United States of America v. Anthony E. Ibekie

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued March 3, 2026
Decided March 31, 2026
Before
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3234
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY E. IBEKIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-CR-00352(2)
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
O R D E R
Anthony Ibekie was convicted by a jury of several fraud offenses arising from an
inheritance-fraud scheme. He moved for a judgment of acquittal, challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence that he defrauded one, non-testifying victim. The district
court found the circumstantial evidence, including Ibekie’s use of an alias and a shell
company, sufficient to convict. Ibekie challenges only the denial of his motion. We
affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-3234 Page 2
Between 2017 and 2020, Ibekie and his codefendants orchestrated an inheritance-
fraud scheme through which they defrauded at least five victims of hundreds of
thousands of dollars. Posing as bank employees, including one fictitiously named
“Peter Pfizer,” the cohorts sent letters to thousands of persons, many elderly, falsely
informing them that they had inherited significant sums from a distant deceased
relative. The recipients were instructed that, to claim the inheritance, they needed to
contact a certain (fictitious) lawyer. Once contact was made, they were told that
collecting the inheritance required them to pay fees to third-party companies—either
wired to bank accounts controlled by the defendants or mailed by check to a designated
address.
In January 2020, Ibekie and his codefendants were charged with wire and mail
fraud (Counts 1 through 8), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343; money laundering (Count 9),
see id. § 1957(a); making false statements to a bank (Counts 11, 13, and 16), see id. § 1014;
and passport fraud (Counts 12 and 14), see id. § 1543. Count 5—the conviction Ibekie
specifically appeals—charged him with wire fraud arising from a September 4, 2019,
transaction in which a victim, Gary Foster, wired $7,680 to a bank account in the name
of Berger Services, Inc. (“Berger Services”).
At trial, the government elicited testimony from four other victims, who
described their communications with the defendants and the amounts lost to the fraud.
Foster, however, did not testify.
An undercover investigator testified that he recorded a conversation in which
Ibekie posed as Pfizer. The investigator recounted that Ibekie directed him to make a
wire transfer at a bank and provided instructions on how to evade the bank’s fraud-
detection system. On cross-examination, Ibekie admitted that he was posing as Pfizer
during the call. Investigators also testified about evidence recovered from Ibekie’s
home, trash, and electronic devices, including destroyed fraud letters and name lists
that could be used to create those letters using a mail-merge process. A fingerprint
specialist testified that Ibekie’s fingerprint was on one envelope for a fraud letter
bearing Pfizer’s name.
Of significance for this appeal, the government presented circumstantial
evidence that Ibekie defrauded Foster. Foster in late 2019 transferred $7,680 to the bank
account of Berger Services, which was owned by Ibekie’s ex-wife. A copy of the
company’s articles of incorporation was found in Ibekie’s garage. Funds from Berger
Services’s bank account were later transferred to an account registered in Ibekie’s name.
In addition, IRS Special Agent Christopher Kadonsky testified that he saw email

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No. 24-3234 Page 3
correspondence (contents unspecified) between Foster and Ibekie, who was using the
Pfizer alias. Kadonsky also testified that Foster’s name appeared on a list of potential
victims that could have been used in a mail-merge process to create the fraud letters.
After the government presented its case in chief, Ibekie orally moved under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, though
he argued only that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of Count 5. After the
jury convicted Ibekie on all counts, the court heard further arguments on the motion.
Ibekie again fixated on Count 5, highlighting the government’s failure to introduce
Foster’s testimony or the contents of his communications with Foster—evidence Ibekie
deemed necessary for a jury to find that he defrauded Foster.
The court took the motion under advisement and a month later issued an oral
ruling denying it. The court acknowledged that there was less evidence of the scheme
against Foster than for the other counts and that the government’s evidence was
primarily circumstantial. But in the court’s view, this circumstantial evidence permitted
the jury to infer that Ibekie defrauded Foster—namely, evidence that Foster wired
money to Berger Services; that Ibekie had communicated with Foster under the Pfizer
alias; that Foster’s name was on a list of potential victims; and that Ibekie used a
consistent modus operandi to defraud the other victims.
The court sentenced Ibekie to 240 months’ imprisonment and 36 months’
supervised release. He now appeals.
Ibekie challenges only the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. He
contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove two of the elements of wire fraud:
(1) his intent to defraud; and (2) his use of an interstate wire to further a fraudulent
scheme. See United States v. Pacilio, 85 F.4th 450, 462 (7th Cir. 2023). As he sees it, the
government could not prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt without
additional evidence, such as his email correspondence with Foster or testimony from
Foster himself. Ibekie faces a steep burden: This court will set aside the jury’s verdict
only when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, “no
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Fitzpatrick, 32 F.4th 644, 649 (7th Cir.
2022)).
Ibekie requires too much of the government. To prove intent, the government
did not need to present evidence that Ibekie intended to harm a specific victim; it could
rely on evidence that he meant to harm any victim. United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 723,

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No. 24-3234 Page 4
727 (7th Cir. 2010). A jury may infer intent from circumstantial evidence “that the
scheme was reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and
comprehension.” Pacilio, 85 F.4th at 464 (quoting United States v. Pust, 798 F.3d 597,
600–01 (7th Cir. 2015)). Under this standard, the jury had sufficient evidence to find
Ibekie’s intent to defraud. Regarding the testifying victims, there was evidence that they
communicated with Ibekie using the Pfizer alias and that he directed them to pay
fictitious fees to Berger Services, which he controlled. As for Foster, there was evidence
that he was targeted under the same fraud scheme—testimony that he transferred
money to Berger Services and that he received emails from Ibekie using the Pfizer alias.
Ibekie acknowledges this evidence, but he argues that it falls short of proof that
any transactions with Foster furthered a fraudulent scheme. He likens his case to United
States v. Durham, where we reversed two wire fraud convictions because the
government introduced only “printouts showing that the two wire transfers were
made” but no evidence “about how the money was used.” 766 F.3d 672, 678–79 (7th Cir.
2014). But Ibekie overreads Durham. “Durham did not require the government to
introduce every existing piece of documentary evidence of a wire’s purpose. It merely
faulted the government for forgetting to provide any purpose evidence at all.” United
States v. Robinson, 165 F.4th 1043, 1052 (7th Cir. 2026). And the government provided
evidence linking this transaction to the inheritance fraud scheme: Foster corresponded
with Ibekie through the Pfizer alias, which Ibekie used to conceal his identity when
defrauding other victims.
To the extent that Ibekie argues that the government was required to corroborate
Kadonsky’s testimony about the emails with documentary evidence, his argument fails
because the jury was free to assess Kadonsky’s credibility and credit his testimony.
See United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455, 488–89 (7th Cir. 2022).
AFFIRMED

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