Christopher Buchanan v. Commonwealth Edison

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 28, 2026*
Decided April 28, 2026
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1698
CHRISTOPHER BUCHANAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH EDISON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23 C 5247
Matthew F. Kennelly,
Judge.
O R D E R
Christopher Buchanan appeals the summary judgment rejecting his claims that
his employer, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), denied him a promotion because of his
color and race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court concluded that Buchanan did not provide
sufficient evidence of discrimination. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1698 Page 2
We construe the evidence presented at summary judgment in the light most
favorable to Buchanan, the non-moving party, and draw reasonable inferences in his
favor. Paterakos v. City of Chicago, 147 F.4th 787, 795 (7th Cir. 2025). Buchanan, who is
African American, maintains that in early 2022 he was denied a promotion based on his
race. Since 2016, he had been employed in ComEd’s Smart Meter Operations (SMO)
division as a work planner, and in April 2021 he assumed a business analyst position. A
few months later, Buchanan applied for a promotion to senior supervisor. Although
Buchanan was the hiring manager’s first choice, he was deemed ineligible for the
supervisory position by the division’s head, Jim Conway, because he had not satisfied
ComEd’s one-year tenure policy. That policy required non-union employees, like
Buchanan, to serve in their current position for one year before seeking a promotion.
Conway refused to waive the requirement for Buchanan. Later, the hiring manager’s
second choice withdrew his application, and his third-choice candidate declined the
position. With no eligible candidates left to consider, the hiring manager removed the
job posting.
Buchanan sued ComEd for employment discrimination, arguing that Conway’s
decision to enforce the one-year policy against him was pretext for racial
discrimination. As evidence, Buchanan pointed to two white employees, Brain Tepper
and Bradley Preston, who previously had been work planners and later were promoted
despite having held their positions for less than a year. Buchanan also derides the one-
year policy as pretense, since he was allowed to interview for the supervisory position
without having the requisite year’s tenure.
ComEd moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion.
Applying both the holistic approach of Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.
2016), and the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973), the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that ComEd
discriminated against Buchanan. First, the court determined that Tepper and Preston
were not appropriate comparators. Tepper, the court explained, was promoted to meet
an urgent need; as a licensed electrician, he brought distinct technical expertise to the
role that Buchanan did not have. Preston’s circumstances were even less similar because
he had spent eight years as a supervisor before his promotion. The court also concluded
that Buchanan’s interpretation of the one-year policy did not support an inference of
discrimination because he failed to present evidence that ComEd agreed with his
interpretation or had interviewed other applicants for a promotion who lacked a year’s
tenure.

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No. 25-1698 Page 3
On appeal, Buchanan first challenges the district court’s conclusion that Tepper
and Preston were not similarly situated to him. Invoking Ortiz, he insists that both
employees are appropriate comparators because they were promoted despite not
satisfying the one-year requirement.
Whether employees are similarly situated is a “flexible, common-sense, and
factual” inquiry. David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 226 (7th Cir.
2017) (quoting Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012)). Relevant factors
include “whether the employees (i) held the same job description, (ii) were subject to
the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same supervisor, and (iv) had
comparable experience, education, and other qualifications—provided the employer
considered these latter factors in making the personnel decision.” Id. (citation omitted).
The district court correctly concluded that the record did not permit an inference
that the men were similarly situated. Tepper, the court noted, had prior experience both
as a supervisor and an electrician—unique credentials that led Conway to waive the
one-year requirement when a recent retirement had left SMO shorthanded and in need
of a senior supervisor. Although Buchanan invoked his master’s degree as evidence of
his expertise, he does not explain how it bears upon the role he sought. As for Preston,
the court pointed to his eight years’ supervisory experience in SMO—a relevant
background that prompted Conway to set aside the one-year requirement once Preston
had become available upon his unexpected release from another ComEd division.
Buchanan next argues that the district court failed to credit his interpretation of
the one-year policy as evidence of pretext. He insists that ComEd effectively waived the
policy by allowing him to advance to an interview without having served in his current
position a year. But pretext is a “dishonest explanation,” a “lie rather than an oddity or
an error.” Vassileva v. City of Chicago, 118 F.4th 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2024) (citations
omitted). And Buchanan does not point to anything in the record to suggest that
Conway did not honestly believe his interpretation of the policy.
Finally, Buchanan argues that the district court impermissibly reviewed each
piece of evidence in isolation (e.g., his ranking as the first-choice candidate, the selective
enforcement of policy, and his proffered comparators) rather than in the aggregate, as
required by Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2016). He
maintains that his evidence, viewed holistically, creates a “convincing mosaic” of
discrimination. But in Ortiz, we “reiterate[d] that ‘convincing mosaic’ is not a legal test”
and therefore not the appropriate standard to evaluate evidence of employment
discrimination. Id. at 765. Rather, courts must determine whether the evidence, viewed
“as a whole” would allow “a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race ...

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No. 25-1698 Page 4
caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Id.; see Wince v. CBRE, Inc.,
66 F.4th 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 2023). The district court here considered all Buchanan’s
cited evidence and reasonably found that none of it raised any issue of fact that he was
not promoted because of his race.
We have considered Buchanan’s remaining arguments, and they do not have
merit.
AFFIRMED

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