BRIAN PATTERSON and BRI’AHN PATTERSON v. Tony Evers

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 5, 2026*
Decided May 7, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3263
BRIAN PATTERSON and
BRI’AHN PATTERSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
TONY EVERS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-cv-599-wmc
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Brian Patterson, a Wisconsin prisoner convicted of first-degree reckless homicide,
and his daughter Bri’Ahn appeal the dismissal of their civil complaint seeking
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-3263 Page 2
injunctive relief in connection with his conviction. The district court dismissed the case
as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). We affirm.
Brian Patterson was charged in 2010 with first-degree intentional homicide for
the shooting death of his cousin. At trial, Brian testified that he acted in self-defense.
Over his counsel’s objection, the jury was instructed on the offense of first-degree
reckless homicide in addition to first- and second-degree intentional homicide. Brian
was found guilty of first-degree reckless homicide. The state courts rejected his direct
appeal and state postconviction challenges, and the federal district court denied his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Brian and his daughter Bri’Ahn then brought this wide-ranging (69 pages)
civil-rights suit against Wisconsin’s governor, Tony Evers; 15 Wisconsin state judges;
and other local and state officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As relevant here, the Pattersons
sought to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Wisconsin statutes criminalizing
first-degree reckless homicide (W IS . S TAT. § 940.02) and second-degree intentional
homicide (W IS . S TAT. § 940.05), both of which they believed to be unconstitutionally
vague. The Pattersons also sought to enjoin further use of Wisconsin’s self-defense jury
instructions, which they said were confusing and incomplete, so much so that jurors
were misled to convict Brian of first-degree reckless homicide despite acquitting him of
intentional homicide.
The district court screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and
dismissed it under the holding of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck holds that
any civil action, seeking damages or injunctive relief, is barred if it necessarily implies
the invalidity of a criminal conviction that has not been set aside by other means or
proceedings. Id. at 486–87. As the court explained, the Pattersons had not shown that
Brian’s conviction had been invalidated. The court added that Bri’Ahn, as Brian’s
daughter, did not appear to have standing to sue.
The Pattersons sought reconsideration, maintaining that Bri’Ahn had standing
despite Heck because—as a gun owner who resided in Wisconsin—her Second
Amendment rights were chilled by the ambiguity surrounding the self-defense laws.
The district court denied the motion. The court explained that the Pattersons did not
identify any statute that implied a threat to prosecute or that expressly restricted the
right to carry a firearm, nor had they shown that Bri’Ahn had suffered an injury
sufficiently concrete to confer standing.
On appeal, the Pattersons principally argue that Bri’Ahn has standing to
challenge the Wisconsin statutes criminalizing first-degree reckless homicide and
second-degree intentional homicide because she fears prosecution owing to “the

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No. 24-3263 Page 3
uncertainty in Wisconsin law” regarding self-defense. Bri’Ahn contends that, because
she lives in a dangerous neighborhood, she likely will need to defend herself with a
firearm but worries that doing so may lead her to engage in self-defense that could
result in her prosecution for reckless homicide like her father.
Bri’Ahn’s fear of prosecution is hypothetical and therefore insufficient for
purposes of standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). A plaintiff
bringing a pre-enforcement challenge to a statute must demonstrate a fear of future
prosecution that is actual and reasonable, not “imaginary or speculative.” Brown v.
Kemp, 86 F.4th 745, 761 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). Bri’Ahn does not allege that she has been threatened
with prosecution or that a prosecution is likely. Her theory of standing—which
contemplates that she one day will exercise her right to self-defense and be charged and
convicted based on flawed jury instructions like those used to convict her father—
depends on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” that does not satisfy the injury
requirement to confer standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013).†
To the extent the Pattersons challenge the district court’s conclusion that Brian’s
claims were Heck-barred, they suggest that an exception to the Heck bar should exist
because his request for a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of habeas relief
has been pending in this court. But “Heck controls the outcome where a section 1983
claim implies the invalidity of the conviction or the sentence, regardless of the
availability of habeas relief.” Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409, 430 (7th Cir. 2020)
(en banc). As we noted in Savory, the Supreme Court may reconsider the need for the
favorable-termination rule in cases where habeas relief is not available, but it has yet to
do so. Id. at 431.
We have considered the Pattersons’ remaining arguments, and none has merit.
Because the district court dismissed the complaint under Heck, we modify the
judgment with regard to Bri’Ahn to reflect that the dismissal is for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction based on her lack of standing.
AFFIRMED as MODIFIED
† Because Bri’Ahn lacks standing to bring suit, we say nothing more about her
assertion that the Heck bar did not apply to her claims.

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