United States of America v. Taiwan Edwards

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 21, 2026
Decided April 24, 2026
Before
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1230
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TAIWAN EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin
No. 3:24-cr-00005-001
James D. Peterson,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Taiwan Edwards pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than
500 grams of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and he was sentenced to 84 months’
imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. He filed a notice of appeal, but his
appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of
the case and addresses the potential issues that an appeal like this could involve, and
Edwards has responded to the motion. See CIR . R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis
appears thorough, we limit our review to matters that counsel and Edwards discuss.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1230 Page 2
See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We conclude that Edwards has
no arguable issues on appeal, so we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Edwards was under investigation in 2023 for drug trafficking in two cities in
southern Wisconsin, Janesville and Beloit. Edwards reportedly sold cocaine to
confidential informants and made frequent use of a storage facility for drug trafficking.
Officers obtained a search warrant to monitor his car with a GPS tracker, later executing
search warrants at the storage facility and his residence. Edwards was arrested after
officers discovered a 1,159-gram brick of cocaine, smaller quantities of other drugs, over
$70,000 in U.S. currency, and six firearms.
Edwards was federally indicted in January 2024. He moved to suppress the
evidence, contending, first, that the officers had attached the GPS tracker while the car
was in an apartment parking lot and, second, that the warrant did not specifically
permit officers to enter private property. A magistrate judge recommended denying the
motion because Edwards lacked a privacy interest in the lot—connected to his mother’s
apartment building—where the car was parked. The district judge accepted the
recommendation.
After Edwards pleaded guilty, a probation officer prepared a presentence
investigation report (PSR) that calculated a range of imprisonment of 151 to 188 months
(based on a total offense level of 29 and criminal history category of VI). Key to the
calculations were a 28-point base offense level, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(6), a 2-level
increase for maintaining a premises for distributing controlled substances, id.
§ 2D1.1(b)(12), a 2-level increase for possession of a dangerous weapon, id.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), and a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a)–(b).
At the sentencing hearing, the district judge adopted the PSR but agreed to vary
downwards from the Guidelines because of the disparity between crack and powder
cocaine. The judge lowered the offense level to 27, which yielded a guidelines range of
130 to 162 months’ imprisonment. Regarding the base offense level, the judge found
that ample evidence of Edwards’s cocaine distribution supported the converted drug
weight. Id. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(6). The judge also found that the proximity of the guns to
drugs was sufficient to support an adjustment for possession of a firearm. Id.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1). And the judge found appropriate the adjustment for maintaining
premises for drug distribution, id. § 2D1.1(b)(12), because Edwards—the unit’s primary
user—had visited the storage unit over 80 times, and the unit’s contents were consistent
with drug trafficking. Id. § 2D1.1(b)(12). After considering Edwards’s arguments in

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No. 25-1230 Page 3
mitigation (his difficult upbringing and the dated nature of his criminal history), the
judge imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment and a 5-year
term of supervised release.
In the Anders brief, counsel first tells us that Edwards wants to challenge not his
guilty plea but the denial of his motion to suppress. However, because an unconditional
guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including Fourth Amendment claims,
see, e.g., United States v. Turner, 55 F.4th 1135, 1139 (7th Cir. 2022), counsel explores
whether any arguable basis exists for the plea to be set aside. She rightly concludes that
there is none. She considers, for instance, challenging the knowing and voluntary
nature of Edwards’s plea. On this point, our review is deferential (because Edwards did
not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea), see United States v. Williams,
946 F.3d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 2020), and a review of the plea-colloquy transcript reflects
that the district judge substantially complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Edwards swore under oath that he understood the nature of the
charges against him, the minimum and maximum penalties, the trial rights he was
giving up, and how his sentence would be calculated—and such statements under oath
are presumed true. See United States v. Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 582 (7th Cir. 2021).
Accordingly, by entering into an unconditional guilty plea, Edwards waived any
defects relating to the motion to suppress.
Counsel next rightly concludes that Edwards could not plausibly challenge the
judge’s guidelines calculations. The judge correctly assessed Edwards’s adjusted offense
level at 27 and his criminal history category at VI. Central to this calculation was drug
quantity, and the judge reasonably determined—based on a confidential informant’s
statements and corroborating evidence at sentencing—that Edwards was responsible
for drugs whose converted weight amounted to over 700 kilograms. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(6).
Counsel also considers, and properly rejects, challenging the judge’s decision to
increase Edwards’s offense level by two based on his possession of a dangerous
weapon. See id. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Edwards did not dispute that six guns were found in the
storage unit near more than a kilogram of cocaine. Because Edwards offered no
evidence to rebut the presumption that firearms found near drugs are connected to the
drug offense, see, e.g., United States v. Zamudio, 18 F.4th 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2021), it would
be frivolous to argue that the two-level increase was erroneous.

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No. 25-1230 Page 4
Counsel also finds no nonfrivolous ground to challenge the adjustment for
maintaining premises for drug distribution under § 2D1.1(b)(12). In applying this
enhancement, judges consider whether the defendant exercised control over—and
used—the premises for drug trafficking over a sustained period. See United States v.
Montgomery, 114 F.4th 847, 850–51 (7th Cir. 2024). The judge found this test satisfied
because Edwards, on all but one occasion, was the only person to access the storage unit
over the relevant 10-month period. See Zamudio, 18 F.4th at 562–63 (upholding
application of the enhancement where defendant stored drugs in his garage for 2 to 3
months). And as the judge recognized, the drugs, paraphernalia, guns, and cash in the
unit indicated that it was used primarily for drug trafficking. On this record, we see no
basis for concluding that the district judge erred in applying this adjustment.
Counsel also asks whether Edwards could plausibly challenge the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. But his 84-month sentence is below the properly
calculated guidelines range, creating a “‘nearly irrebuttable presumption’” on appeal
that it is not unreasonably long. United States v. Holder, 94 F.4th 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2024)
(citations omitted). Nothing in the record suggests that this presumption could be
overcome, given the judge’s explanation of the sentence in terms of the sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judge highlighted the “very serious” extent of
Edwards’s armed drug trafficking and his lengthy criminal history. The judge also
discussed Edwards’s mitigating arguments (his difficult upbringing, acceptance of
responsibility, and the Guidelines’ disparity between crack and powder cocaine), but
these are factors we do not reweigh on appeal. See United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th
786, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2022).
Finally, Edwards argues in his Rule 51 response that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. But those arguments are best reserved for collateral review, where
a more complete record can be developed, see United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453, 456–57
(7th Cir. 2020).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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