United States of America v. Maurice Whitesides

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2999
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
M AURICE WHITESIDES ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:24-cr-00011-JRS-CMM-1 — James R. Sweeney II, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2025 — DECIDED J UNE 3, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, K IRSCH , and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
K IRSCH , Circuit Judge. Maurice Whitesides pleaded guilty
to drug and firearm offenses. At sentencing, the district court
applied a two-level drug-premises enhancement pursuant to
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(12). White-
sides argues on appeal that the enhancement does not apply
because his residence was not continuously used for distrib-
uting methamphetamine and that the district court made

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2 No. 24-2999
erroneous factual findings. The enhancement was properly
applied, and any factual errors were harmless, so we affirm.
I
After receiving a tip that Maurice Whitesides was distrib-
uting drugs in Terre Haute, Indiana, police officers initiated a
traffic stop on the car he was driving. The officers searched
the car and seized $14,226 from the center console. After re-
ceiving warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), Whitesides admitted that he was traveling to Indian-
apolis to purchase a large quantity of methamphetamine.
Later that day, officers searched a residence rented by
Whitesides on Spruce Street in Terre Haute. In a kitchen cab-
inet, the officers found approximately 423 grams of pure
methamphetamine, two digital scales, and an empty box of
sandwich baggies. A loaded handgun and ammunition were
found in a bedroom. Officers conducted a separate search of
the home of Whitesides’s girlfriend, located on South Seventh
Street in Terre Haute, and found roughly 316 grams of pure
methamphetamine, two additional scales, and two other fire-
arms. Officers also obtained messages from Whitesides’s cell-
phone which showed that he provided both the Spruce Street
and South Seventh Street addresses to suspected drug cus-
tomers. While the specific number of drug transactions that
occurred at the Spruce Street home is unclear, officers con-
firmed one sale.
A grand jury indicted Whitesides with one count of pos-
session with intent to distribute a mixture of methampheta-
mine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of
unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in

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No. 24-2999 3
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 992(g)(1). Whitesides pleaded guilty
to both counts.
In the Presentence Investigation Report, the probation of-
ficer recommended a two-level enhancement for maintaining
a premises for distributing a controlled substance. U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(12). At the sentencing hearing, the district court
heard testimony from an officer who led the investigation into
Whitesides’s activities. The officer testified regarding the cir-
cumstances surrounding Whitesides’s arrest, the subsequent
investigation of the Spruce Street and South Seventh Street
homes, and the messages obtained from Whitesides’s cell-
phone. The officer also testified that the investigation re-
vealed no evidence that Whitesides was gainfully employed.
Whitesides objected to the application of the drug-prem-
ises enhancement, arguing that the government failed to
demonstrate that he continuously used the Spruce Street
home for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine. The
district court overruled Whitesides’s objection, finding that
the two-level increase was appropriate. The court observed
that, in addition to the loaded firearm and methamphetamine
found at the Spruce Street home, “[t]wo digital scales with
crystal residue on them were found at the residence under
methamphetamine that was found there. And empty boxes of
plastic baggies used for drug distribution were next to the
scales.” The court also noted that Whitesides “gave his resi-
dence address to drug customers.” But the investigating of-
ficer did not testify that there was crystal residue on the scales
found at the house, nor that there were multiple empty boxes
of plastic baggies next to the scales (there was one). And the
officer testified that Whitesides was directing suspected (but
not confirmed) drug customers to the house.

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4 No. 24-2999
After applying the drug-premises enhancement and a sep-
arate enhancement for possessing a firearm under U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), the district court concluded that Whitesides’s
total offense level was 33 and that his Criminal History Cate-
gory was II, resulting in a Guidelines range of 151 to 188
months in prison. The district court sentenced Whitesides to
188 months and noted: “even if I had sustained Mr. White-
sides’ objections … this would be the appropriate sentence
under the sentencing factors based on the defendant’s history
and characteristics and circumstances of the offense.”
II
Whitesides makes two arguments on appeal. First, he con-
tends that the record does not support the district court’s ap-
plication of the drug-premises enhancement. Second, he ar-
gues that the district court made three factual errors that af-
fected his sentence. We review the district court’s application
of the U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) premises enhancement de novo
and review the district court’s underlying factual findings for
clear error. United States v. Craft, 99 F.4th 407, 411 (7th Cir.
2024).
A
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level en-
hancement where “the defendant maintained a premises for
the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled
substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). The government does not
argue that Whitesides manufactured methamphetamine, so
the only question is whether distributing methamphetamine
was a “primary or principal use[]” of the Spruce Street home.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17. In making this determination, the
Sentencing Guidelines provide that courts should consider

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No. 24-2999 5
“how frequently the premises was used by the defendant
for … distributing a controlled substance and how frequently
the premises was used by the defendant for lawful purposes.”
Id. But a sentencing court is not required to engage in a “sim-
ple balancing test” comparing lawful and unlawful uses but
rather is to consider “both the frequency and significance of
the illicit activities, including factors such as quantities dealt,
customer interactions, keeping ‘tools of the trade’ and busi-
ness records, and accepting payment.” Craft, 99 F.4th at 411
(citation modified).
The record supports the district court’s conclusion that
drug distribution was a primary use for the Spruce Street
home. Police found 422.6 grams of pure methamphetamine
and tools of the trade—a loaded firearm, ammunition, and
two digital scales—at the Spruce Street home. Officers also
discovered text messages where Whitesides provided the
Spruce Street address to suspected drug customers. In addi-
tion, there was no evidence that Whitesides was gainfully em-
ployed. While we have noted that making a livelihood from
selling drugs alone is “not sufficient, by itself, to support the
application of the premises enhancement,” such a finding can
“move the needle” towards applying the enhancement “by
placing a defendant’s home-centered drug trafficking activity
in context.” Id. at 412–13. Here, considering the other evidence
presented, including the methamphetamine and drug para-
phernalia found at the Spruce Street home, Whitesides’s un-
employment supports the district court’s conclusion that he
must have sold drugs out of that location. See United States v.
Winfield, 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2017) (fact that the defend-
ant was “primarily living off proceeds from drug sales” sup-
ported the conclusion that the defendant “must have stored

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6 No. 24-2999
or sold additional quantities of drugs at his apartment than
the relatively modest amounts recovered by police”).
Whitesides contends that one confirmed drug transaction
is insufficient to warrant the application of the enhancement.
But nothing in the text of § 2D1.1(b)(12) requires a minimum
number of transactions to trigger the drug-premises enhance-
ment. Regardless, the district court considered officer testi-
mony indicating that Whitesides provided the address of the
Spruce Street home to suspected drug customers (suggesting
that it was more than one customer). And there was evidence
that Whitesides was on his way to purchase more drugs at the
time of his arrest.
Whitesides’s reliance on two recent cases from this circuit
is also unavailing. In United States v. Craft, we vacated a dis-
trict court’s application of the drug-premises enhancement
where the defendant primarily distributed drugs from a gas
station rather than his house and where there was no evidence
that the defendant received or stored drugs at his home. 99
F.4th at 411–12. Here, by contrast, Whitesides used his home
to store tools of the trade, including a gun and digital scales.
And in United States v. Montgomery, 114 F.4th 847 (7th Cir.
2024), we vacated a district court’s application of the enhance-
ment where it was unclear whether the defendant had actu-
ally “maintained” a storage unit for the purpose of
§ 2D1.1(b)(12), and where the defendant had only accessed
the storage unit three times to carry out drug transactions. Id.
at 850–51. In this case, it’s undisputed that Whitesides main-
tained the Spruce Street home, there was credible evidence
that he was unemployed, and he provided the address to sus-
pected customers, supporting the conclusion that Whitesides
was distributing drugs from the home.

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No. 24-2999 7
Whitesides also argues that the district court failed to ad-
equately consider his lawful uses of the Spruce Street home,
such as looking after his children. However, we have made
clear that the analysis should not be reduced to a “simple bal-
ancing test” that compares the frequency of lawful and un-
lawful uses of a home. United States v. Zamudio, 18 F.4th 557,
562 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). Such an analysis would
effectively “immunize every family home that is also used for
drug distribution from being deemed an illegally maintained
‘premises’” since “the amount of lawful activity in a home is
all but certain to exceed the amount of illegal activity.” United
States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017). Therefore,
the district court did not err when it applied the two-level
drug-premises enhancement.
B
Whitesides argues that even if the district court did not err
in applying the enhancement, it made mistakes in determin-
ing the underlying facts that require remand. Defendants
have a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate
information, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972),
and factual errors can require remand if the inaccurate infor-
mation mattered in the sentencing determination. United
States v. Williams, 106 F.4th 639, 656 (7th Cir. 2024). “For false
information to form part of the basis for a sentence, the de-
fendant must show first, that information before the sentenc-
ing court was inaccurate, and second, that the sentencing
court relied on the misinformation in passing sentence.”
United States v. Propst, 959 F.3d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 2020) (cita-
tion modified). The context of the misstatement “plays a cru-
cial role in evaluating the degree of influence that an unsup-
ported fact has had on a district court’s sentencing decision.”

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8 No. 24-2999
United States v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 342 (7th Cir.
2010).
We acknowledge that the district court misspoke while
discussing some of the circumstances supporting the applica-
tion of the enhancement: the digital scales found at the Spruce
Street home did not have drug residue on them, there was
only one box of empty baggies found at the home, and White-
sides did not give his address to known (but only suspected)
drug customers. But there are no indications that those inac-
curacies “mattered in the sentencing decision.” United States
v. Pennington, 908 F.3d 234, 240 (7th Cir. 2018). The district
court’s “focus, and its point of reliance” was on the broader
points that the tools of the trade were found at Whitesides’s
home, that Whitesides conducted at least one sale at the
home, that he had communicated the location to others, and
that he was unemployed. Williams, 106 F.4th at 657 (district
court’s misstatement about a defendant’s criminal history
while explaining sentence did not require remand where dis-
trict court “was less concerned with getting the number [of
convictions] precisely right than it was with highlighting the
sheer volume of [the defendant’s] criminal conduct and the
troubling trend it represented”). The record supports the dis-
trict court’s conclusion that the drug-premises enhancement
applies. Even if we remand to the district court, such a deci-
sion would be “pointless” since we are certain that the district
court would impose the same sentence. United States v. Abbas,
560 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2009).
A FFIRMED

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