United States of America v. Aaron Strong

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued March 3, 2026
Decided March 16, 2026
Before
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1037
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AARON STRONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:22CR00083-001
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Judge.
O R D E R
Aaron Strong, a former police officer for New Castle, Indiana, challenges the
sufficiency of evidence from which a jury convicted him of witness tampering. The
government presented evidence that Strong lied to a state investigator about beating a
compliant arrestee and that officers’ use of excessive force was a regular subject of
federal investigations with state collaboration. Because we have held that similar
evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for witness tampering, we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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A federal grand jury indicted Strong on three counts of deprivation of rights
under the color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and one count of witness tampering related to
the possible commission of a federal offense, id. § 1512(b)(3). He pleaded not guilty to
all counts.
As relevant to this appeal, the charges centered on Strong’s beating of an arrestee
in August 2019. Two other officers were chasing a fleeing suspect in an alley. One of
these officers testified that shortly before Strong arrived, the suspect surrendered, put
his hands up, and lowered himself onto the ground. When the other officer went to
arrest the suspect, Strong told both officers to “get back” and struck the suspect’s upper
body with his baton 10 to 15 times. The arresting officer reported the incident to a
supervisor after taking the suspect to the emergency room and seeing the extent of his
injuries.
Strong’s witness tampering occurred once the New Castle Police Department
referred the matter to the Indiana State Police for investigation of Strong’s use of
excessive force. During a voluntary interview, Strong lied to Detective Andrew
Wandersee, stating that he struck the suspect only three times and only once above the
waist.
Wandersee brought his investigation to the FBI. He informed Special Agent
Timothy Kempf, who worked out of the same post as Wandersee, about the
investigation when it started because he knew that the FBI took interest in excessive
force cases. Wandersee testified that he had worked with the FBI on only two of the
more than forty excessive-force investigations he had conducted, but that it was
nevertheless routine for the state police to share information with federal officers about
cases that they may wish to prosecute federally. After Wandersee finished his own
investigation into Strong, the FBI requested his materials, and Wandersee shared them.
The FBI assigned Kempf to investigate the beating and another agent to
investigate an incident where Strong had used excessive force at a county jail. Kempf
testified that excessive force investigations consumed a significant amount of his time
while he was stationed in Indiana. He served on a squad focused on civil rights that
included an officer of the Indiana State Police, which regularly shared information
relating to these investigations.
After the government’s presentation and again after the close of evidence, Strong
moved for acquittal on the charge of witness tampering. He argued that there was no
evidence that he was aware of the possibility that Wandersee would share his files with

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No. 25-1037 Page 3
federal investigators. The district court denied both motions because the government
was not obligated to prove his subjective awareness. The jury convicted Strong on all
counts. The court imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months’ imprisonment for
deprivation of rights and 151 months’ imprisonment for witness tampering. Strong
appeals.
On appeal, Strong challenges only the denial of his motion for acquittal on the
witness tampering charge. To sustain a conviction for witness tampering under
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant engaged in misleading conduct toward another person with the intent to
hinder, delay, or prevent communication to a federal law enforcement officer relating to
a possible federal offense. To establish the defendant had this intent to hinder a federal
investigation—as opposed to investigation generally—the government must show a
reasonable likelihood of federal involvement, meaning the possibility was “more than
remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical.” Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 678
(2011).
Ordinarily, we review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. See, e.g., United
States v. Carpenter, 162 F.4th 876, 881 (7th Cir. 2025). The government, however, argues
that plain error review applies because Strong’s argument is broader on appeal than it
was in the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.
2012). The government characterizes Strong’s argument to the district court as
concerning only his subjective knowledge of potential federal involvement whereas his
argument on appeal concerns the objective likelihood—the correct test under Fowler.
Although Strong drew undue attention to his subjective awareness of federal
involvement, rather than his intent, we agree with Strong that de novo review is
appropriate. He identified the relevant evidence and legal authority for the proposition
that there had to be a reasonable likelihood of federal involvement. This is sufficient to
preserve this argument so that he could clarify and focus his theory in this appeal.
See United States v. Otradovec, 72 F.4th 794, 796 (7th Cir. 2023).
On the merits, Strong maintains that the government did not present evidence
from which the jury could find it was reasonably likely that his interview would reach
federal officials. Strong emphasizes that the commission of a federal crime—like
deprivation of rights—alone does not create a federal nexus for a witness tampering
charge. See United States v. Snyder, 865 F.3d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 2017). But in Snyder, the
potential witness never communicated with federal investigators because the defendant
murdered her to cover up an underlying convenience store robbery. Id. at 499. Had she

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No. 25-1037 Page 4
not been murdered, we concluded that such communication would have been unlikely
because convenience store robberies are rarely prosecuted federally. Id. By contrast,
Wandersee in fact communicated with federal investigators about the beating. It is
difficult to see how it was impossible for a reasonable jury to find that this event was
reasonably likely to occur when the jury saw evidence that it had occurred. See United
States v. Veliz, 800 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2015).
More importantly, Strong’s case is materially identical to United States v. Sheffler,
125 F.4th 814 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2785 (2025), a case that distinguished
Snyder. In Sheffler, we affirmed a prison guard’s conviction under § 1512(b)(3) for lying
to a state investigator in an interview about his fatal beating of a prisoner. Id. at 824–25.
At trial, the government had presented evidence that serious assaults by prison guards
were a common target of federal civil rights investigations, federal and state officials
regularly collaborated, and a federal investigation in fact materialized. We held that
such evidence was sufficient to satisfy the reasonable likelihood standard.
The government presented similar evidence in this case: Wandersee and Kempf
both testified that instances of excessive force are a common subject of federal civil
rights investigations; that there was collaboration between federal and state officials in
these investigations; and that, again, a federal investigation of Strong’s use of force had
in fact materialized.
Strong’s attempts to distinguish Sheffler are unpersuasive. He points out that the
defendant in Sheffler filed a false report immediately after the beating and was
interviewed the day after, whereas Strong lied only in an interview, which took place
five days after the arrest. But Strong makes no effort to explain why a difference of four
days and the addition of a written report materially alters the likelihood of a federal
investigation.
Strong also contends that state and federal officials in Sheffler worked together
frequently while Wandersee testified that he worked with the FBI in only two of his
excessive force investigations. The reasonable likelihood standard is a “relatively low
bar.” Sheffler, 125 F.4th at 822. Strong does not develop an argument why two of forty
investigations is so low a number that a reasonable jury was not permitted to find that it
was “more than remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical,” that Wandersee would
involve federal officials in his investigation. Id. (quoting Fowler, 563 U.S. at 678);
cf. Snyder, 865 F.3d at 498 (federal government brought charges in only six out of
hundreds of robberies). Regardless, Kempf also testified that he and other agents
regularly communicated with the state police, even if not Wandersee specifically,

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during federal excessive force investigations, as was true in Sheffler. A reasonable jury
had ample evidence from which to find that a federal investigation was likely enough
that Strong intended to hinder that investigation by lying to Wandersee.
AFFIRMED

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