment
debtor’s ability to collect under the citation. See generally 83
N.E.3d 44. There, National Life sought to recover a $3.5 mil-
lion judgment it held against Ronald Scarlato. Id. at 46. To en-
force its judgment, National Life served the International
Bank of Chicago (“IBC”) with a citation to discover assets,
prohibiting IBC from transferring Scarlato’s assets. Id. Scar-
lato and two LLCs of which he was the managing member
then took out a $3.5 million loan from IBC. Id. at 47–48. The
loan agreement limited Scarlato’s use of advances to only
funding a specific construction project in which IBC held an
interest. Id. at 48. Scarlato and the two LLCs requested a $3.5
million “advance” under the loan agreement, directing that
IBC disburse it to a construction escrow agent. Id. IBC dis-
bursed some of the funds to the escrow agent and disbursed
the rest to third parties and accounts controlled by the LLCs.
Id. at 48–49. After learning of the loan, National Life moved
for a judgment that IBC violated the citation by disbursing the
loan to at least one third party. Id. On appeal, the court held
that IBC violated the citation’s restraining provision. Id. at 58–
59. Explaining that § 2–1402 is to be “construed liberally,” the
court found that IBC engaged in “evasive conduct” that “frus-
trate[d] the purpose of” § 2–1402. Id. at 55, 57. A judgment
debtor would frustrate § 2–1402 if he could “enter into loan
agreements with third-party lending institutions that merely
include language restricting the debtor’s ability to access the
funds, while at the same time allowing the debtor the author-
ity to request disbursements.” Id. at 57. Upholding such be-
havior would “create an avenue by which judgment debtors
would be able to avoid the consequences of the judgment.” Id.

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No. 25-1395 13
Or, compare Door Properties, where the Appellate Court of
Illinois determined that a gratuitous money gift from a party
under a citation to a judgment debtor would fall outside § 2–
1402’s scope and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to fur-
ther the develop the record on whether the payment at issue
was or was not gratuitous. See generally 188 N.E.3d 806. Door
Properties, LLC sought to enforce a $750,000 judgment it ob-
tained against Ayad Nahlawi and, accordingly, served a cita-
tion to discover assets on Mago BB, LLC, which Nahlawi’s
parents and two friends controlled. Id. at 807–09. Three years
later, Door Properties learned that Mago had paid at least
$15,000 to cover Nahlawi’s attorney fees in various legal mat-
ters. Id. at 808. It then moved for a finding that Mago had vi-
olated the citation, arguing the $15,000 was property Nahlawi
possessed (as debt Mago owed him) and thus Mago should
have paid it to Door Properties. Id. Mago responded that the
payment was “a gift and reciprocation for favors” that
Nahlawi had done for his parents and friends in the past and
was thus exempt from the citation because it was not property
owned by or owed to Nahlawi. Id. (citation modified). The
trial court found that § 2–1402 covered the funds, and entered
judgment for Door Properties. The Appellate Court of Illinois
reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine the nature of the payment and whether it was covered
by § 2–1402. Id. The court explained § 2–1402 would reach the
payment if Mago made it for “debt” it owed Nahlawi as debt
is “‘property’ of the judgment debtor,” but “a gratuitous pay-
ment on the judgment debtor’s behalf, out of goodwill or love
or familial obligation” is “not covered by” § 2–1402. Id. at 814.
Our law on fraudulent transfers generally aids our analy-
sis as well. First, 11 U.S.C § 548(a)(1)(A) allows a bankruptcy
trustee to “avoid any transfer … of an interest of the debtor”

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14 No. 25-1395
if the debtor “made such transfer or incurred such obligation
with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to
which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such
transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, in-
debted.” A trustee need not point to “[d]irect proof of actual
intent to defraud” to succeed. Frierdich v. Mottaz, 294 F.3d 864,
869–70 (7th Cir. 2002). Rather, circumstantial “badges of
fraud” can establish intent. Id.; see also In re Chi. Mgmt. Con-
sulting Grp., Inc., 929 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2019). Such
“badges” include:
[W]hether the debtor retained possession or control of
the property after the transfer, whether the transferee
shared a familial or other close relationship with the
debtor, whether the debtor received consideration for
the transfer, whether the transfer was disclosed or con-
cealed, whether the debtor made the transfer before or
after being threatened with suit by creditors, whether
the transfer involved substantially all of the debtor’s
assets, whether the debtor absconded, and whether the
debtor was or became solvent at the time of the trans-
fer.
Frierdich, 294 F.3d at 870 (citing 5 Collier on Bankruptcy
¶ 548.04(2)(b) (15th ed.)); cf. In re Chavin, 150 F.3d 726, 729 (7th
Cir. 1998) (listing indicators of intent to defraud creditors and
the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)).
Second, Illinois’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(“UFTA”), 740 ILCS 160/5, provides that a “transfer made …
by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor” if the debtor made
the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any creditor of the debtor,” § 5(a)(1). Courts look to the indi-
cators of fraud the UFTA provides. § 5(b)(1)–(11) (listing

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No. 25-1395 15
indicia of “actual intent” to defraud courts may consider
“among other factors”); see also Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Banco
Panamericano, Inc., 674 F.3d 743, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2012). Rele-
vant too is whether the debtor made the transfer “in good
faith,” where “good faith will probably be lacking if the trans-
feree knows that the transfer may be voidable because he
knows of an outstanding judgment against the transferor.”
For Your Ease Only, Inc. v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 560 F.3d 717,
721 (7th Cir. 2009).
Neither statute, of course, is directly applicable here. Both
deal with transfers made by a debtor to avoid debts owed to
a creditor. Here, however, RBG was not itself Venkus’s debtor;
the creditor-debtor relationship is between Venkus and
Lindstrom. But these provisions provide guidance and are in-
structive. Our underlying inquiry is similarly whether RBG
frustrated Venkus’s rights as a creditor by wrongly transfer-
ring the value of the stock options.
Remember, the citation required RBG to “freeze” assets
owned by Lindstrom which it controlled. RBG could not “in-
terfere with” or “frustrate” the citation, including by engag-
ing in “evasive conduct.” With these principles in mind, we
find RBG’s calculation of the severance payment highly sus-
pect based on the limited record before us. Before his termi-
nation, Lindstrom (i) according to RBG, “misappropriated”
and later embezzled funds from the company; (ii) accumu-
lated over $370,000 in debt he owed RBG, on top of the over
$13 million he owed Venkus—an amount which took priority
over the debt he owed RBG; and (iii) was convicted of fraud.
We find it doubtful an employer would pay an employee a
“gratuitous” severance upon termination given these circum-
stances, especially as RBG had no obligation to pay anything

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16 No. 25-1395
when terminating Lindstrom if Lindstrom did not timely ex-
ercise the options.
We further note that the severance payment enabled RBG
to avoid paying Lindstrom (and Venkus) the full value of the
options. Cf. Nat’l Life Real Est. Holdings, 83 N.E.3d at 55–57
(party can violate the citation by engaging in “evasive con-
duct” which “frustrate[s] the purpose of” § 2–1402). RBG also
retained an amount equal to the debt Lindstrom owed it; an
amount it otherwise would not have been able to recover as
Lindstrom’s funds would first go to Venkus until Lindstrom
had paid off the $13,776,518 given the lien priority. We strug-
gle to understand why RBG would have paid Lindstrom an-
ything if it was not recovering the significant debt Lindstrom
owed and if it did not owe Lindstrom the value of the options.
And we struggle to understand why Lindstrom did not exer-
cise the options, particularly given the existing debt and res-
titution he owed. To be sure, RBG claims Lindstrom’s debt is
still on its books. But, if that is true, it leaves us with even more
questions about the motivation and purpose behind the “sev-
erance” payment and why RBG relied on the debt Lindstrom
owed in calculating his severance in the first place.
The record needs further development of the facts and cir-
cumstances leading to RBG’s calculation of Lindstrom’s sev-
erance. There may be “additional evidence that is pertinent,”
which the district court should consider “in the first instance.”
For Your Ease Only, 560 F.3d at 723 (remanding for evidentiary
hearing before district court to consider whether third party
violated citation); see also Door Props., 188 N.E.3d at 816. We,
therefore, remand for the district court to hold an evidentiary
hearing to uncover answers to the questions we raise. We
leave it to the sound discretion of the capable district court to

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No. 25-1395 17
decide whether further discovery or other proceedings are
necessary.
B. 735 ILCS 5/12–801, 803
The question remains of whether RBG violated the citation
by paying Venkus only 15% of the severance because it deter-
mined Illinois’s 15% wage garnishment cap, § 12-803, applies
to severance payments. Venkus claims § 12-803 does not ap-
ply to severance payments so he should have received 100%
of the severance, not 15%.
The statute at issue is the Illinois Wage Deduction Act
(“IWDA”), 735 ILCS 5/12–801–19. The IWDA governs wage
garnishment by judgment creditors. Relevant for our pur-
poses are two subparts: (1) the general “definitions” provi-
sion, § 12–801, which defines “wages” as “any hourly pay, sal-
aries, commissions, bonuses, or other compensation owed by
an employer to a judgment debtor”; and (2) the 15% garnish-
ment cap, § 12–803, which provides, in relevant part, that
“[t]he wages, salary, commissions and bonuses subject to col-
lection under a deduction order, for any work week shall be
… 15% of such gross amount paid for that week ….”
Before the district court, Venkus conceded that a “sever-
ance” payment fell under § 12–801’s definition of “wages,”
but disputed whether § 12–803’s 15% cap applied to that same
severance. On appeal, Venkus attempts to walk back that con-
cession. He now disputes both whether “wages” in § 12–801
includes a “severance” payment and, either way, whether
§ 12–803’s 15% cap applies to such a severance payment.
1. “Wages” under § 12–801
Ordinarily, an issue a party fails to raise, fails to develop,
or concedes before the district court is waived on appeal. See

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18 No. 25-1395
Ross v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 74 F.4th 429, 434 (7th Cir.
2023); Cintas Corp. v. Perry, 517 F.3d 459, 466 (7th Cir. 2008). In
some instances, and at our discretion, we have recognized an
exception for a “pure issue of statutory interpretation.”
Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 38 F.3d 1429, 1439 (7th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Amcast Indus. Corp v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d
746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that because forfeiture is a
“sanction” which “should be related to harm done or threat-
ened,” we can find an argument not forfeited, despite a
party’s “failure to present [the] ground to the district court”
when there is no harm)). We may, at our discretion, consider
such an issue if it is “fully argued in the brief[s].” Id.; see CFPB
v. Consumer First Legal Grp., LLC, 6 F.4th 694, 705 (7th Cir.
2021) (framing Amcast’s rule as one of “discretion”). We exer-
cise this discretion “sparingly” and “in ‘rare instances.’” Soo
Line R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 965 F.3d 596, 601–02 (7th Cir.
2020) (quoting In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701,
714 (7th Cir. 2015)).
This case is not one of the “rare instances” where we will
exercise our discretion. Venkus does not explain why we
should consider the issue (beyond now arguing that a sever-
ance payment is not “wages” under § 12–801). Moreover, he
did not merely “fail” to raise the issue before the district court.
He affirmatively conceded it. On remand, we leave it to the
district court to decide whether to excuse Venkus’s previous
concession.4
4 If the district court excuses Venkus’s concession on remand, we note
an additional issue. Section 12–801 defines “wages” as “any hourly pay,
salaries, commissions, bonuses, or other compensation owed by an

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No. 25-1395 19
2. “Severance” under § 12-803
Turning to the 15% garnishment cap, § 12–803 states that
the cap applies to the “wages, salary, commissions and bo-
nuses subject to collection under a deduction order, for any
work week.” Venkus contends § 12–803 contains a “periodic-
ity” requirement because it includes the “for any work week”
language and states that the 15% cap applies to the “gross
amount paid for that week.” That is, the 15% cap only applies
to “wages, salary, commissions and bonuses” paid on some
periodic basis. But, he argues, because a severance payment
is a one-time lump sum, even if the severance falls under § 12–
801’s “wages,” it is not “wages” subject to § 12–803’s 15% cap
as it lacks periodicity.
We think this issue likely relies, in large part, on whether
(1) severance payments generally fall under § 12–801’s defini-
tion of “wages” and (2) whether the payment here was indeed
employer to a judgment debtor.” (emphasis added). As noted, RBG re-
peatedly characterized the payment as gratuitous and not required, which
sounds more like a gift. At oral argument, counsel for RBG explained that
no contract or agreement obligated RBG to pay Lindstrom a severance.
RBG was just trying to “do right by [Lindstrom].” That is, RBG did not
“owe[]” Lindstrom severance. Counsel also explained that Lindstrom’s
pay stub listed the payment as a “stock bonus.” There appears to be a
question over whether a “gratuitous” severance is “owed by an employer
to a judgment debtor,” § 12–801 (emphasis added), such that it falls under
§ 12–801’s definition of “wages,” even if the district court decides a “sev-
erance” payment generally—such as one a contract obligates an employer
to pay—does. We leave it to the district court to first decide this question
and the underlying questions of fact regarding the nature of the payment
here. It might also be that the citation does not cover the payment in the
first place. See Door Props., 188 N.E.3d at 814–15 (citation’s transfer prohi-
bition does not apply to gratuitous money gift).

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20 No. 25-1395
a severance payment that is “wages” for § 12–801’s purposes.
We remand for the district court to address these questions in
the first instance.
C. Attorney’s Fees
Finally, a brief point on attorney’s fees. Section 2–1402(f)
allows the court to “punish any party who violates the re-
straining provision of a citation as and for [] contempt.” Upon
a finding of contempt, Illinois permits attorney’s fees “as part
of the penalty.” W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Belmont State Corp.,
712 F.3d 1030, 1035 (7th Cir. 2013). Proving contempt is a two-
step test: First, the party moving for contempt must show a
“[f]ailure to comply with a[] [court] order” which “serves as
prima facie evidence of contempt.” Webber v. Zimmerlein, No.
3-24-0157, 2025 WL 1734066, at *11 (Ill. App. Ct. June 23, 2025).
If satisfied, “the onus shifts to the contemnor to prove that the
violation was not willful or contumacious and he or she had
a valid excuse for failing to follow the order.” Id.
The district court did not reach Venkus’s request for fees
or the question of contempt because it found RBG had not vi-
olated the citation. Because we remand for the district court
to hold further proceedings, the district court should also, if it
finds RBG violated the citation, consider whether to award at-
torney’s fees.
* * *
For the reasons discussed, we REVERSE the decision of the
district court and REMAND for an evidentiary hearing and any
further discovery and proceedings the district court deems
necessary.

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