Kelly D. McGoffney v. JAMES R. SWEENEY II and TANYA WALTON PRATT

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 20, 2026*
Decided May 20, 2026
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1601
KELLY D. MCGOFFNEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMES R. SWEENEY II and TANYA
WALTON PRATT,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:24-cv-00572-JPH-MJD
James Patrick Hanlon,
Judge.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1601 Page 2
O R D E R
Kelly McGoffney appeals the dismissal of her lawsuit against two federal judges.
We affirm.
McGoffney sought damages plus injunctive and declaratory relief against Judge
James Sweeney and then-Chief Judge Tanya Walton Pratt of the Southern District of
Indiana. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). She alleged that Judge Sweeney had denied her due process by arbitrarily
dismissing complaints in earlier cases. Although McGoffney also named Judge Pratt,
she did not say what that judge had done wrong.
Another district judge, James Hanlon, screened this complaint and labeled it
frivolous because Judge Sweeney is protected by absolute judicial immunity and
McGoffney alleged nothing about Judge Pratt. The court thus ordered McGoffney to
explain why judgment dismissing with prejudice should not issue. McGoffney
responded but failed to explain how she would overcome judicial immunity, so the
court entered judgment.
On appeal, McGoffney argues that the district court was wrong to screen her case
because, she says, the screening statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), covers only plaintiffs
who wish to proceed in forma pauperis, whereas she intended to pay the filing fee. But
our precedents foreclose this argument. Though other circuits disagree, see Bradley v.
Sabree, 842 F.3d 1291, 1292 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016) (flagging split), we have read the provision
to reach “all litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status,” Rowe
v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999). And district courts “have ample authority to
dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save
everyone time and legal expense.” Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003).
Here, the district court correctly determined that McGoffney’s claims are
frivolous. Judge Sweeney has absolute immunity against damages for judicial acts.
See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978). And the complaint contains no
allegations against Judge Pratt (who would enjoy the same immunity). McGoffney does
not argue that the immunity analysis differs for injunctive or declaratory relief, and in
any event she points to no authority suggesting she can collaterally attack Judge
Sweeney’s dismissals in this manner. See Parmalat Cap. Fin. Ltd. v. Grant Thornton Int’l,
756 F.3d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Federal district judges have appellate authority over
decisions by magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges, and certain administrative law
judges … but not over decisions by other district judges.”).

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No. 25-1601 Page 3
McGoffney also faults the district court for marking the dismissal “with
prejudice” and denying leave to amend. But McGoffney’s show-cause response did not
explain how she could overcome judicial immunity, nor does her appellate brief.
Finally, we warn McGoffney that further frivolous filings may result in sanctions
including a fine and filing bar. See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186–87
(7th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED

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