Timothy W. Mackall v. Katherine Sweeney Bell

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 24, 2026*
Decided February 25, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1289
TIMOTHY W. MACKALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KATHERINE SWEENEY BELL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:24-cv-00296-MPB-MG
Matthew P. Brookman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Timothy Mackall brought this lawsuit alleging numerous constitutional
violations arising from a protective order issued against him and his subsequent
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1289 Page 2
convictions for violating the protective order, harassment, and stalking. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. We affirm.
We accept as true the well-pleaded facts alleged in Mackall’s complaint and
draw reasonable inferences in his favor. See Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678
(7th Cir. 2024). We also take judicial notice of the state-court records relating to the
protective order and Mackall’s convictions. See Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir.
2017).
Mackall alleges that in 2021, he maintained a relationship with defendant Jane
Doe in which he performed handyman services in exchange for sexual relations. They
were not dating, and they did not live together. In November 2021, Doe allegedly
became jealous and emotional after seeing a photo of Mackall on social media. She
argued with Mackall. He was outside her house and could not leave because he did not
have a ride home. Doe called the police, but they declined to write a report or remove
Mackall from the premises.
Later that month, Doe sought and obtained a civil protective order barring
Mackall from contacting her, her son, and her coworkers. Mackall alleges that to obtain
this order, Doe made false statements, including that she and Mackall dated and that
Mackall harassed Doe, her son, and her coworkers. Mackall maintains that the Marion
County Circuit Court Clerk, Katherine Sweeney Bell, conspired with Doe, assisting her
in fraudulently obtaining the protective order. Mackall further alleges that the
defendants initiated contact with him in violation of the protective order. Mackall
unsuccessfully appealed that order in state court.
In May 2022, Mackall was charged with multiple counts of invasion of privacy in
violation of a protective order, see I ND. C ODE § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(1), stalking, § 35-45-10-
5(a), harassment, § 35-45-2-2(a), and intimidation, § 35-45-2-1(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). In June
2024, a jury found Mackall guilty and the state court entered judgments of conviction
for two counts of stalking, six counts of invasion of privacy, and two counts of
harassment. In July 2024, he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Mackall
unsuccessfully appealed his conviction in state court.
Mackall filed this lawsuit in June 2024 while awaiting his criminal trial. He
brought a litany of claims including conspiracy to commit perjury and challenges to the
constitutionality of an Indiana statute governing protective orders. See I ND. C ODE § 34-
26-5-3. He asked the court to remove Doe’s gun licenses, declare various state statutes

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No. 25-1289 Page 3
unconstitutional, enjoin the State from enforcing the statute, and award him monetary
damages.
After Mackall was convicted, the district court screened his complaint and
dismissed it for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court observed that
some of Mackall’s claims may be barred by the statute of limitations because the
protective order was issued in 2021 and he was charged with violating it in May 2022,
both more than two years before he filed this lawsuit in June 2024. Even still, the court
explained, the claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994),
because any judgment in line with his allegations that the protective order and his
criminal charges for violating it were based on false allegations would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his convictions.
On appeal, Mackall argues that his claims are not Heck-barred because the state-
court judgment against him is invalid and Indiana law “permits state court losers to
directly or collaterally attack a void judgment.” But Mackall’s disagreement with the
judgment does not make it invalid. Mackall needed to have a separate proceeding
expunge, reverse, or otherwise invalidate his conviction before bringing his § 1983
claim. Heck, 512 U.S. 486–87. But no such proceeding occurred, and his conviction still
stands. See Mackall v. State, No. 24A-CR-2036 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept 24, 2025) (affirming
Mackall’s convictions). A conclusion in line with Mackall’s allegations that he did not
stalk or harass Doe and that the protective order was based on falsehood would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions. See McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619,
621–22 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] plaintiff’s claim is Heck-barred despite its theoretical
compatibility with his underlying conviction if specific factual allegations in the
complaint are necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the conviction.”); Savory v.
Cannon, 947 F.3d 409, 417 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“There is no logical way to reconcile
[fabrication-of-evidence] claims with a valid conviction.”). Mackall also urges that Heck
does not apply because he seeks to invalidate Indiana’s protective-order statute (and the
relevant civil proceedings) rather than directly challenge the state-court criminal
judgment. But ruling the statute unconstitutional would invalidate the protective order,
which would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions for violating it. See Heck,
512 U.S. 486–87. We will not endorse such an end run around the requirements of Heck.
Because Mackall’s claims are Heck-barred, we need not address whether they are
also time-barred under the relevant statute of limitations.
AFFIRMED

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