Adam Raney v. Tonia Moon

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 26, 2026*
Decided May 28, 2026
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2695
ADAM RANEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TONIA MOON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-CV-1159
Nancy Joseph,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Adam Raney, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued three prison officials for their alleged
violations of his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A magistrate judge screened
the complaint and dismissed it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We affirm.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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We construe Raney’s pro se complaint liberally and assume the truth of his
allegations, as supplemented by prison records he attached. Otis v. Demarasse, 886 F.3d
639, 644–45 (7th Cir. 2018). In March 2023, Raney, while incarcerated at Waupun
Correctional Facility, began experiencing chest pain and dizziness. He complained to a
correctional officer who agreed to contact medical staff. After additional unsuccessful
attempts to seek medical assistance, Raney vomited, lost consciousness, and hit his
head. A few hours later, Raney was taken to see a nurse who examined him and
concluded that he had suffered an anxiety attack. Raney then submitted multiple
grievances, complaining that he had received inadequate medical attention during and
after the incident. Because Raney had submitted the grievances more than 14 days after
the incident, each was rejected as untimely.
Raney then sued the prison’s warden, Randall Hepp, and two grievance
examiners, Tonia Moon and Jason Benzel. In his complaint, Raney alleged that the
officials violated his constitutional rights by failing to investigate the claims he raised in
his grievances and by violating the Wisconsin Department of Corrections’ grievance
policies. After Raney consented to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), the judge screened the complaint and concluded that it failed to state a claim
because (1) § 1983 does not cover prison policy violations, and (2) prisoners have no
constitutional right to grievance investigations. The judge gave Raney three weeks to
file an amended complaint but dismissed the case after Raney failed to do so.
Raney moved to reopen the case and attached an amended complaint, renewing
his previous allegations and asserting that the defendants had prevented him from
exhausting his administrative remedies by falsifying documents and misrepresenting
the prison’s policies to him. But the magistrate judge denied the motion. The judge
noted that Raney, in a parallel § 1983 action against a nurse, had already leveled the
same exhaustion-related arguments against Moon and Benzel. See Raney v. Goehl, et
al., No. 2:24-cv-00487-NJ (E.D. Wis. May 20, 2024). The district judge in that case
dismissed the claims against Moon and Benzel, finding Raney’s allegations failed to
state a claim on the merits. The judge also declined to address Raney’s argument
regarding exhaustion because no defendant had yet raised a failure-to-exhaust defense.
When the remaining defendants in that case later filed a motion for summary judgment
on exhaustion grounds, the magistrate judge concluded that the prison had rendered
the grievance process unavailable to Raney, excusing him from any exhaustion
requirement. See Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (exhaustion
requirement in Prison Litigation Reform Act inapplicable where officials render

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No. 25-2695 Page 3
administrative remedies unavailable by, for example, failing to respond to properly
filed grievance). Because the exhaustion-related issues had been resolved in the parallel
suit, and because Raney had otherwise failed to state a claim, the magistrate judge
denied the motion to reopen the case.
Raney appeals, but before addressing the merits, we consider whether this
appeal is timely. Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure generally
requires a party to file a notice of appeal in a civil case within 30 days of the entry of the
judgment or order appealed. After the magistrate judge denied Raney’s motion to
reopen and a subsequent motion for reconsideration, Raney moved for an extension of
time to file a notice of appeal. See F ED. R. A PP. P. 4(a)(5). The judge granted the motion,
extending the time to August 25, 2023. Raney then filed a notice of appeal on
September 25, one month past the extended deadline. Although we are not empowered
to grant a further extension of time to file a notice of appeal, see F ED. R. A PP . P. 26(b), we
may construe Raney’s request for an extension of time as a notice of appeal because that
motion was filed within the original 30–day window for a notice of appeal and signaled
his intent to appeal. Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2017); see F ED. R. A PP . P.
3(c)(7) (“An appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of
appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the
notice.”). Consistent with this principle, we conclude that Raney’s timely motion for an
extension of time to file a notice of appeal adequately demonstrated his intent to appeal.
Satisfied that our appellate jurisdiction is secure, we turn to the merits. On
appeal, Raney renews his arguments that prison officials violated his constitutional
rights by mishandling his grievances and by failing to investigate his complaints about
his medical care. But as the magistrate judge correctly explained, prisoners generally
have no constitutional right to an investigation of their grievances. See Owens v. Hinsley,
635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Prison grievance procedures are not mandated by the
First Amendment and do not by their very existence create interests protected by the
Due Process Clause.”). Although a prisoner might be able to state a claim under the
Eighth Amendment against a grievance officer who “turns a blind eye” to ongoing
unconstitutional conduct, Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015), nothing in
Raney’s complaint reflects that the defendants here knew of and disregarded a
continuing risk of harm. Indeed, Raney’s grievances were focused on the response to his
past medical episode and the inadequate care he received in its aftermath. And even
though the magistrate judge concluded in the parallel suit that the grievance process
was unavailable to Raney for purposes of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the

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mishandling of a grievance does not give rise to an independent constitutional claim.
See Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2016).
AFFIRMED

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