Jennipher Renee Forte v. Aric Rutkowski

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 19, 2026*
Decided May 27, 2026
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2826
JENNIPHER RENEE FORTE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ARIC RUTKOWSKI, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:24-CV-332-CCB-AZ
Cristal C. Brisco,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jennipher Renee Forte sued officials involved in state court proceedings related
to visitation rights for her child. The district court dismissed her complaint at screening,
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2826 Page 2
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), concluding that the officers of the court were immune and
that Forte failed to state a claim against the other defendants. We affirm the judgment.
Forte brought this wide-ranging suit against various officials who were involved
in child-visitation proceedings in St. Joseph County Probate Court. She alleges that she
complained to each of the defendants about the father abusing her child and her child’s
special needs, which she believes arose in part from brain injuries from the abuse. The
defendants include two magistrate judges, a court referee, a guardian ad litem
appointed for the child, and three social workers, as well as St. Joseph County itself.
Forte asserts that instead of considering the evidence of abuse, Magistrate Judge Aric
Rutkowski held her in contempt for interfering with the father’s visitation and referee
Len Zappia dismissed Forte’s request for a protective order against the child’s father.
The district court screened and dismissed Forte’s complaint. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). The court ruled, first, that Forte’s attempt to hold St. Joseph County
accountable under a theory of respondeat superior failed because municipalities can be
held liable only for their own wrongdoing. Next, the court determined that the judges
and court officials involved in the custody dispute proceedings were all immune for
their judicial acts. Lastly, the court determined that Forte failed to provide any
explanation for how the social workers violated her constitutional or federal rights.
On appeal, Forte argues that the district court erred in rejecting her theory of
respondeat superior liability against St. Joseph County. But as the district court
recognized, a municipality cannot be held liable for the constitutional torts of its
employees and agents. First Midwest Bank v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir.
2021). In her reply brief, Forte attempts to raise a claim under Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), asserting St. Joseph County had a policy or custom of
mishandling disability cases and maintained improper child protection practices. But
she cannot raise new theories in a reply brief, see Su v. Johnson, 68 F.4th 345, 353 (7th Cir.
2023), and regardless, Forte identifies no relevant county policy nor facts suggesting
that the challenged conduct is a part of a widespread practice or custom. First Midwest,
988 F.3d at 986. Neither the county nor its officials have a federal constitutional duty to
protect a child against abuse, absent allegations of a special relationship or a state-
created danger that are not present here. Id. at 988 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)).
Forte next challenges the district court’s determination that the magistrate
judges, referee, and guardian ad litem are immune from suit. Forte asserts that

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No. 25-2826 Page 3
immunity does not protect against clear violations of laws designed to protect children.
She otherwise contends that Judge Rutkowski was in a relationship with a prosecutor
assigned to her case, violating Indiana’s judicial code of conduct and motivating his
alleged wrongdoing. But absolute judicial immunity bars all claims against a judge
unless the plaintiff can show that the judge acted in a non-judicial capacity or in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction—allegations of illegality, malice, or bad faith cannot
overcome immunity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Myrick v. Greenwood,
856 F.3d 487, 488 (7th Cir. 2017). Forte relies on Gibson v. Goldston, 85 F.4th 218 (4th Cir.
2023), but that case involved a judge who acted outside of her judicial capacity when
she searched a home. Id. at 223–24. Here, regardless of any alleged impropriety by
Judge Rutkowski, the challenged actions—declining to consider evidence, denying
Forte’s petitions, and finding her in contempt—were all judicial acts and therefore the
judges, referee, and guardian were all entitled to absolute immunity. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978) (judges); Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970
(7th Cir. 2009) (extending immunity to guardians ad litem, special masters, and other
“arms of the court”). Although the social workers do not benefit from judicial
immunity, Forte still does not identify any specific claims against them.
Finally, Forte argues that her child’s ADHD qualifies him for protection under
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Forte, however, does not cite, nor can we find, any
authority that would allow her to litigate this claim pro se on behalf of her child. See
Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED

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