Robert Bettis v. Paul Novak

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 5, 2026*
Decided May 5, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-3285
ROBERT BETTIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAUL NOVAK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 25 cv 03618
Sunil R. Harjani,
Judge.
O R D E R
Robert Bettis alleges that he was abused as a ward of the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services and that his court-appointed guardians ad litem did not
seek to remove him from abusive residences. He sued those guardians, contending that
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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they conspired to violate his rights under the constitution. The district court dismissed
his case at screening because the defendants were immune from liability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Regardless of immunity, we conclude that he failed to state a claim,
id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and we therefore affirm the judgment.
We accept as true the facts alleged in Bettis’s complaint. Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th
331, 333 (7th Cir. 2022). Bettis was a ward of the Department of Children and Family
Services from 2005 through 2019. In that time, he alleges he was abused by his
caretakers and other third parties and otherwise mistreated by the Department. He was
first placed in a foster home where the foster parent’s son sexually abused him. In a
second foster home, his foster parent beat him. In 2011 and again in 2013, he was sent to
a mental hospital and medicated without his consent. From 2013 through 2014, he was
placed in a residential program, where other residents sexually abused him. From 2017
through 2018, he was placed in another residential program, where he was deprived of
food and medicine. And in 2018, the Department began the process to emancipate Bettis
from the wardship but failed to provide services that he believes were required by
Illinois law.
Defendants Paul Novak, Kathy Gordon, and Barbara Hayward were lawyers
working for the Lake County Public Defender’s Office. Each was appointed to serve,
according to Bettis, as both his attorney and as a guardian ad litem. (His filings do not
explain when any of them were appointed or when they ceased working on his matter.)
According to Bettis, in the course of their work, the defendants participated in various
hearings and administrative meetings where they were told, by people not identified in
the complaint, of his allegations of abuse. But Bettis says they refused to take certain
ameliorative actions, such as demanding that he be removed from those abusive
environments, despite a duty to represent his best interests.
Bettis filed this suit in 2025. In his original complaint, he sued these defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that their failure to act violated his due-process and
equal-protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court screened
his suit and dismissed with leave to amend because, as guardians, the defendants were
shielded by absolute judicial immunity. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
Bettis filed an amended complaint with substantively the same factual
background, now contending that the defendants’ actions were part of a conspiracy to
deprive him of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The district
court again dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. The court concluded that he
did not allege facts that could demonstrate that the defendants entered an agreement to

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No. 25-3285 Page 3
violate his rights, nor did he include facts suggesting that they had an impermissible
motive to discriminate. Further, the court directed Bettis to explain in his next
complaint whether the defendants were guardians or if they were instead his attorneys,
in which case they might not be immune.
In his second amended complaint, Bettis added allegations that the defendants
participated in meetings and other court proceedings, suggesting that this amounted to
a conspiracy against him. He also alleged that the defendants sought relief for
non-Black wards, evincing their racial animus against Black children like him. He
claimed that the defendants violated his rights under the constitution, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; conspired to violate those rights, see id. § 1985(3); and neglected to prevent a
conspiracy to violate his rights, see id. § 1986. He also added state-law claims for
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The district court dismissed this complaint solely based on immunity. Although
the complaint referred to the defendants as “court-appointed attorneys,” the court
concluded that the relief Bettis wanted could only have been obtained through their
duties as guardians. Because the defendants were immune as guardians, the court
determined that it would be futile to amend the complaint to plead the federal-law
claims, and the court thus dismissed those claims with prejudice. The court dismissed
the state-law claims without prejudice so he could pursue them in state court.
On appeal, Bettis maintains that the defendants were not immune for concealing
these abuses and abandoning their duties to him. He primarily argues that the
defendants’ malicious intent stripped them of immunity. But accusations of malice or
“retaliatory purpose,” no matter how forcefully made, cannot defeat absolute judicial
immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Myrick v. Greenwood, 856 F.3d 487,
488 (7th Cir. 2017).
Bettis fares better with his argument that the defendants can be sued in their
capacity as public defenders. As the district court recognized, although guardians are
immune from damages when their role is to serve the court, Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d
967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009), we have also contemplated that if a court-appointed lawyer acts
as both a child’s attorney and as an agent of the court, he might not be immune for
actions performed in his capacity as the child’s attorney, Golden v. Helen Sigman &
Assocs., Ltd., 611 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2010). Indeed, under Illinois law, a lawyer can
serve both roles for a ward of the state. See 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1). Many of Bettis’s
allegations—e.g., the defendants’ failure to “file emergency motions,” to “petition for
sanctions,” or to “otherwise advocat[e] to prevent further harm”—appear to straddle

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this fine line between a lawyer’s duties as guardian and as attorney. We will therefore
assume, without deciding, that if the defendants had taken the actions that Bettis wishes
they had, they would have been acting as his attorneys and would not be immune.
Bettis’s complaint nonetheless fails to state a claim. Insofar as they were his
attorneys, the defendants were not themselves acting under color of state law. See Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). They can be liable under §§ 1983 or 1985,
then, only if they conspired with a person acting under color of state law—here officials
in the Department. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (§ 1983); Milchtein v.
Milwaukee County, 42 F.4th 814, 827 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2022) (§ 1985). To plead the existence
of a conspiracy, Bettis needed to allege that the defendants and the Department officials
“reached an understanding … to deny” him his constitutional rights. Scott v. Univ. of
Chi. Med. Ctr., 107 F.4th 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v.
Warren County, 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016)). Those allegations must be based on
facts “suggest[ing] that an agreement was made,” not a mere conclusion that people
entered an agreement. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); see also Cooney,
583 F.3d at 971.
Bettis has not provided any facts suggesting that the defendants agreed with
Department officials to deprive him of his constitutional rights. He alleged that the
defendants sometimes met with unnamed third parties during court hearings and
administrative meetings, but he never alleged that the defendants entered an overt
agreement with state officials to violate his constitutional rights. He instead argues that
the defendants’ purported “pattern of suppression, concealment, and abandonment” of
their duties creates a plausible inference that they agreed with state officials to violate
Bettis’s rights. This allegation of mere inaction, or even indifference, in the face of
potential constitutional violations does nothing to suggest an agreement to
affirmatively violate his rights. At best, Bettis suggests that the defendants ratified
misconduct by the Department and his abusive caretakers by ignoring his allegations.
But ratification is far from conspiracy. See Scott, 107 F.4th at 758 (“Merely working in
parallel toward ‘a common goal’ is not the same as conspiring together.” (citation
omitted)).
We add that Bettis’s complaints also do not allow a reasonable inference of a
conspiracy among Department officials or his caretakers. He made no allegations that
these third parties entered some agreement, and their conduct does not lead to a
plausible inference of an agreement. And because he did not adequately allege the

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existence of any conspiracy among these other parties, his claim under § 1986 against
the defendants here fails as well. See Milbeck v. George, 171 F.4th 930, 940 (7th Cir. 2026).
Bettis otherwise argues that he could obtain prospective declaratory or injunctive
relief against the defendants even in their role as guardians ad litem and regardless of
immunity. But he lacks standing to pursue such relief. A federal court may adjudicate a
claim only if the plaintiff can show, among other things, that the injury is “likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.” California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 669 (2021) (quoting
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006)). Bettis ceased to be a ward of the
state in 2019, so there is no plausible basis to infer that the defendants are still his
guardians or capable of influencing any proceedings relating to him in the future. The
injunction he requested—a mandate for “reform and oversight of GAL practices”—
would therefore be of no use to Bettis. And a request for a declaratory judgment
“cannot alone supply jurisdiction otherwise absent.” Id. at 672–73.
Finally, Bettis asks us to remand the case so he may have a third opportunity to
amend his complaint. But we do not see how further amendment could cure these
deficiencies, and he does not explain in his brief how he could plead a plausible
conspiracy. See Circle Block Partners, LLC v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 1014, 1023
(7th Cir. 2022).
AFFIRMED

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