United States of America v. Donta Allen

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 28, 2026
Decided April 29, 2026
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2041
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DONTA ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:24CR00022-001
Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge.
O R D E R
Donta Allen pleaded guilty to multiple counts each of Hobbs Act robbery and
brandishing a firearm and was sentenced to 456 months’ imprisonment. Despite a
broad appeal waiver in his plea agreement, Allen appeals. His appointed counsel
asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses
the potential issues that an appeal like this could involve. Because counsel’s analysis
appears thorough, and Allen has not responded to counsel’s motion, see C IR . R. 51(b),
we limit our review to the subjects that counsel raises. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 25-2041 Page 2
774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We conclude that Allen has no arguable issues on appeal, so we
grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Allen was indicted in 2024 for his involvement in a conspiracy to rob various
retail stores in the Indianapolis area. During several of the robberies, Allen brandished a
firearm. He agreed with the government to plead guilty to eleven counts of robbery,
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and four counts of brandishing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
The written plea agreement included an appellate waiver under which Allen expressly
waived his right to appeal the conviction and sentence “on any ground, including the
right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742.”
At a combined plea-and-sentencing hearing, Allen testified under oath that he
understood the charges and applicable penalties; his trial rights; the consequences of
pleading guilty; the role of the Sentencing Guidelines; and the waiver of his appellate
rights in the plea agreement. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1). After Allen agreed to the
factual basis, the district judge accepted his guilty plea.
At sentencing, the judge adopted the presentence report and calculated a
guidelines range of 384 to 524 months’ imprisonment. She sentenced Allen to 456
months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release and ordered him to pay nearly
$12,000 in restitution and a special assessment.
Counsel informs us that Allen wishes to withdraw his guilty plea and therefore
considers whether Allen could raise a non-frivolous argument that his plea was not
knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024).
Counsel rightly concludes that this challenge would be frivolous. Allen did not move in
the district court to withdraw his plea, so we would review only for plain error.
United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2020). And Allen cannot show that the
judge erred in accepting his plea. The judge substantially complied with Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 and ensured that Allen’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and
supported by an adequate factual basis. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(2)-(3). Under oath,
Allen confirmed that he understood the charges, penalties, and rights he was waiving.
He also affirmed that his plea was voluntary, not the product of coercion, and not given
in exchange for any promise outside the written agreement.
Counsel next considers whether Allen could plausibly challenge his sentence and
correctly concludes that the appeal waiver in his plea agreement forecloses this
challenge. An appeal waiver “stands or falls” with the plea agreement of which it is

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No. 25-2041 Page 3
part. United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020). Because Allen’s guilty plea
was valid, his appellate waiver is enforceable. No exception to the waiver applies
because Allen’s sentence and terms of supervised release do not exceed the applicable
statutory maximums, and nothing in the record suggests that the judge considered any
constitutionally impermissible factors. See United States v. Edwards, 145 F.4th 774, 780
(7th Cir. 2025).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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