Keisha L. Lewis v. Indiana Department of Transportation

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1776
K EISHA L. LEWIS ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
I NDIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-01865-JMS-MJD — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 30, 2026 — DECIDED A PRIL 22, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, and R OVNER and HAMILTON ,
Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN , Chief Judge. The Indiana Department of
Transportation fired Keisha Lewis for poor performance and
insubordination. Lewis, who suffers from a kidney condition,
previously clashed with her supervisors about her remote-
work accommodation, job responsibilities, and performance
reviews. After her termination, Lewis sued the Department
and certain individuals, alleging disability discrimination,

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2 No. 25-1776
race discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Reha-
bilitation Act, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After Lewis vol-
untarily dismissed some counts, the district court granted
summary judgment to the Department on those remaining.
Because no reasonable jury could find for Lewis on any of her
claims, we affirm.
I
Lewis worked for the Indiana Department of Transporta-
tion in the Real Estate Division from December 2014 until her
termination on December 20, 2022. Her responsibilities in-
cluded reviewing and approving federal relocation claim
vouchers for assistance payments. The claim process went as
follows: consultants helped people displaced by highway
projects find replacement housing or business locations.
Then, the consultants submitted paperwork to the Real Estate
Division, and Lewis would approve and mail checks to the
displaced persons.
Lewis’s problems with the Department began in 2021.
That year, the Director of Real Estate, William Geibel, con-
ducted a job justification review. Lewis received a promotion
and a raise. But she complained to Geibel that her raise was
insufficient. Lewis, a black employee, received a 9 percent
raise, yet a white colleague received a 12 percent raise. Geibel
testified that the State Personnel Department sets pay rates.
Per Geibel, those rates pre-determined the raises available for
each employee, depending on base salary. The other em-
ployee’s base salary was lower than Lewis’s, so he received a
higher percentage raise.
Additional difficulties arose concerning Lewis’s remote-
work accommodation. For context, in March 2020, the

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No. 25-1776 3
Department staff began working out of the office due to
COVID-19. Although the employees returned to the office by
summer 2022, Lewis received a remote-work accommodation
for health issues related to her kidney transplant and compro-
mised immune system. Her accommodation also allowed her
to meet her supervisors outside the downtown office to drop
off the processed checks. After Lewis began working from
home—and contrary to the directions of her supervisor, Julie
Foreman—Lewis stopped processing checks for the Finance
Department. She also emailed the Finance Operations Man-
ager and said she would no longer assist with the relocation
vouchers. Around this time, it was recommended that Fore-
man have daily virtual meetings with Lewis to monitor her
work progress.
Lewis’s supervisors soon stepped in. When Foreman
found out that Lewis was refusing work, Foreman contacted
Human Resources Director Janell Gurney. In her email, Fore-
man reported Lewis’s refusal to assist with the vouchers and
Lewis’s backlog of 100-150 parcels. Foreman also described
confronting Lewis about her accommodation because Lewis
had posted about attending a high school football game on
social media. Based on Gurney’s advice, Foreman told Lewis
that her failure to complete job duties was “insubordination”
and Lewis needed to submit additional documentation for
her remote-work accommodation. Foreman also informed
Lewis that she was required “to perform [her job duties],” and
failing to do so “[was] insubordination and w[ould] result in
disciplinary action.”
In response, Lewis brought several complaints. She ini-
tially emailed the State Personnel Department, claiming she
was receiving “harassing phone calls from [Foreman]”

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4 No. 25-1776
referencing her accommodation and staff complaints about
her activities outside of work. To Lewis, she “had no other
choice than file a complaint against … Foreman, for harass-
ment and discrimination of [her] medical condition.” Gurney
told Lewis she no longer needed to provide further documen-
tation about her accommodation or continue to come to the
office to handle the checks. Lewis then filed a second internal
complaint alleging disability discrimination, which was later
dismissed by the State Personnel Department.
A few days later, Foreman emailed Geibel and Gurney to
report “[a]nother instance of insubordination” by Lewis.
Lewis’s work logs seemed to overrepresent the hours worked
for the work product created. Foreman also expressed her
frustration with Lewis’s activities that seemed inconsistent
with “strict COVID precaution behavior,” such as taking her
kids to SkyZone and The Children’s Museum. In the weeks
before the email, Lewis had also been late to multiple meet-
ings with Foreman, including once when she was 20 minutes
late, even after taking two hours of personal time just before
the meeting.
Matters escalated quickly. The day after Foreman’s report,
Lewis had her regular check-in phone call. Geibel, Foreman,
and Lewis discussed Lewis’s work logs as well as her with-
drawal from participating in an upcoming “diversity inclu-
sion week.” Over the following days, Foreman directed Lewis
to provide weekly data reports, which would detail her un-
finished work. Lewis and Foreman then engaged in an email
dispute about generating those reports. Foreman later for-
warded the email thread to Gurney, claiming Lewis “was bla-
tantly refusing to produce the [reports].” In response, Gurney
instructed Foreman to begin documenting Lewis’s

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No. 25-1776 5
“inappropriate/egregious behavior,” but told Foreman she
could not write up Lewis because “[i]t would appear as retal-
iation.”
Lewis did not provide a specific report and she told Geibel
she did not have the time to do so. Geibel worked with an-
other employee to obtain the information. The report showed
Lewis had “over 400 parcels outstanding,” including some of
the Department’s largest projects, putting it at risk of losing
federal funding. At this point, Geibel recommended to the
State Personnel Department that Lewis be fired. In December
2022, Lewis was terminated for “poor performance and insub-
ordinate conduct.”
Lewis then sued the Department, Geibel, and Foreman,
bringing claims for disability discrimination and retaliation
under § 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794, as well as under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The court
granted the parties’ joint motion to dismiss against Foreman.
Then, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the
Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims against the Depart-
ment and the § 1981 claims against Geibel.
The district court agreed and concluded that no reasona-
ble jury could find for Lewis on any of her claims. So, the court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Lewis appeals.
II
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, con-
struing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in
the nonmoving party’s favor. Bourke v. Collins, 142 F.4th 918,
921 (7th Cir. 2025). But an inference is “not reasonable if it is

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6 No. 25-1776
directly contradicted by direct evidence provided at the sum-
mary judgment stage.” Downing v. Abbott Lab'ys, 48 F.4th 793,
815 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Nor is a “conceivable
inference necessarily reasonable.” Id. (citation modified). The
moving party is entitled to summary judgment if “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is en-
titled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a).
Lewis appeals summary judgment for the defendants on a
number of her claims: disability discrimination and retalia-
tion in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and racial
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII.
A
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires employers
receiving federal funds to reasonably accommodate their em-
ployees with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Bourke, 142 F.4th
at 921. To establish a violation of the Act, a plaintiff must
show: (1) she was handicapped as defined by the Act; (2) she
was “otherwise qualified” to participate in the program; (3)
the program receives federal financial assistance; and (4) she
was “denied the benefits of the program solely because of her
handicap.” Royan v. Chi. St. Univ., 145 F.4th 681, 689 (7th Cir.
2025) (citation modified). Only the fourth requirement is at is-
sue in this case.
1
Lewis claims the district court erroneously derived a sole-
causation standard from the Rehabilitation Act’s text, rather
than using the but-for causation test provided by the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.
(ADA). To Lewis, because the court failed to consider other

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No. 25-1776 7
but-for causes of Lewis’s termination, it applied the wrong le-
gal standard.
This is incorrect. Although the Rehabilitation Act “incor-
porates the liability standards of the [ADA],” Bourke, 142 F.4th
at 921, it does not do so for causation standards. Instead, Con-
gress opted for an elevated causation standard for disability-
discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a).
The ADA requires plaintiffs to show they were discrimi-
nated against “on the basis of” their disability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). But under the Rehabilitation Act their discrimina-
tion must be “solely by reason of” their disability. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a). That means a plaintiff bringing a claim under the Re-
habilitation Act must show sole causation, rather than but-for
causation. Royan, 145 F.4th at 693.
We have consistently concluded that the Rehabilitation
Act’s sole-causation standard is “more stringent than the
ADA’s ‘but for’ inquiry.” Id. (citing Swain v. Wormuth, 41 F.4th
892, 899 (7th Cir. 2022); Conners v. Wilkie, 984 F.3d 1255, 1260
(7th Cir. 2021)). This requirement “contrasts with the ADA,
which requires only that the plaintiff’s disability be a reason
for the challenged action.” Conners, 984 F.3d at 1260; see also
Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citations omitted) (“Aside from the ‘solely by reason of’
standard of causation, which is unique to this statute and not
present in the ADA … the Rehabilitation Act incorporates the
standards applicable to Title I of the ADA.”).
In Royan, this court held that a student who failed out of a
doctoral program did not produce evidence from which a rea-
sonable jury could find that she was dismissed solely because

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8 No. 25-1776
of her disabilities. Id. The plaintiff argued that but for the dis-
closure of her illness, she would not have failed her clinical
rotation and never have been placed on probation or assigned
to the instructor who failed her, ultimately leading to her dis-
missal. Id. But she had failed her second and final clinical ro-
tation, and there was no evidence her supervising instructor
was aware of her disabilities when he failed her. Id. Thus,
without evidence that her supervisor knew of her disability,
no reasonable jury could conclude she was “dismissed …
solely based on her disabilities.” Id. at 694.
Several circuits share our view that § 504 has a stricter cau-
sation standard than the ADA’s “but for” standard. See, e.g.,
Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 750 (4th Cir.
2018) (“To succeed on a claim under the Rehabilitation Act,
the plaintiff must establish he was excluded ‘solely by reason
of’ his disability; the ADA requires only that the disability
was ‘a motivating cause’ of the exclusion.”) (citation omitted);
G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623, 635 (6th Cir. 2013)
(holding that § 504 requires proof that the “plaintiff is being
excluded from participation in, or being denied the benefits
of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program
solely by reason of his handicap”) (citation omitted); K.M. ex
rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2013) (determining that § 504’s “causal standard” which
requires the plaintiff “to show a denial of services solely by
reason of disability” is even stricter than the ADA’s “but for”
standard) (citation modified). As the Fifth Circuit nicely sum-
marized, “under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer is liable
only if the discrimination occurred solely by reason of her or
his disability, not when it is simply a motivating factor.” Hou-
ston v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 17 F.4th 576, 586 (5th Cir. 2021) (ci-
tation modified).

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No. 25-1776 9
Lewis’s disability was not the sole cause of her termina-
tion. She had over 400 outstanding parcels to close out, which
cost the Department over $150,000 to rectify. Lewis also does
not dispute that Geibel recommended she be fired because of
her deficient job performance and her insubordination. Lewis
cannot show that her disability was the sole cause of her ter-
mination, so she has not established a disability-discrimina-
tion claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
2
Lewis argues the Department’s post-hoc justification for
her termination was pretextual. In support, she cites non-
Rehabilitation Act and out-of-circuit cases. To her, an “em-
ployer’s decision to assign additional duties and subject her
to heightened scrutiny” constitutes “a pattern of antago-
nism,” and therefore evidence of discriminatory intent. She
submits the Department was looking for a reason to terminate
her after she received her accommodation. This, she says, is
sufficient evidence of pretext necessitating a trial.
But our inquiry into whether a discharge is pretextual
turns on “whether the employer honestly believed the reason
it has offered to explain the discharge.” Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of
Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 505 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
This “requires more than just faulty reasoning or mistaken
judgment on the part of the employer.” Swain, 41 F.4th at 900
(citation omitted). It requires a “lie, specifically a phony rea-
son for some action.” Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d
724, 726 (7th Cir. 2008) (evaluating an employer retaliation
claim under Title VII) (citation omitted). Yet, we are not a “su-
per personnel department that second-guesses employers’
business judgments.” Murphy v. Caterpillar Inc., 140 F.4th 900,
915 (7th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). “If a reasonable fact

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10 No. 25-1776
finder would be compelled to believe” an employer’s expla-
nation, then the employer “is entitled to summary judgment.”
Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 736.
The Department had several legal justifications for
Lewis’s firing, including her history of insubordination and
ineffective job performance. She contested her assigned duty
assignments, had a poor record of timely attendance at meet-
ings, made negative comments about Geibel to other employ-
ees, and refused a direct order from Geibel. Each is a valid
justification for adverse employment action. See Bruno v.
Wells-Armstrong, 93 F.4th 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 2024) (conclud-
ing that the employer’s stated reason for refusing to raise
salary was not pretextual when the employee had been insub-
ordinate); Monroe, 871 F.3d at 506–07 (holding that there was
no evidence of pretextual termination when an employee’s
post-traumatic stress disorder “caused him … to be volatile
toward his subordinates”). Though “evidence of pretext does
not require but does permit an inference of unlawful motive,”
Murphy, 140 F. 4th at 915, the Department had consistent per-
formance-related reasons to terminate Lewis.
Further, Lewis’s failure to contest these facts before the
district court means she waives this attempt on appeal. She
did not dispute key facts concerning her refusal to do more
work, her tendency to speak over Geibel in meetings, negative
comments she made about Geibel’s ability to manage the Real
Estate Division, and the 400-parcel backlog at the time of her
discharge. An argument raised for the first time on appeal is
waived. Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897
(7th Cir. 2023).
To Lewis, waiver is not fatal to her claim because the dis-
trict court improperly credited testimony about the parcels

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No. 25-1776 11
that was uncited in the summary judgment briefs. But the
court was entitled “to consider uncited materials in the rec-
ord” at the summary judgment stage. Flynn v. FCA US LLC,
39 F.4th 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2022); F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c)(3). And in
civil cases, plain error review is “severely constricted because
a civil litigant should be bound by his counsel’s actions.”
Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc. v. Church Mut.
Ins. Co., S.I., 168 F.4th 483, 490 (7th Cir. 2026) (citation modi-
fied). When an argument is affirmatively waived, like here,
rather than forfeited, “we need not even consider” whether to
apply plain error review. Id.
B
Next is Lewis’s Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim. To
prove such an allegation, an employee must show: (1) she en-
gaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an
adverse action by her employer; and (3) there is a causal link
between the two. See Fuller v. McDonough, 84 F.4th 686, 690
(7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Our circuit precedent is in-
consistent as to whether a plaintiff must show the protected
activity was the but-for cause of the adverse action, Brooks v.
Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 440 (7th Cir. 2022), or whether it is
enough to show “retaliatory intent played a part in [the]
termination.” Fuller, 84 F.4th at 691. We need not resolve this
incongruity here because Lewis’s claim fails under both
standards.
Lewis argues Foreman’s critical comments and report to
the Human Resources Department show retaliatory intent.
She claims Foreman was frustrated about her accommoda-
tion, citing their discussion over Lewis’s attendance at the
football game and taking her children to SkyZone and the

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12 No. 25-1776
Children’s Museum. But she neglects to mention Foreman’s
concerns about Lewis’s deficient communication, poor at-
tendance at meetings, and lack of transparency about her
work product.
The Department had “legitimate non-retaliatory reasons”
for terminating Lewis based on her insubordination and sub-
par work performance. Id. (citation modified). As with the
claim of pretextual termination, the district court correctly
found that Lewis did not show unlawful intent. Lewis’s em-
ployer had concerns about her productivity—unrelated to her
disability accommodation—which led to her termination.
There was neither retaliatory intent nor was her poor produc-
tivity a protected activity. So, Lewis does not prevail on her
retaliation claim.
C
Last, we consider Lewis’s allegations of racial discrimina-
tion and retaliation under Title VII.
1
At summary judgment, a district court evaluating a Title
VII race discrimination claim asks, “whether the plaintiff has
introduced evidence that would permit a reasonable fact-
finder to conclude that the plaintiff's race … caused the dis-
charge or other adverse employment action.” Igasaki v. Ill.
Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021) (ci-
tation modified). Direct or circumstantial evidence will be
considered “in a single pile and must be evaluated as a
whole.” Id.
One way to establish a Title VII racial discrimination claim
is through the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 957.

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No. 25-1776 13
But ultimately, a plaintiff need not prevail under McDonnell
Douglas. Lewis needs only to present enough evidence to al-
low a reasonable jury to conclude in her favor. Vega v. Chi.
Park Dist., 954 F.3d 996, 1004 (7th Cir. 2020).
The district court correctly found that Lewis “provide[d]
no supporting details as to whether [a white employee of the
Department] was a comparator in job title, job duties, or other
contributing factors to the disparity.” Her racial discrimina-
tion claim hinges on a pay-raise disparity: she received a 9
percent raise, yet a white employee received a 12 percent
raise. But she does not rebut or even acknowledge that the
white employee received a higher raise because his salary was
lower than hers before and after the raise.
Further, Lewis waived this argument by not developing
an argument on appeal that engages with the district court’s
reasoning. Bradley, 59 F.4th at 897; see also Greenbank v. Great
Am. Assurance Co., 47 F.4th 618, 629 (7th Cir. 2022) (“We have
made clear that perfunctory and underdeveloped arguments,
and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority
are waived.”). It is not enough to preserve an issue by pre-
senting an argument in general terms. See Fednav Int’l Ltd. v.
Cont’l Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 2010). The district
court found that Lewis waived her Title VII racial discrimina-
tion claim. Her argument “almost exclusively focuse[d]” on
the pay-raise disparity rather than any “meaningful analysis
regarding discrimination on the basis of her race itself.”
On appeal, Lewis argues she offered evidence that Geibel
“harbored animosity toward her because of her race.” To
Lewis, Geibel considered her complaint that he had not paid
her fairly because of her race as insubordinate. And she as-
serts Geibel’s long-term efforts to seek Lewis’s termination,

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14 No. 25-1776
coupled with the allegedly pretextual justifications for her ter-
mination, also show racial discrimination sufficient for jury
consideration.
Lewis’s contentions fail to engage with the district court’s
reasoning, and her arguments on appeal remain “underdevel-
oped, conclusory, or unsupported by law.” Puffer v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012). “[E]vidence that sim-
ilarly situated non-African-American employees were treated
more favorably” could have supported Lewis’s claim, and
would have been essential under the McDonnell Douglas
method. See, e.g., Johnson v. Advoc. Health and Hosps. Corp., 892
F.3d 887, 896 (7th Cir. 2018). She provided no such evidence.
Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary
judgment on her Title VII racial discrimination claim.
2
Lewis’s Title VII retaliation claim does not succeed for
similar reasons. A plaintiff bringing such a claim must show
that “the record contain[s] sufficient evidence to permit a rea-
sonable fact finder to conclude that retaliatory motive caused
the discharge[.]” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 959. Lewis does not do so.
She claims Geibel “harbored animosity toward her because of
her race” leading him to “consider[] her [pay-raise] complaint
… as insubordinate.” But as the district court found, Geibel
advocated for Lewis’s promotion and pay raise. That fact,
along with the lack of other evidence, leads to the conclusion
that Geibel acted without discriminatory or retaliatory mo-
tives. Lewis also did not raise any material dispute that her
supervisor’s beliefs about her insubordination and ineffec-
tiveness were insincere.

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No. 25-1776 15
She cannot show “by a preponderance of the evidence”
that her insubordination and ineffectiveness were “a pretext
for discrimination.” Robertson v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 F.3d
371, 378 (7th Cir. 2020). Lewis did not raise a material dispute
about Geibel’s beliefs. No reasonable jury could conclude that
her complaint was causally related to her termination. See
Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir. 2012) (“For an
inference of causation to be drawn solely on the basis of a sus-
picious-timing argument, we typically allow no more than a
few days to elapse between the protected activity and the ad-
verse action.”); see also Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 959 (“two-month
gap between [an employee]’s protected activities and his ter-
mination cannot show retaliation on its own”).
III
Lewis’s disability did not cause her termination, and she
did not raise any genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the Department’s decision to terminate her was pretextual.
Nor could a reasonable jury find a causal connection between
her remote-work accommodation and the cited performance
issues that led to her termination. Lewis also waived her dis-
crimination claim, and she did not materially dispute her su-
pervisors’ sincere belief about her insubordination and inef-
fectiveness. For these reasons, the district court properly
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in all
respects.
A FFIRMED

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