United States of America v. Edlando M. Watson

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2432
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EDLANDO M. WATSON ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 1:23-cr-00109-WCG-1 — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 25, 2025 — DECIDED A PRIL 2, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and S YKES ,
Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN , Chief Judge. The Second Amendment protects
the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. This right,
Justice Story proclaimed, is “the palladium of the liberties of
a republic.” 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States 620 (4th ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873).
But the right is not unlimited.

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2 No. 24-2432
We are asked to decide whether the federal felon in pos-
session of a firearm law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is constitutional
as applied to Edlando Watson, who has a prior felony convic-
tion for possessing an illegal drug with intent to distribute it.
As applied to Watson, this law is constitutional because his
previous felony drug-dealing conviction is inherently danger-
ous. His disarmament is consistent with the history and tra-
dition of Founding-era laws. But we do not decide whether
an individual with a non-dangerous felony can be disarmed.
I. Background
Early one morning in May 2022, Laquiesha Washington
and her children rode by Uber to a home in Madison, Wiscon-
sin. When they arrived, Washington got out and told the
driver she needed to retrieve something from the residence
but would be right back. After several minutes, Washington
ran out of the door, yelling “pull out, pull out, he’s coming
with a gun!” As she jumped into the Uber, three shots rang
out. The driver sped away and later flagged down police.
The next day police interviewed Washington. She said
“Meek” had fired the shots. Madison Detective Joseph Buccel-
lato recognized the nickname from Meek J’s Masonry, owned
by Edlando Watson. Washington gave police Meek’s phone
number, which matched the number on file for Watson.
Buccellato knew Watson lived at a nearby hotel. He se-
cured a search warrant for the hotel room (“hotel warrant”).
The hotel warrant authorized police to take a DNA cheek
swab from Watson “and any other occupants of [the hotel
room] at the time of warrant service.” Police searched the ho-
tel room and found photos of Watson.

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No. 24-2432 3
About a month later, police arrested Watson. Buccellato
then secured a search warrant for Watson’s masonry business
(“business warrant”). That warrant authorized police to take
a DNA sample from Watson and “any other occupants of [the
business] at the time of warrant service.” A sample was taken
from Watson at the police station.
The gun used in the shooting had yet to be located. Police
spoke with Watson’s ex-girlfriend, Lashundia Pearnell, who
revealed that Watson had stashed guns in her storage unit but
recently removed them. Then, an anonymous tipster told po-
lice that Linda Yarrington, the mother of Watson’s child, was
safekeeping Watson’s gun in her storage locker. Police
searched her unit and found several handguns and rifles.
Male DNA collected off some of the guns matched the sample
taken from Watson. Later, in recorded jail telephone calls to
Yarrington’s number, a female voice was heard telling Watson
that police seized the guns, and Watson asked how police
knew which unit to search.
Federal authorities then became involved. A grand jury in-
dicted Watson under § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a
firearm. His previous felony convictions were for possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and
possession of a firearm by a drug user, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
Watson moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. The district
court denied the motion. He then argued that state police vi-
olated the Fourth Amendment by swabbing his cheek at the
police station, so his DNA sample linking him to the guns in
the storage unit should be suppressed in the federal case. Fed-
eral prosecutors defended the validity of the business

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4 No. 24-2432
warrant, but for judicial economy they sought a new warrant
(“federal warrant”) to obtain a new DNA sample.
The federal warrant authorized police to swab Watson’s
cheek for DNA. Attached to that warrant was a probable
cause affidavit detailing the evidence tying Watson to the
guns found in the storage unit, including eyewitness ac-
counts, witness statements, and Watson’s own statements.
The affidavit did not mention that Watson’s DNA matched
the DNA on the guns. Watson again moved to suppress the
DNA evidence. He asserted that because federal authorities
knew his DNA matched the DNA on the guns, the federal
warrant was also unconstitutional.
The district court denied his second motion to suppress.
The court reasoned that “[i]f, as Watson contends, state offi-
cials previously obtained a sample of his DNA illegally, that
should not preclude federal officials from lawfully obtaining
a separate sample using a warrant based on evidence that is
untainted by the previous illegality.” And significant evi-
dence outside of Watson’s DNA tied him to the guns in the
locker: “Had Watson’s DNA not already been available in the
state case, the Government certainly would have obtained it
in its investigation of the charges here.”
Watson pleaded guilty to a single count of possessing fire-
arms as a felon, in violation of §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). That
plea agreement preserved his right to appeal his Second
Amendment and DNA suppression arguments. He timely ap-
peals both.1
1 The court thanks Ellen A. Matheson, Esq., and Eric G. Pearson, Esq.,
of Foley & Lardner LLP for their helpful assistance representing Watson
in this appeal.

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No. 24-2432 5
On appeal of a district court’s ruling of a motion to sup-
press, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Correa, 908 F.3d 208,
214 (7th Cir. 2018). The same is true for Watson’s Second
Amendment challenge. United States v. Viveros-Chavez, 114
F.4th 618, 622 (7th Cir. 2024).
II. The Fourth Amendment
Watson reads the business warrant as authorizing his
DNA to be taken only at his business. After all, it reads, “[a]
DNA buccal sample from Edlando Watson and any other oc-
cupants” of the business (emphasis added). But state police
swabbed his cheek at the police station, which Watson now
claims exceeds the scope of the business warrant. He admits
federal authorities secured the federal warrant for his DNA.
But to Watson, their knowledge that his DNA matched the
DNA on the guns makes the federal warrant unlawful, as the
bell cannot be unrung.
Evidence collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment
may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). But evidence lawfully discovered
from an independent source is admissible. Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 443 (1984). This “independent-source” exception ap-
plies “[s]o long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely inde-
pendent of an earlier, tainted one.” Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988).
The affidavit supporting the federal warrant provided
more than enough evidence to implicate Watson and lawfully
authorize the DNA swab that was taken:

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6 No. 24-2432
• An eyewitness tied Watson to the shooting.
• Watson’s ex-girlfriend Pearnell said Watson owned
guns and recently moved them from her storage unit.
• A tipster told police Watson’s gun was in Yarrington’s
unit. Watson and Yarrington knew each other.
• Multiple guns were found in the storage unit; those
guns had male DNA on them.
• Police listened to recorded jail telephone calls in which
a female voice was heard telling Watson that police
seized the guns, and Watson asked how police knew
which unit to search.
The federal warrant—which did not state that Watson’s DNA
was on the guns—is thus a lawful means of obtaining Wat-
son’s DNA, “genuinely independent” from any problems
with the business warrant.
Compare this case to United States v. Miller, 68 F.4th 1065
(7th Cir. 2023). There, police responded to the scene of gunfire
and found the defendant shot and holding a key fob to a car.
Id. at 1066. After giving emergency aid, police pressed the but-
ton on the fob. It unlocked a nearby car, riddled with bullet
holes, and with a firearm inside. Id. at 1067. Police later sought
a warrant to search the car and attached a probable cause af-
fidavit that did not mention the key fob. Id. The gun found
inside was used to prosecute the defendant. Id. The defendant
claimed pressing the button on the fob violated the Fourth
Amendment, but the government argued the warrant pro-
vided an independent source. Id.
This court held that the independent-source doctrine ap-
plied for two reasons. Id. at 1070. First, the evidence about the

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No. 24-2432 7
fob did not affect the decision to issue the warrant because
“the warrant application did not mention the key fob at all.”
Id. Second, even though police knew the car belonged to the
defendant because the key fob was in his hand and unlocked
the nearby car, “[t]he car would have been searched regard-
less of the identity of its owner.” Id. It had several bullet holes
and a pool of blood near it. Id.
This case is like Miller. Here, the affidavit attached to the
federal warrant did not state that Watson’s DNA was on the
guns. So, like the warrant in Miller, the DNA evidence “in no
way affected the judge who signed the warrant.” Id. And,
given the extensive evidence tying Watson to the firearms in
the storage unit, if state authorities had not already sought to
collect Watson’s DNA, federal authorities would likely have
done so. Thus, his DNA evidence did not affect “the officers’
decision to apply for the warrant.” Id. We therefore reject Wat-
son’s Fourth Amendment challenge.
III. The Second Amendment
At the outset, we highlight that Watson argues § 922(g)(1)
violates the Second Amendment as applied to him. This chal-
lenge and requested relief does not reach beyond his circum-
stances. See Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414
(1974) (A law may be constitutional in some circumstances
but “nonetheless unconstitutional as applied to appellant’s
activity.”). By contrast, a facial challenge is a claim that
§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in all its applications, to Watson
and all other felons. See Lukaszczyk v. Cook County, 137 F.4th
671, 673–74 (7th Cir. 2025). Given the difference between the
challenges, the felony crimes that Watson has been convicted
of are important to our analysis.

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8 No. 24-2432
The Second Amendment protects “the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms.” U.S. C ONST. amend II. That individ-
ual right, however, does not extend to everyone. Illegal aliens
may be disarmed. United States v. Carbajal-Flores, 143 F.4th
877, 887 (7th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 826 (2025). The
Supreme Court also rejected a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8) from Zackey Rahimi, a domestic abuser who fired
a gun in the air while dining “[w]hen the restaurant declined
his friend’s credit card.” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680,
688 (2024). Rahimi posed “a clear threat of physical violence
to another.” Id. at 698. And this court recently held that
§ 922(g)(3) was constitutional as applied to a habitual user of
heroin and crack cocaine. United States v. Seiwert, 152 F.4th
854, 859, 872 (7th Cir. 2025).
The question here is whether Watson’s permanent dis-
armament is consistent with the Second Amendment. We first
explain why dicta from District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570 (2008), does not resolve that question. Then, we undertake
the history and tradition analysis laid out in New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022).
A. Heller dicta
The government assures us a Bruen analysis is unneces-
sary because Heller already foreclosed as applied challenges
to § 922(g)(1). To be sure, Heller cautioned, “nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohi-
bitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” 554 U.S. at
626. And Bruen and Rahimi did not cast doubt on that conclu-
sion. Indeed, they reaffirmed Heller’s core holding. So, the
government submits, the dicta from Heller should bind us and
obviate the need to evaluate § 922(g)(1) challenges under
Bruen.

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No. 24-2432 9
But this court has already rejected that argument. See At-
kinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 2023). Heller
does not resolve the basket of questions raised in § 922(g)(1)
challenges. Further, in Bruen the Court “rolled up its sleeves
and examined a wealth of laws and commentary spanning
several centuries, paying close attention to the enforcement
and impact of various regulations.” Id. The Court did the
same in Rahimi, rejecting a facial challenge to § 922(g)(8) based
on historical surety laws and “going armed” laws. 602 U.S. at
698.2 Recently, this court in Seiwert declined to rely on its
§ 922(g)(3) precedent that did not include a historical analysis.
152 F.4th at 861–62 (“[W]e must take a fresh look employing
Bruen’s text-and-history framework.”). Thus, just as with
Bruen, Rahimi, and Seiwert, the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)
as applied to Watson must be evaluated under the history and
tradition analysis.
First, we examine whether Waston’s conduct falls under
the plain text of the Second Amendment. Second, we resolve
whether § 922(g)(1) as applied to Watson is “consistent with
the principles that underpin our [Nation’s] regulatory tradi-
tion.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692.
B. Felons as “the people”
Bruen’s first step asks whether “the Second Amendment’s
plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” 597 U.S. at 17. All
agree Watson, at one point, bore an “Arm.” But the govern-
ment submits that felons are not among “the people” who
have the right to bear arms.
2 Though United States v. Gay, 98 F.4th 843, 846 (7th Cir. 2024), rejected
a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) based on Heller’s dicta, that
case predated Rahimi.

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10 No. 24-2432
Heller tells us “the people” “unambiguously refers to all
members of the political community, not an unspecified sub-
set.” 554 U.S. at 580. That aligns with what the Court said ear-
lier in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: “‘the people’ seems to
have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Con-
stitution … to refer to a class of persons who are part of a na-
tional community or who have otherwise developed suffi-
cient connection with this country to be considered part of
that community.” 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (citation modified).
Founding-era sources define “people” as “the whole Body of
Persons who live in a Country[ ] or make up a Nation.” N.
Bailey, A N U NIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 601–02 (22d ed. 1770). “Citizen” was also used
synonymously with “the people.” See e.g., THE F EDERALIST
No. 2, at 10 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961) (“To all gen-
eral purposes we have uniformly been one people each indi-
vidual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights,
privileges, and protection.”).3
Thus—without providing a conclusive definition—we can
say the phrase “the people” at least encompasses citizens,
which includes felons. Several circuits agree. United States v.
Duarte, 137 F.4th 743, 754–55 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 2026 WL 135692, at *1 (2026); Range v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 124
F.4th 218, 228 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc); Zherka v. Bondi, 140
3 See also T HE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison) (“Hearken not to the
unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America … can no
longer be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing em-
pire.” (citation modified)); Douglass v. Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465, 467
(1821) (“[T]he people of the United States … resist[ed] the … British King
and Parliament. They united and acted in concert, as one people … [T]hey
knew that they were practically, as well as legally, fellow-citizens, … en-
joying every right and privilege indiscriminately with the inhabitants.”).

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No. 24-2432 11
F.4th 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 2026 WL 135708, at *1
(2026); United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308, 311 (5th Cir.
2025), cert. denied, 2026 WL 135675, at *1 (2026).
The government points out that felons have historically
been denied the right to vote, serve on juries, and hold public
office. Because the state can strip those political rights from
felons, those individuals are not members of the “political
community” as stated in Heller. 554 U.S. at 580. And historical
sources link voting with gun ownership: “[T]he Pennsylvania
Test Acts … stripped citizens of certain civic rights, such as
the right to bear arms or sit on juries, but did not deprive them
of fundamental individual rights such as the right of freedom
of conscience or the right to publish their sentiments on public
matters.” Saul Cornell, “Don't Know Much About History”: The
Current Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY . L.
R EV. 657, 679 (2002). If the state has the power to rescind vot-
ing rights, so too with gun rights.
Jurists have observed, though, a distinction between col-
lective and individual rights. Voting, serving on juries, and
holding office are collective rights, exercised for the benefit for
the polity. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 462 (7th Cir. 2019) (Bar-
rett, J., dissenting) (“[T]he right to vote is held by individuals,
but they do not exercise it solely for their own sake; rather,
they cast votes as part of the collective enterprise of self-gov-
ernance.”). By contrast, felons were not historically deprived
of their individual rights—a felon could attend church or join
a protest, and he retained his criminal procedure rights if later
accused and tried. Heller holds that owning a firearm is an in-
dividual right, 554 U.S. at 635. So, if the individual/collective
rights distinction is correct, felons are part of “the people”
even though they could not vote.

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12 No. 24-2432
This question is admittedly difficult. To our knowledge,
courts and historians have not resolved it. Duarte, 137 F.4th at
752–54 (observing the “conflicting interpretations of his-
tory”). So, faced with conflicting historical evidence, we ad-
here to Heller’s language until the Supreme Court tells us dif-
ferently.
Felons, then, are part of “the people” as members of our
national “political community.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 580. That
conclusion aligns us with the other circuits. Duarte, 137 F.4th
at 754 (“[I]n the face of these conflicting interpretations of his-
tory, we adhere to the Supreme Court’s definition of ‘the peo-
ple,’ which does not exclude felons.”); Zherka, 140 F.4th at 77
(“Zherka, notwithstanding his felony conviction, is among
‘the people’ protected by the Second Amendment.”); United
States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 649 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Williams
is a member of the people claiming ‘the right’ to possess a
gun”); United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1126 (8th Cir.
2024) (presuming the felons count as “the people”), cert. de-
nied, 145 S. Ct. 2708 (2025).
We move now to Bruen’s second step.
C. History and tradition
Because the Constitution presumptively protects Watson’s
conduct, the government has the burden to show that
§ 922(g)(1) is “consistent with this Nation's historical tradition
of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17.
To date, courts and scholars have identified few if any
Founding-era felon in possession laws. See Kanter, 919 F.3d at
454 (Barrett, J., dissenting). But that is not the end of the mat-
ter. A contemporary regulation must only be “relevantly sim-
ilar” to a historical regulation. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29. A “dead

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No. 24-2432 13
ringer” or “historical twin” is unnecessary. Id. at 30. Just so,
courts cannot compare restrictions at too high a level of gen-
erality—for example, that both serve “public safety”—be-
cause, after all, “[e]verything is similar in infinite ways to eve-
rything else.” Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARV. L. R EV. 741, 774 (1993); see also Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 740
(Barrett, J., concurring) (warning against reading a “principle
at such a high level of generality that it waters down the
right”).
The Supreme Court has not spoken to the appropriate
level of generality for this inquiry, as it has in other contexts.
See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam) (in
the qualified immunity context, “existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate”); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (in the
habeas context, “a state prisoner must show that the state
court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court
was so lacking in justification that there was an error well un-
derstood and comprehended in existing law beyond any pos-
sibility for fairminded disagreement”). But the Court has told
us to consider the “[w]hy and how” of the historical and con-
temporary regulation. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692. And the focus
is on “the principles underlying the Second Amendment.” Id.
Rahimi also gave us an example of the appropriate level of
generality, describing historical surety and going armed laws
as restrictions on “individuals … threaten[ing] the physical
safety of another.” Id. at 698.
Also important for our inquiry is that more than one kind
of historical regulation may justify a single contemporary law.
Rahimi concluded that surety laws and going armed laws,
“[t]aken together,” are relevantly similar to § 922(g)(8). Id.

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14 No. 24-2432
This tells us that the government may point to more than one
“distinct legal regime” to justify a contemporary regulation.
Id. at 694.
The history and tradition analysis is not without its chal-
lenges. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 734 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(“The historical approach is not perfect.”). For example, the
circuits have relied on laws that disarmed disfavored groups,
laws that would certainly be unconstitutional today. It is un-
clear whether that is permissible. Id. at 723 (“[I]n using pre-
ratification history, courts must exercise care to rely only on
the history that the Constitution actually incorporated and
not on the history that the Constitution left behind.”). And
when performing a historical analysis, we are told to consider
“the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Id. at
692. But at what level of generality courts should operate is
also unclear. See United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492, 497 n.2
(6th Cir. 2024) (“[D]epending on how broadly a court draws
the analogy, a tradition of disarming potentially rebellious
groups arguably would not map on to our modern felon-in-
possession statute.”).
With the guidance we have, and trying our best to navi-
gate these difficulties, we see two enduring traditions that
merit consideration. First, legislatures deemed groups “dan-
gerous” and categorically disarmed them. Second, legisla-
tures established as punishment the death penalty for violent
felony convictions. The greater power to execute necessarily
includes the lesser power to disarm. “Taken together,” these
traditions support disarming those with dangerous felonies.
United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 894 (11th Cir. 2025)
(Pryor, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 2026 WL 135685, at *1
(2026).

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No. 24-2432 15
1. Bans on groups legislatures deemed dangerous
Start with English common-law traditions. Throughout its
history, England’s rulers viewed opposition groups—
whether religious, political, or ethnic—as rebellious. The best
way to quash a rebellion before it began was to disarm dissi-
dent groups. For example, Catholics, considered seditious
and obedient to the Pope, were forbidden from owning arms.
Carbajal-Flores, 143 F.4th at 884. “Popish Recusants” had their
“Armour, Gunpowder, and Munition” seized by King James
I in 1610. 1 STUART R OYAL PROCLAMATIONS: R OYAL
PROCLAMATIONS OF K ING JAMES 1, 1603–1625, 247–48 (June 2,
1610). After the English Civil War, the Catholic-sympathetic
Charles II was restored as King. He and his younger brother,
James II, targeted “dangerous and disaffected persons”—
those believed to be disloyal, including non-Anglican
Protestants. Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Historical Justification for
Prohibiting Dangerous Persons from Possessing Arms, 20 W YO. L.
R EV. 249, 259 (2020). And “[u]nder the auspices of the 1671
Game Act, for example, the Catholic Charles II had ordered
general disarmaments of regions home to his Protestant ene-
mies.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 593. Later, after the Glorious Revolu-
tion and King James II lost his throne, King William III, Prince
of Orange, and Queen Mary II targeted Catholics. Those who
refused to declare themselves as non-Catholic had their arms
seized. Greenlee, supra, at 260–61 (collecting examples).
Political dissidents, too, were often disarmed because they
either threatened rebellion or did rebel. During Owain
Glyndŵr’s 15th century Welsh revolt against the English,
King Henry IV imposed harsh conditions on the Welsh peo-
ple. That included a prohibition on any “Welshmen from
henceforth bear[ing] any manner of armour with such city.” 2

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16 No. 24-2432
Henry IV ch. 12 (1400-01). Later, those opposing the Stuart
Kings in the 17th century, Charles II and James II, were dis-
armed. JOYCE LEE M ALCOLM , T O K EEP AND BEAR A RMS: THE
O RIGINS OF AN A NGLO-A MERICAN R IGHT 31–53 (1994). And af-
ter the Glorious Revolution, those Tories previously loyal to
the Stuart Kings were disarmed by William and Mary. Green-
lee, supra at 259.
Additionally, “land and gun ownership were historically
linked.” Carbajal-Flores, 143 F.4th at 883. The common-law
rule was that all “persons may hold lands, except aliens.” Id.
(quoting M’llvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 297
(1805)). Landownership related to the idea of allegiance to the
English monarchy—one who did not own land felt no attach-
ment to the monarchy’s success. A similar concern “also war-
ranted barring [those without land] from keeping arms.” Id.
at 883–84.
This pre-Founding history teaches that English sovereigns
categorically disarmed groups thought “to threaten the phys-
ical safety of another.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. Whether rebel-
ling like the Welsh, or perceived as threatening rebellion like
the Catholics, such groups threatened public safety and sta-
bility—in other words, they were “dangerous.” Though we
do not place undue weight on this history, this “unbroken line
of common-law precedent” illuminates our inquiry. Bruen,
597 U.S. at 35; Carbajal-Flores, 143 F.4th at 883.
Across the Atlantic in pre- and post-Founding America,
the tradition of disarming those viewed as dangerous to soci-
ety continued. “Slaves and Native Americans … were
thought to pose more immediate threats to public safety and
stability and were disarmed as a matter of course.” Kanter, 919
F.3d at 458 (Barrett, J., dissenting). States like Virginia,

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No. 24-2432 17
Maryland, and Pennsylvania continued the tradition of dis-
arming Catholics. Carbajal-Flores, 143 F.4th at 885; Range, 124
F.4th at 258–59 (Krause, J., concurring in the judgment). Loy-
alists, too, were disarmed because of their perceived threat
against the Revolution. Carbajal-Flores, 143 F.4th at 886.
Some of these ignominious class-wide bans were categor-
ical restrictions. For example, for black people, there were nar-
row exceptions extended to “house-keepers” who were free
or of mixed race, and all those living on a frontier plantation.
Otherwise, black people could not carry arms.4 Many colonies
also restricted the sale of firearms and ammunition to Indians
as a class.5
4 Collection of All Such Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, of a
Public and Permanent Nature, as Are Now in Force; with a New and Com-
plete Index. To Which are Prefixed the Declaration of Rights, and Consti-
tution, or Form of Government, 187 (The Making of Modern Law: Primary
Sources through 1803); An Act Directing the Trial of Slaves Committing
Capital Crimes, §§ 14–15, VA. CODE (W. W. Gray 1820); A Law Respect-
ing Slaves, § 4, 1804 LA. T ERRITORY ACTS 107, 108 (E. Stout 1804). See also
An Act to Restrain the Evil Practices Arising from Negroes Keeping Dogs,
and to Prohibit Them From Carrying Guns or Offensive Weapons, ch. 81,
§§ 1-2, 1806 MD . LAWS 46, 47 (1806 statute exempting free black and mixed
race people but not slaves); An Act Prescribing the Rules and Conduct to
Be Observed with Respect to Negroes and Other Slaves of This Territory,
§§ 19–21, LA STAT (passed 1806 stating, “No slave shall … carry any vis-
ible or hidden arms, not even with a permission for so doing ); see also
Zherka, 140 F.4th at 87–88 (1723 Virginia and 1852 Mississippi statutes).
5 Duarte, 137 F.4th at 765 (Collins, J., concurring) (collecting examples);
An Order Directed to the Comittee (sic) of Scittuate, MASS. GEN. LAWS
(William White 1856) (1675 Plymouth Colony order prescribing death
penalty for selling weapons to Indians); An Act for Preventing Lending
Guns, Ammunition, &c. to the Indians, 1723 Conn. Acts 292, 292 (T. Green)
(1723 Connecticut Act); An Act to Prohibit the Selling of Guns,

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18 No. 24-2432
The trend of class-wide disarmament continued into the
mid-1800s. In that timeframe, states faced the growing social
problem of homeless, wandering, or destitute people. Dozens
of laws were enacted that categorically prohibited tramps
from possessing firearms, often without exception.6 Ohio’s
Supreme Court upheld its law disarming tramps, writing that
the Second Amendment “was never intended as a warrant for
vicious persons to carry weapons with which to terrorize oth-
ers.” State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 575 (Ohio 1900). States also
continued to ban black people from owning any firearms.
Zherka, 140 F.4th at 88 n.50 (collecting examples). “Black
Gunpowder, or Other Warlike Stores, to the Indians, P A. T ERRITORY L AWS,
306, 306-7 (B. Franklin 1763) (PA law).
6 Act of May 3, 1890, §4, 1890 I OWA ACTS 68, 68-69 (G. H. Ragsdale)
(“Any tramp … who shall be found carrying any firearm or other danger-
ous weapon, shall be punished by imprisonment.”); An Act Concerning
Tramps, ch. 806, §§ 1-9, 1880 R.I. PUB . L AWS 110, 110-111 (E. L. Freeman &
Co.) (“Any tramp who … shall be found carrying any firearm … shall be
punished by imprisonment.”); An Act to Punish Tramps, ch. 213, §§ 1-2,
1880 M E . L AWS, 212, 212-213 (Sprague & Son 1880); An Act Concerning
Tramps, ch. 155, §§ 6 & 8, 1879 DEL . L AWS 223, 224-225 (The Delawarean
Office 1879) (“Any tramp … who shall be found carrying any firearm or
other dangerous weapon … shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and pun-
ished accordingly”); An Act to Define and Suppress Tramps, Bill no. 243,
§§ 1-5, 1879 OHIO L AWS 191, 191-192 (Nevins & Myers 1879)(“That any
tramp who … shall be found carrying any fire-arms … be imprisoned”);
An Act to Suppress Vagabondage, ch. 188, § 4, 1879 W IS. S ESS. L AWS 273,
274 (David Atwood) (“Any tramp who shall … carry any fire-arms or
other dangerous weapon, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished at hard
labor”); An Act to Punish Tramps, ch. 38, § 2, 1878 N.H. L AWS 170, 170
(Josiah B. Sanborn 1878); An Act Relating to Tramps, no. 14, § 3, 1878 V T.
A CTS & RESOLVES 29, 30 (J & J.M. Poland 1878).

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No. 24-2432 19
people in Mississippi were prohibited from owning guns with
no exceptions.” Id.
We draw two important conclusions from this history.
First, this sad tradition includes laws repugnant by today’s
standards. Many of these laws would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Yet, for this analysis their import cannot be ig-
nored. These laws reflect the boundaries of the legislature’s
power to enact class-wide disarmament laws consistent with
the Second Amendment. Duarte, 137 F.4th at 767 (Collins, J.,
concurring) (This “historical tradition recognizes some meas-
ure of legislative discretion to impose disarmament on partic-
ular categories of persons who are thought to present a ‘spe-
cial danger of misuse.’” (citation modified)).
Second, as noted, these disarmament laws sometimes in-
cluded exceptions, and other times they did not. In some
states, a slave could own a gun if he could prove he was an
“orderly and peaceable person” or needed the firearm to
hunt. Williams, 113 F.4th at 656. But other states, particularly
in the South, categorically prohibited slaves from owning
guns. See supra n.4. Consider, too, a Pennsylvania law disarm-
ing Catholics, which provided no method to get their guns
back.7 See also Zherka, 140 F.4th at 91 (identifying categorical
bans). As a result, the legislature may determine that classes
of people are dangerous.
7 An Act for Forming and Regulating the Militia of the Province of
Pennsylvania, 627, PA. CONS. STAT. (WM Stanley Ray 1898) (PA Law
Passed 1757) (“That all arms, military accoutrements, gunpowder and am-
munition of what kind soever, any papist or reputed papist within this
province hath or shall have in his house or houses or elsewhere one month
after the publication of this act, shall be taken from such papist or reputed
papist.”).

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20 No. 24-2432
2. Greater includes the lesser
The second tradition concerns the penalty for felonies. At
the Founding, a felony charge was “generally connected with
that of capital punishment.” 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, C OMMENTARIES *98. See also Bucklew v. Precythe,
587 U.S. 119, 129 (2019) (At the Founding, death was “the
standard penalty for all serious crimes.”). Execution was the
penalty for serious crimes, like treason, murder, arson, bur-
glary, robbery, rape, and larceny. Dubois, 139 F.4th at 895
(Pryor, C.J., concurring). And the “death penalty was also a
commonplace punishment for criminal recidivism in early
America.” Sheherezade C. Malik & D. Paul Holdsworth, A
Survey of the History of the Death Penalty in the United States, 49
U. R ICH . L. R EV. 693, 694 (2015). Dictionaries, too, defined “fel-
ony” to be a category of crimes punishable by death. Duarte,
137 F.4th at 769–70 (Collins, J., concurring) (collecting exam-
ples). In short, “relaxed Virginia Anglicans like Thomas Jef-
ferson and James Madison or dour Calvinist New Englanders
like Fisher Ames and the Adamses would have likely seen the
death penalty not only as historically commonplace but as in-
trinsically just and … divinely prescribed.” JOSEPH A.
M ELUSKY & K EITH A. PESTO, C RUEL AND U NUSUAL
PUNISHMENT: R IGHTS AND LIBERTIES U NDER THE LAW 30 (2003).
This tradition highlights that when the Second Amend-
ment was adopted, legislatures could define a “serious” crime
as a felony and impose the death penalty. Crimes involving
danger to persons or society (murder, rape, and treason) were
often labeled as felonies. If those convicted of dangerous
crimes received the greatest possible punishment, the legisla-
ture may instead impose disarmament, the “lesser re-
striction.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699.

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No. 24-2432 21
Some believe this “greater includes the lesser” theory rests
on shaky historical footing. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 459 (Barrett, J.,
dissenting) (“During the period leading up to the [F]ounding,
the connection between felonies and capital punishment
started to fray.”); Folajtar v. Att’y Gen., 980 F.3d 897, 920 (3d
Cir. 2020) (Bibas, J., dissenting). But that a legislature rarely
imposed the death penalty for felonies does not mean it could
not have done so for all felonies, if it wished. After all, we can-
not assume “[F]ounding-era legislatures maximally exercised
their power to regulate.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 739–40 (Barrett,
J., concurring). The states’ power to execute is not subject to
the “use it or lose it” rule. Id. What is more, executions for
felony convictions apparently occurred often. “Between 1790
to 1829 … the states carried out an estimated 779 executions,
and did so for crimes against people (e.g., murder and rape)
[and] property (e.g., arson, forgery, and horse stealing).” Han-
nah Freedman, The Modern Federal Death Penalty: A Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 107 C ORNELL L. R EV. 1689, 1709 (2022).
Indeed, the “death penalty was an accepted punishment at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.” Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 867 (2015).
This theory has not been conclusively accepted. Yet Rahimi
does employ it: “The going armed laws provided for impris-
onment, and if imprisonment was permissible to respond to
the use of guns to threaten the physical safety of others, then
the lesser restriction of temporary disarmament that Section
922(g)(8) imposes is also permissible.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699.
Since Rahimi, other circuits have debated the theory. Compare
Duarte, 137 F.4th at 768, 771 (Collins, J., concurring), with id. at
790 (VanDyke, J., concurring). And some circuits have cited
this rationale in rejecting all as-applied challenges to

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22 No. 24-2432
§ 922(g)(1). Id. at 756; Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1127; Dubois, 139
F.4th at 897 (Pryor, C.J., concurring); Zherka, 140 F.4th at 82.
When considered along with the historical disarmament
laws, the theory provides some historical support that the leg-
islature had the power to permanently disarm dangerous fel-
ons.
D. Watson’s as-applied challenge
The categorical disarmament laws “confirm what com-
mon sense suggests”: individuals convicted of dangerous fel-
onies pose a risk to society and may be disarmed consistent
with the Second Amendment. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 698. Section
922(g)(1), then, as applied to Watson, fits within that tradition.
Exercising its authority like state legislatures at the Founding,
Congress reasonably determined that a felony drug convic-
tion is a “dangerous” crime. That link makes “common
sense.” Id. Federal caselaw well substantiates that drugs and
guns together are dangerous. See, e.g., Smith & Wesson Brands,
Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280, 287 (2025) (Car-
tels “use the imported firearms to commit serious crimes—
drug dealing, kidnapping, murder, and others.”); Muscarello
v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (“the ‘dangerous com-
bination’ of ‘drugs and guns’”); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S.
385, 391 n.2 (1997) (There is a “link[] between drugs and vio-
lence.”).
The view that guns and drugs together are dangerous is
also reflected in other laws, like 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which im-
poses significant prison time for using a firearm during a drug
offense. Consider the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, too, which
increase sentences for possessing a firearm during a drug of-
fense. § 2D1.1(b)(1). We also note that the Court in

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No. 24-2432 23
Rahimi rejected the argument that a person could be disarmed
merely for being irresponsible. 602 U.S. at 701–02. A dealer of
illegal drugs is more than just irresponsible; he is a threat to
the physical safety of society.
Congress made the common-sense decision to disarm
drug dealers like Watson because they are dangerous. History
allows for that. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 451 (Barrett, J., dissenting)
(“History is consistent with common sense: it demonstrates
that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people
from possessing guns.”). Watson’s predicate felony drug
dealing conviction is sufficient to lawfully disarm him.8
The historical disarmament laws support disarming Wat-
son and other dangerous felons. And until the Supreme Court
provides further guidance, the “greater includes the lesser”
theory fortifies that conclusion. These two enduring tradi-
tions “taken together,” see, e.g., Dubois, 139 F.4th at 897 (Pryor,
C.J., concurring), lead us to uphold § 922(g)(1) as applied to
dangerous felons based on the recognized power of the states
to disarm dangerous felons.
Watson has a second felony conviction for possessing a
firearm while being an unlawful user of a controlled sub-
stance. § 922(g)(3). Whether that predicate felony may be
enough to disarm Watson is a thorny question. On one hand,
Congress reasonably could have determined that a prior
8 The government argues the entirety of Watson’s criminal history, not
just his prior felony convictions, shows he is “dangerous” and can thus be
disarmed. It is not necessary to decide here whether a defendant’s entire
profile can or should be considered. Watson’s predicate felony, which pro-
vides the basis for Watson’s disarmament under § 922(g)(1), shows him to
be dangerous.

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24 No. 24-2432
violation of federal gun laws suggests one will misuse fire-
arms again. See Seiwert, 152 F.4th at 866. On the other hand,
the Supreme Court may allow as-applied challenges under
§ 922(g)(3). See United States v. Hemani, No. 24-40137, 2025 WL
354982 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 2025) (per curiam), cert. granted, 146 S.
Ct. 326 (2025). If so, Watson’s § 922(g)(3) conviction, at the
time, could have been vacated under an as-applied challenge.
His vacated conviction could not have served as a predicate
felony under § 922(g)(1).
This appeal does not concern whether Congress may
deem non-violent felons “dangerous.” That question has split
the courts of appeals. Some have held that no as-applied chal-
lenge can succeed under § 922(g)(1). “[T]here is no need for
felony-by-felony litigation regarding the constitutionality of
§ 922(g)(1).” Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1125.9 That is because histor-
ical laws did not always require an individualized determina-
tion of dangerousness. See Dubois, 139 F.4th at 898 (Pryor,
C.J.); Duarte, 137 F.4th 771 (Collins, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Zherka, 140 F.4th at 91 (“Although some of the histori-
cal laws created such an exemption structure, not all of them
did.”). But other courts have identified successful as-applied
challenges. Range, 124 F.4th at 228; Williams, 113 F.4th at 657;
United States v. Mitchell, 160 F.4th 169, 194 (5th Cir. 2025)
(“[W]e hold that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to
Mitchell's § 922(g)(3) predicate offense.”). We reserve ruling
on an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) under the Second
9 In reaching that conclusion, some courts have relied on their pre-
Bruen and Rahimi precedent. See United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th
Cir. 2024); Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 2026
WL 568283, at *1 (2026).

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No. 24-2432 25
Amendment by a felon whose predicate felony offense is not
“dangerous.”
Finally, felon status does not necessarily mean permanent
disarmament. Under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), a person may apply
to the Attorney General for relief from federal firearm dis-
armament if the applicant shows he “will not be likely to act
in a manner dangerous to public safety” and “the granting of
the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.” Id. The
procedure was effectively disabled after Congress barred the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives from
using funds to evaluate applications. See United States v. Bean,
537 U.S. 71, 74 (2002). The current Attorney General has re-
scinded the delegation of authority to the ATF and has begun
to restart the 925(c) process. Withdrawing the Attorney General’s
Delegation of Authority, 90 Fed. Reg. 13080 (Mar. 20, 2025).
Though Watson did not apply under § 925(c), other felons
may do so.
IV. Conclusion
Section 922(g)(1)’s disarmament of dangerous felons is
constitutional under the Second Amendment. Watson’s pred-
icate felony—possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
it—is a dangerous felony. His as-applied challenge therefore
fails.
A FFIRMED

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